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1THE DETERMINANTS OF THE DISCRETIONARY PURCHASE OF 
PROPERTY INSURANCE BY PUBLICLY LISTED COMPANIES 
IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.1.1 Background
This study examines the determinants of the discretionary purchase of property 
insurance by publicly listed companies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)1’2’3. The 
necessity to research this subject is underpinned by prior studies conducted in developed 
insurance markets such as the United States (US) (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1982, 1986; 
Davidson, Cross and Thornton, 1992; Hoyt and Khang 2000), Canada (e.g., Core, 1997), 
the United Kingdom (UK) (e.g., Ashby and Diacon, 1998; Main, 1983, 2000), and Japan 
(e.g., Yamori, 1999). These studies argue that risk aversion provides an economic 
rationale for both individuals and small and closely-held companies to purchase 
insurance where direct diversification of firm-specific (unsystematic) risks may not be
1 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) in this study refers to mainland China, but excluding Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan. These Chinese territories are outside die scope o f this study because they differ 
substantially from the PRC in terms o f their legislative structures, western economic-based history, long 
established financial markets and company regulation (e.g., see Naser and Wallace, 1995; Cheung and 
Chow, 1999; Gul, 1999). The terms “China” and “PRC” are also used interchangeably in this study. 
Additionally, the Chinese Pinyin system of translation is used in this thesis, where necessary, to convert 
Chinese characters into the Roman alphabet
2 Rejda (1998, p.19) defines insurance as ” . . .  the pooling of fortuitous losses by transfer of such risks to 
insurers, who agree to indemnify insured for such losses, to provide other pecuniary benefits on their 
occurrence, or to render services connected with risk". Article 2 of the Chinese Insurance Law (1995) also 
provides an equivalent definition of insurance. Therefore, the concept o f insurance provides a similar, but 
nonetheless, distinct function from other risk transfer/hedging mechanisms such as tradable derivative 
instruments. Additionally, the term “property” used in this study relates to physical assets such as buildings 
and inventories rather than to intangible assets such as goodwill and brands.
3 Companies in this thesis refer to those corporate bodies registered under China’s Companies Law (1993). 
Also, the terms “company”, “corporation”, “firm”, “enterprise”, “entity” and “organization” are used 
interchangeably in this study. Additionally, publicly listed companies are defined as those joint-stock 
companies which satisfy the listing criteria determined in the Companies Law (1993) and the Provisional 
Ordinance on the Issue and Trade o f Shares (1993) to list shares at the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE), 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), or at stock exchanges outside mainland China.
2available -  for example, due to insufficient financial resources, limited risk management 
expertise and so on. However, risk aversion by owners cannot by itself satisfactorily 
explain the large amount of insurance purchased by large and widely-held companies 
(Main 1982a, 1982b) 4 . For instance, neo-classical financial economics-based 
theories/models, such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 
1965; Mossin, 1966), predict that in efficient markets it is more cost-effective for 
investors to diversify unsystematic risks by holding balanced portfolios of investments 
than it is for them to purchase (potentially costly) commercial insurance. Although some 
kinds of insurable systematic risks (e.g., regional property damage arising from a severe 
earthquake or flood) are difficult to be diversified effectively by holding a balanced 
portfolios of investments, Main (1983, p.198) contends that in the presence of the 
loadings in insurance transaction (e.g., insurer’s expenses and profit), “. . .  the premiums 
charged for any available insurance against systematic risks will be high enough to deter 
corporate purchase.” Thus, prima facie, the purchase of insurance by large and widely- 
held companies that seek to transfer unsystematic and systematic risks might not add 
value for shareholders (e.g., see Main, 1982a, 1982b, 1983).
Therefore, risk aversion by investors may not by itself be the main reason for the 
purchase of insurance by large and widely-held companies. Indeed, the modem firm can 
be viewed as a "nexus of contracts" among various constituents (e.g., owners, managers, 
creditors, employees) who may have incompatible and conflicting interests (e.g., see 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, it is not obvious which of the contracting parties 
in the firm would benefit from the corporate purchase of insurance. Moreover, many 
large corporations - often grown out of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) - may not only 
diversify their business across industries and/or geographically but also be able to self- 
retain a large portion of business risk. For instance, Doherty and Smith (1993) report that 
the large oil and gas conglomerate British Petroleum (BP) only insures externally against 
most relatively small exposures while large risks are self-insured.
4 The criterion for “widely-held company” suggested by Mayers and Smith (1990) refers to a company with 
more than 100 shareholders. This criterion of the span of corporate ownership-control is commonly used in 
prior insurance-based research.
3Therefore, an important question that emerges from the extant literature is this: 
what are the motives behind the corporate purchase of insurance? In attempt to address 
this question, a number of researchers (e.g., Main, 1982a, 1983; Mayers and Smith, 1982, 
1987; Skogh, 1989, Davidson et al., 1992) have used financial economics-based theories, 
such as agency theory, to identify key motivating factors (other than the risk aversion of 
owners) to explain the decision of managers in large and widely-held companies to 
purchase insurance. For example, corporate insurance purchases may be explained by 
bondholders’ “me-first” rules -  that is, where corporations buy insurance as the result of 
creditors’ demand for protection against financial losses in the event of bankruptcy. In 
turn, insurance could thus allow corporate lenders (e.g., banks) to lower their interest 
charges thereby increasing the value of the borrowing firm (e.g., see Davidson et al., 
1992). Additionally, Main (1982b, 2000) argues that corporate insurance can help to 
assure customers and investors about an entity's ability to remain a going concern and 
avoid costly bankruptcy. Nonetheless, Yamori (1999, p.24) reports that to date a major 
limitation is that “ . . . hypotheses have not been substantially tested by actual data . . . 
[thus] knowledge regarding whether previous theoretical predictions are valid is very 
limited.” Clearly, therefore, more empirical tests of theoretically grounded hypotheses 
need to be carried out, particularly in large but under-researched emerging markets like 
China.
1.1.2 The Chinese Insurance Industry
The last twenty years or so have witnessed the exponential growth in the 
corporate purchase of insurance in the PRC. Indeed, Ma, Lin and Ma (1998) report that 
over the last two decades growth in insurance premiums in commercial lines has 
exceeded 30 percent per annum in China. In absolute terms, PRC-based companies 
accounted for annual premiums of approximately RMB 30 billion (US$ 3.6 billion) in 
1999, representing over 70 percent of the non-motor general insurance market (People's 
Bank of China (PBOC), 2000)5. Despite such dynamic growth, many industry
5 The Chinese currency is Renminbi (RMB). The exchange rate used in this study is US$ 1=RMB 8.3, 
which was the officially fixed exchange rate set by the central bank (the PBOC) during die period of 
empirical analysis (i.e., 1997-99).
4commentators (e.g., Niu, 1995; Ma et al., 1998; A.M. Best, 1999; Shen, 2000) forecast 
that the corporate demand for insurance in the PRC will continue to increase in line with 
the country's rapidly expanding rate of inward investment and developing economic 
infrastructure. Furthermore, fixture growth in corporate insurance procurement is also 
likely to be encouraged by the ongoing reform of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the 
PRC and China’s joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) (e.g., see Ma et al., 1998; 
Li, 1999; Shen, 2000; Xu, N., 2000). To date, empirical studies have not examined the 
determinants of corporate purchase of property insurance in the PRC as " . . .  the scarcity 
of reliable data has long constituted a major obstacle for analyses of the Chinese business 
environment" (Luo and Sadrieh, 1995, p.24). However, emerging economies, such as 
China, are becoming progressively integrated into the global economic system and 
concomitantly adopting improved corporate reporting practices (Xiao, 1999; Shen, 2000). 
These changes are now providing a good opportunity for researchers to test further and/or 
refine financial economics-based theories that were primarily developed and tested in 
Western developed countries (e.g., see Shenkar and Von Glinow, 1994; Tan and 
Litschert, 1994; Luo, 1999).
1.2 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
Drawing a framework from the financial economics literature, this study 
examines empirically those factors that influence: (a) the managerial propensity to 
purchase property insurance (hereafter as “insurance participation decision”); and (b) the 
financial extent of property insurance use by publicly listed companies in the PRC 
(hereafter as “insurance volume decision”). To achieve this aim, the study has five 
specific objectives:
1. To analyze the institutional environment within which Chinese publicly listed
companies operate. In particular, the unique setting of China’s financial markets 
and the salient features of PRC-based publicly listed companies are examined.
52. To select an appropriate theoretical framework by means of an extensive review 
of the extant financial economics literature.
3. To develop hypotheses drawn from the selected theoretical framework, and test 
them empirically using statistical techniques.
4. To analyze and evaluate the empirical results.
5. To make conclusions and consider the implications for policymaking and future 
research.
13 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
This research project contributes to the existing insurance and risk management
literature and generates regulatory/practical implications in six principal ways as follows:
1. The pattern of economic reform in the PRC over the last two decades or so has
been transitional; this contrasts sharply with the more revolutionary economic 
changes taking place in some former State-planned economies of Eastern Europe 
(e.g., see Booth and Stroinski, 1996; Qian, Roland and Xu, 1999; Tam, 2000). 
Therefore, the key determinants of the corporate purchase of insurance in the PRC 
might be similar to, or different from, those of developed market economies (e.g., 
the US), existing planned economies (e.g., Cuba), and the newly opened-up 
economies of Eastern Europe (e.g., Poland). This study, as the first of its kind, 
should thus contribute important insights into the nature of insurance decisions in 
newly/partially privatized publicly listed companies that are emerging in China's 
transitional economy. For example, the results of the research could highlight how 
different ownership structures in Chinese publicly listed companies might 
influence the extent to which property insurance is purchased.
62. This study uses firm-level panel data for 1997-99 to derive robust tests of 
formulated hypotheses on the corporate purchase of property insurance. Thus, 
some of the data limitations experienced in prior studies (e.g., the use of single­
period data) are mitigated in this project6. Additionally, the tight control over 
property insurance pricing in the PRC during the research period 1997-99 is likely 
to avoid some potentially confounding effects caused, for example, by 
fluctuations in insurance pricing and changes in insurers’ underwriting practices 
on corporate purchase of property insurance. Thus, the variations in the level of 
premiums paid by PRC-based publicly listed companies are more likely to reflect 
changes in managerial discretion rather than external factors such as volatile 
movements in market forces. It is considered that this attribute enables a more 
robust test of the research hypotheses to be performed. Moreover, by employing a 
two-stage analytical approach (i.e., analyzing the determinants of insurance 
participation and volume decisions separately), this study should be able to 
generate more informative insights into company managers’ insurance decisions 
than previous studies (e.g., Yamori, 1999; Hoyt and Khang, 2000).
3. As noted in section 1.1.2, the study of a large emerging insurance market, such as 
China, provides an opportunity for testing and refining financial economics-based 
theories on the corporate purchase of insurance that have hitherto been tested in 
developed economies. The methodology and results of this study could thus act as 
a useful framework and benchmark for future insurance-based research in both 
the PRC and other Asian countries, particularly those with a similar economic 
structure and political history to China (e.g., Vietnam -  see Bucheton and 
Cominh, 1995).
6 Yamori (1999) is believed to be the first study that empirically investigates the purchase o f insurance by 
non-financial corporations in a major non-Western economy, namely Japan. However, this and other prior 
studies have only used single-period data It is argued by many researchers (e.g., see Hsiao, 1985; Solon, 
1989; Baltagi, 1995) that analysis using panel data can have many advantages. For instance, panel data “ . .
. give more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of 
freedom and more efficiency” (Baltagi, 1995, p.4).
74. The research project could have important implications for policymakers and 
corporate stakeholders (e.g., shareholders and debtholders). For example, the 
extent to which the level of commercial property insurance complements or 
substitutes for other loss recovery mechanisms, such as State-funded contingent 
capital, could help policymakers to better identify and assess the adequacy, or 
otherwise, of current corporate risk management practices in PRC-based publicly 
listed companies. This could assist in the design of future economic (e.g., 
financial regulatory) reforms in the Chinese corporate sector. Additionally, the 
results from this study could help to answer key policy-related questions like 
whether corporate debtholders and/or shareholders need to monitor more closely 
the corporate risk management practices in China.
5. The present study could help to direct the marketing strategies and product 
innovation initiatives of insurance suppliers (including foreign insurers operating 
in the PRC) by shedding light on how they could better target potential customers. 
For instance, if the findings reveal that those companies with substantial foreign- 
invested capital are more likely to demand property insurance than majority 
Chinese-owned companies, then insurers may wish to develop their product 
strategies to better reflect on the risk management needs of multinational 
organizations.
6. The results from this study could be useful for Chinese company managers -  for 
example, by enabling them to better understand the effects of insurance purchases 
on business operations. This could also help them improve their risk management 
practices in the future.
1.4 RESEARCH METHODS
To achieve the above stated aim and objectives of this project, a combination of
literature-based and quantitative research methods are adopted in this study as follows:
81. A search and analysis of the relevant literature, leading to the selection of an 
appropriate theoretical framework to guide the empirical investigation.
2. The empirical component of this study involves a statistical analysis of firm-level 
panel data for the period 1997-99. Both univariate and multivariate statistical 
techniques (e.g., Heckman’s two-stage sample selection analysis) are used. Data 
on firm-specific variables (i.e., the explanatory variables in this study) are 
extracted from two public databases (the Genius Securities Information Database 
(GSID) and Hong Kong & Macao Securities Information System (HKMSIS)), 
which contain details of the published annual financial statements of PRC-based 
publicly listed companies. The dependent variables (i.e., purchase/non-purchase 
dummy and corporate spending on property insurance) are identified either from 
voluntary disclosures in annual financial statements or directly from company 
Financial Directors/Treasurers through a telephone survey. (For further details, 
see section 5.3)
1.5 ASSUMPTIONS AND SCOPE
1.5.1 Assumptions
This study has six underlying assumptions as follows:
1. A high degree of managerial discretion over insurance decisions is assumed to
exist in PRC-based companies. This assumption is deemed to be justified as 
several commentators have reported that considerable progress has been made in 
terms of the degree of autonomy given to company managers since China 
embarked on its reform programme in 1978 (e.g., see Ma, 1998; Chi, 1999; Tam, 
2000). For instance, the decision-making rights of managers (e.g., on making 
insurance purchases) in publicly listed companies are empowered by Article 119 
of China’s Companies Law (1993). Additionally, the Insurance Law (1995) sets 
forth the voluntary basis for commercial insurance purchase decisions in the PRC
9(Article 4 and 10). Thus, managers of publicly listed companies in the PRC are 
considered to be able to make insurance choice decisions independently o f State 
officials.
2. Procurement of commercial property insurance is assumed to constitute one of the
most important risk management mechanisms available to managers of publicly 
listed companies in the PRC. This assumption is believed to be reasonable 
because complete risk retention and self-insurance are normally impractical for 
most Chinese companies due to their limited assets size, insufficient accumulated 
reserves and the general lack of risk management expertise (e.g., see Graham, 
1996; Tian, 2001 )7. In addition, alternative risk management instruments (e.g., 
financial derivatives) are generally not available for most companies in the PRC 
due to the absence of locally developed derivatives markets and limited 
managerial expertise (e.g., see Karmel, 1996; Long, Payne and Feng, 1999).
3. This study is predicated on the notion that insurance suppliers in the PRC can 
satisfactorily meet the corporate demand for insurance. In other words, it is 
assumed that insurance demand is not severely restricted by an inadequate market 
supply of insurance. Indeed, the current availability of over 300 different kinds of 
commercial insurance products and 29 insurers in the Chinese market-place 
testifies to the reasonableness of this assumption (e.g., see Wu, 1996; Wei, Yu 
and Guo, 1999).
4. In this research project, variations in the level of corporate property insurance 
spending of Chinese publicly listed companies are deemed to mainly reflect the 
in-house demand for insurance coverage rather than changes in the market pricing 
of risks underwritten by insurance companies. This approach is consistent with 
that followed in prior studies (e.g., Yamori, 1999; Hoyt and Khang, 2000).
7 By international standard, the size of publicly listed companies in the PRC is also fairly small in terms of 
the average total assets (around US$ 11 million) and net assets (roughly US$ 5.5 million) in 1997 (CSRC 
database (2000)).
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Moreover, this assumption is justified given the tight regulation of property 
insurance premiums and the observed insensitivity of insurance prices to market 
conditions in the PRC (e.g., see Wu, 1996; Shen, 2000; Wang, 2000). (For further 
details, see section 2.5)
5. Firm-specific data are obtained from two publicly available databases (i.e., the 
GSID and the HKMSIS) which, as mentioned earlier in section 1.4, are sourced 
from the audited annual financial statements of Chinese publicly listed 
companies. Details of discretionary premiums paid are derived by financial 
managers from in-house accounting systems that are also normally subject to 
independent audit review8. Thus, the data to be used in this study are assumed to 
be reliable.
6. In this study, it is assumed that there is a positive theoretical linkage between the 
decision to participate in insurance hedging and the decision on the financial 
extent of insurance use by publicly listed Chinese companies. Indeed, this 
assumption is implicit in previous studies of corporate hedging behavior such as 
Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) and Hardwick and Adams (1999)9.
8 Graham (1996) reports that the audits o f many publicly listed Chinese companies, in particular companies 
issuing shares to foreign investors, are often performed by international accounting firms, such as Price 
Waterhouse Coopers and KPMG Peat Marwick. Also, it is argued that the corporate accounting system in 
the PRC has since the 1990s moved closely towards international accounting practice (e.g., see Winkle, 
Huss and Chen, 1994; Gul, 1999). Additionally, DeFond, Wong and Li (2000) report improvements in 
auditor independence after China’s new Auditing Standards, which are based on International Auditing 
Standards, came into effect in 1995. These observations o f the increasing professional nature o f  external 
auditing in China further help to support the assumption that the data used in this study are reliable.
however, Cummins, Phillips and Smith (2001) argue that interrelations between the hedging participation 
and volume decisions could be influenced by the differences in transaction costs. For example, they argue 
that in the case of derivatives hedging, the participation decision may be influenced by the large fixed costs 
associated with engaging such activity; in contrast, the volume decision can be influenced by differential 
risk tolerances and marginal cost considerations. Consequently, foe hedging participation and volume 
decisions may not necessarily be positively related. However, a similar argument may not hold for 
insurance trading. This is because the purchase of commercial insurance is generally easier (and hence less 
costly) to establish compared with an in-house derivatives function. Indeed, Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993) argue that scale economies appear to be less pronounced in trading o f insurance. Therefore, the 
assumption made here seems to be reasonable.
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1.5.2 Scope of the Project
The scope of this project is defined in seven major respects as follows:
1. Only publicly listed companies are investigated in this project because the 
evidence obtained from such entities is likely to be more relevant in the PRC 
context10. Corporate forms in the PRC encompass non-company enterprises and 
companies; the latter include limited liability companies (LLCs) and joint-stock 
companies (referred to as “shareholding enterprises” in the PRC). Non-company 
SOEs and LLCs are not examined in this study. The former are essentially non­
commercial entities whose existence derives from the old centrally planned 
economy and most of them (particularly those large SOEs) are scheduled to be 
restructured into publicly listed (joint-stock) companies in the near future (e.g., 
see Ma, 1998; Tam, 2000). The LLCs on the other hand, as mainly closely-held 
enterprises, do not satisfy the criterion of widely-held corporation (e.g., see 
Article 20 of Companies Law (1993)). As such, this project only focuses on 
publicly listed (joint-stock) companies, which the Chinese government deems to 
be the dominant form of “modem enterprise systems” 11. In addition, under 
Article 156 of Companies Law (1993) only publicly listed companies are required 
to publish audited annual financial statements and make these available for public 
scrutiny.
10 Only those companies listed at the two main PRC-based stock exchanges - SHSE and SZSE - will be 
examined. The Beijing Stock Exchange, which currently has two automated price quotation systems for 
institutional holders o f equity shares of 17 companies, is excluded from this project as this bourse is not 
substantive. Also, the 17 companies traded on these systems cannot he listed at the SHSE or SZSE (e.g., 
see Abdel-khalik, Wong and Wu, 1999; Xu and Wang, 1999).
11 The basic notion o f “modem enterprise system” as defined by China’s Companies Law (1993) is that an 
enterprise should be an independent legal entity that is responsible for its operating performance and 
equipped with a governance structure that controls for the separation o f ownership from management. To 
date, only joint-stock companies and LLCs have been installed with such a governance structure; the non­
company SOEs have not had such a structure yet at the time this study was carried out (See also section 
2.33.1 of Chapter 2).
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2. Only publicly listed companies incorporated in mainland China will be examined 
in this project. Publicly listed companies incorporated in other Chinese territories, 
namely Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, are excluded from this study. This is to 
avoid the potentially confounding effects that institutional differences (e.g., legal 
structures) could have on the empirical results (see also footnote 1).
3. As in previous studies (e.g., Xu and Wang, 1999), A-share companies listed at
both the SHSE and the SZSE are included in the data set12. Gao (1997) and Tian 
(2001) report that there is no systematic difference between the A-share market 
indices of the SHSE and the SZSE in terms of market movements. One reason for 
this observation is that companies listed at the two stock exchanges are likely to 
be exposed to similar macro-economic and political influences. Thus, the results 
of this research study are unlikely to be biased by the inclusion of SHSE-listed A- 
share companies and SZSE-listed A-share companies. However, A-share and B- 
share markets are segmented and B-share prices are traded at a discount to A- 
share prices because they are strictly available to different investors (Gao, 1997; 
Mok and Hui, 1998). Nonetheless, B-share companies (at the SHSE and the 
SZSE) are included in this study. This is because B-share companies appear to be 
a potentially important component of publicly listed companies as the Chinese 
government encourages shareholding enterprises to issue B-shares in order to 
attract foreign investment (Gao, 1997; Chen, Firth and Kim, 2000) 13 . 
Additionally, it might be interesting to determine whether the degree of 
investment by foreign institutions in Chinese publicly listed companies influences 
corporate property insurance decisions.
4. Compulsory third party liability insurance, companies' statutory social insurance
contribution (e.g., to employees' pension) and insurance payments made to
12 A-shares are exclusively available to domestic investors; B-shares are fbreign-owned shares listed at the 
SHSE and SZSE. H-shares are foreign-owned shares of Chinese companies listed at the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (see also section 2.2.3.2 o f Chapter 2).
13 Currently, B-share companies together represent about 15 percent of the total o f publicly listed 
companies in China (CSRC database (2000)).
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captive insurance operations (e.g., China Oil & Chemical group) are excluded 
from this study14. The former two types of insurance are mandated by government 
regulations, while insurance captives are not normally open-market commercial 
insurers with whom managers are free to make unrestricted insurance choices 
(e.g., see Adams and Hillier, 2000). However, collateralized-assets insurance 
coverage provided under the terms of debt covenants is considered to be within 
the ambit of this project. In the PRC, although debt-based insurance requirements 
are not statutorily prescribed, such covenants are increasingly being introduced 
through negotiation and the mutual agreement of the contracting parties (Li, 
1999). Occasionally, companies may also purchase group insurance on behalf of 
their employees as a benefit-in-kind (e.g., personal injury insurance and house- 
content insurance) (Wu, 1996). Because this type of purchase is not primarily for 
the company itself and thus unlikely to correlate closely with firm-specific 
variables (e.g., assets size), it is excluded from this project.
5. Discretionaiy liability insurance (e.g., product and directors & officers' liability) 
is not an economically significant part of total corporate insurance procurement in 
the PRC (e.g., discretionary liability insurance only represented about 3 percent of 
the total general insurance premium in 1997) (PBOC, 1998). Furthermore, 
because of changing legal judgements (long-tail) liability risks are often difficult 
to ascertain accurately ex-ante (Doherty, 1997). Consequently, the levels of 
liability-based premiums are unlikely to correspond closely with currently 
measurable firm-specific factors such as the accounting value of total assets (i.e., 
size). As such, this form of insurance is deemed to be outside the scope of this 
study. In their US-based study, Hoyt and Khang (2000) also suggest that in 
addition to liability insurance, business interruption insurance should be excluded 
because revenue-expense structures vaiy from firm to firm. This approach is also 
followed in this study.
14 Adams and Hillier (2000) report that a captive is a wholly-owned subsidiary insurance company of a 
non-insurance parent corporation whose primary purpose is to insure or reinsure risks within the group.
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6. Property insurance in this study specifically includes insurance coverage o f fixed 
assets (e.g., buildings, plants, equipments and vehicles), current non-financial 
assets (e.g., inventories) and other physical assets (e.g., office fittings). However, 
land is excluded from the ambit of this research project because in China it is 
State-owned and so considered not to be subject to prospective private damage 
claims. Hence, companies in China do not need, for example, to seek insurance 
cover for land damage due to pollution.
7. The time span of data in this study covers the three years 1997-99. The year 1997 
is the earliest accounting period for which complete and accurate data on PRC- 
based publicly listed companies were available from public sources at the time 
this study was carried out. Firm-level insurance premium data, however, have to 
be collected mainly from each company, as it is often a voluntary disclosure item 
in the published annual accounts of PRC-based publicly listed companies. To 
ensure the project is completed in a timely manner, the latest complete year of 
data used is for 1999.
1.6 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
This thesis is divided into seven chapters as follows:
Chapter 1: Overview of the Study. This chapter covers the justification for the 
choice of this research topic, the aim and objectives of the study, the contribution to 
knowledge, and a description of research methods employed. It also addresses the 
underlying assumptions and the scope of this study. Finally, an outline of thesis is 
provided.
Chapter 2: The Chinese Corporate and Insurance Environment This chapter 
provides background information about the institutional environment in which both 
Chinese publicly listed companies and the domestic insurance market operate.
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Additionally, the institutional merits of the PRC as a research environment are examined 
in this chapter.
Chapter 3: Literature Review and Theoiy Selection. This chapter identifies 
and reviews critically the various financial economics-based theories and hypotheses 
which have been advanced in the literature to explain the determinants of the corporate 
purchase of insurance. The purpose of this chapter is to select an appropriate theoretical 
framework within which to focus and conduct the empirical component of the study.
Chapter 4: Hypotheses Development. This chapter examines the main 
propositions of the selected theoretical framework and their implications for explaining 
the determinants of the purchase of property insurance by Chinese publicly listed 
companies. From this analysis, a number of testable hypotheses are formulated in order to 
facilitate empirical testing.
Chapter 5: Research Design. This chapter discusses the rationale for the 
statistical analysis techniques used in this study. The sources of data, the statistical 
procedures adopted and the measurement of variables are also described in this part of the 
thesis.
Chapter 6: Empirical Results and Evaluation. The chapter reports the 
statistical results derived from the analysis of the sample of Chinese public companies 
quoted at the SHSE and the SZSE over the period 1997-99, including relevant diagnostic 
statistics and sensitivity tests.
Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions. A summary of the main findings and 
key conclusions regarding the determinants of the discretionary purchase of property 
insurance by publicly listed companies in the PRC are presented in this chapter. The 
contribution of this study is assessed and its implications for corporate stakeholders, 
insurance suppliers and other interested parties are also considered. Moreover, 
opportunities for future research are identified in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 2: THE CHINESE CORPORATE AND 
INSURANCE ENVIRONMENT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides information on the institutional environment within 
which PRC-based publicly listed companies and the domestic insurance market 
operate. Specifically, the chapter examines the current regulatory and legislative 
framework in China, the features of domestic financial markets, and the key 
characteristics of publicly listed companies in the PRC. Additionally, the advantages 
of conducting an empirical study of the determinants of discretionary purchase of 
property insurance in the PRC’s corporate sector are put forward in this chapter.
12  INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
2.2.1 Key Features
China, with a population of more than 1.2 billion people and a landmass of 9.6 
million square kilometres, has experienced the fastest rate of economic growth in the 
world over the last two decades (e.g., see Cao, Qian and Weingast, 1999; Demberger, 
1999; Smyth, 1999). Indeed, the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reached 
RMB 7,955 billion (US$ 959 billion) in 1998 thus making China the world’s seventh 
largest economy. Additionally, the PRC has been the second largest recipient of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world (behind the US) since 1993 (Sun, Tong 
and Yu, 2002). China’s entry into the WTO should also enable the Chinese economy 
to become more open and closely integrated into the world economic system (Kynge, 
2000; Shen, 2000). Not surprisingly, therefore, China as one of the largest and rapidly 
expanding developing economies in the world has attracted increasing research 
interest from scholars over the last twenty years (e.g., see Yao and Song, 1998; 
Cheung and Chow, 1999). Given the country’s great commercial potential this 
academic interest is particularly evident in the field of corporate finance, including 
risk management (Xu, C.K., 2000).
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22.2 Economic Reforms
China embarked on market-oriented economic reforms in late 1978 (Cao et al., 
1999). The reform process prior to 1984, however, was mainly focused on 
restructuring the agricultural system (Demberger, 1999); the emphasis was then 
shifted to the urban industrial sector (Ma, 1998). However, in contrast to the more 
radical corporate ownership privatization program followed in Russia and Eastern 
Europe, China’s reform of SOEs has been a gradual and evolutionary process based 
on the experience of experimentation (e.g., see Qian et al., 1999; Tam, 2000). Until 
the early 1990s, economic reforms concentrated mainly on the managerial aspects of 
enterprises (e.g., decentralizing the decision-making process and expanding 
managerial autonomy in SOEs) without touching on the nature of ownership of SOEs 
(Huang and Duncan, 1997; Ma, 1998). Thereafter, the Chinese government began to 
partially privatize SOEs by restructuring them into publicly listed joint-stock 
companies (Sun and Tong, 2000). The corporatization process of SOEs in the PRC 
normally involves offering public investors the productive/profitable parts of business 
units, while leaving the non-productive/unprofitable parts (e.g., hospital and school 
for employees) either in the original state-owned entity (the parent company) or with 
local government (Aharony, Li and Wong, 2000). Following corporate restructuring, 
new shares are then issued to the public through an initial public offer (IPO) (Smyth, 
1999; Chen et al., 2000). Publicly listed joint-stock companies are thus likely to 
become the dominant form of Chinese “modem enterprise system” as the government 
has decided to adopt the system of shareholdings as the main elements of its reform of 
large and medium-sized SOEs (e.g., see Ma, 1998; Tam, 2000).
22 3  Domestic Financial Markets
223.1  Debt Markets
The debt financing of PRC-based companies is predominantly facilitated 
through bank borrowings (Peng, 1999; Tian, 2001). The issue of company debentures 
is tightly controlled in China as the government sets an annual quota on the volume of 
total issues. Thus, debentures are not normally available for the majority of Chinese
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enterprises (e.g., see Articles of 161-163 of China’s Companies Law (1993)). In 
addition, State-owned banks, which are becoming more market oriented, are often 
cautious in granting loans to companies because of the high risk of financial losses 
(e.g., see Cao et al., 1999; McGregor, 2000). For instance, it is now common for 
banks to require sufficient asset collateral and insurance cover as a necessary 
condition for issuing commercial loans. So far, both the level of savings interest and 
the benchmark bank lending rate are rigorously controlled by the central bank -  the 
PBOC. Since 1996, however, the PBOC has lowered the interest rate seven 
consecutive times in order to combat deflation in China. This policy has led to a 
decline in the cost of corporate borrowings and a concomitant increase in the volume 
of corporate lending, which has further resulted in an increase in the corporate 
demand for property insurance on collateralized assets (Peng, 1999).
2 2 3 2  Securities Markets
China’s securities markets15 have in recent years been substantially influenced 
by the government’s efforts to restructure SOEs and transform them into publicly 
listed joint-stock companies (e.g., see Mills and Cao, 1996; Mok and Hui, 1998; 
Aharony et al., 2000). Although the first joint-stock company appeared in 1984, 
formal trading of shares did not start until the two national stock exchanges -  the 
SHSE and the SZSE were established in December 1990 and April 1991, respectively. 
The total market capitalization of these two markets reached RMB 1,710 billion (US$ 
206 billion) at the end of 1997, accounting for approximately 20 percent of the 
national GDP and roughly 10 percent of the total estimated value of emerging 
markets’ capitalization (International Finance Corporation [IFC], 1998) 16 . 
Additionally, Lee and Rui (2000) report that in 1997 the combined daily trading 
volume of China’s major two bourses averaged at about 750 million equity deals -  
slightly less than the estimated 900 million daily average share dealings of the 
London Stock Exchange over the same period. As at the end of 1999, there were 976
15 The terms “securities markets”, “share markets”, “equity markets”, and “stock markets” are used 
interchangeably in this chapter and elsewhere in this thesis.
16 The total market capitalization in China may be overstated in that some types o f equity (e.g., State- 
held shares) are not publicly tradable (e.g., see Xu and Wang, 1999).
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Table 2.1
Summary of PRC-based Publicly Listed Companies by Share Categories
This table describes the numbers of PRC-based publicly listed companies by share 
types for the period 1997-99.
Listed in the PR£  (the SHSE and SZSE) Listed outside the PRC |
Total Sub­total A only Boniy A&B A&H
Sub­
total Honly A&H
1997 787 745 627 25 76 17 42 25 17
1998 876 851 727 26 80 18 43 25 18
1999 976 949 822 26 82 19 46 27 19
Source: derived from the CSRC database (2000)
Note:
1. A only: companies with A-shares only; B only: companies with B-shares only; H only: companies 
with H-shares only; A&B: companies with both A-shares and B-shares; A&H: companies with both A- 
shares and H-shares.
2. The overseas securities markets where Chinese companies are listed include HK (44 companies), 
New York (eight companies), London (two companies) and Singapore (one company). Because most 
o f overseas listed Chinese companies are traded on the HK Stock Exchange, for simplicity, all the 
overseas listed Chinese companies are referred to as H-share companies in the official statistics o f 
China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC).
Figure 2.1
Categories of Shares in the PRC-based Publicly Listed Companies
This figure illustrates the major categories of shares that are issued by Chinese 
publicly listed companies - namely, State shares, domestic institutional shares, staff 
shares, tradable A-shares, foreign institutional shares, B-shares and H-shares.
Total Shareholdings
Domestic-owned shares (A-shares) Foreign-owhed sharesilc
Dome >tic
State Institutional Staff Tradable
shares shares shares A-shares
(iguojia gu) (faren gu) (zhigong gu) (liutong gu)
Foreign B-shares H-shares 
institutional (B gu) (H gu)
shares 
(waizi farengu)
Source: Derived from various sources (e.g., Mok and Hui, 1998; Xu and Wang, 1999)
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publicly listed companies in these two markets with slightly over half of these 
companies being listed at the SHSE (see Table 2.1).
PRC-based publicly listed companies are typically owned by five groups of 
shareholders: the State, domestic institutions, private individuals, company staff and 
foreign investors (see Figure 2.1). The main features of these categories of shares are 
further described in Table 2.2. The existence of varying levels of State-held shares in 
PRC-based publicly listed companies is due to the feet that most of them were 
transformed from former SOEs (Gul, 1999). As illustrated in Table 2.2, tradable A- 
shares, exclusively designated for domestic investors, are the only type of equity 
traded among domestic investors at the two stock exchanges in mainland China. It has 
been argued by some commentators (e.g., see Li and Deng, 1999; Xu and Wang,
1999) that staff-held shares are designed more as an employee benefit-in-kind rather 
than as an incentive device. Furthermore, the local currency (Renminbi) is not 
officially convertible; therefore while B-share prices are denominated in Renminbi, 
transactions are settled in US dollars at the SHSE and HK dollars at the SZSE. As the 
Figure 2.2 makes clear, most Chinese publicly listed companies are concentrated in 
the manufacturing and service (e.g., retail) sectors of the economy. These two sectors 
together account for approximately 80 percent of the total number of publicly listed 
companies in the PRC. Geographically, most Chinese publicly listed companies are 
located in the Eastern Coastal region (62 percent), followed by the Central region (20 
percent) and the Western region (18 percent) (CSRC database (2000))17. In other 
words, the numbers of publicly listed companies in China appear to be closely related 
to the degree of regional economic development.
As noted in Chapter 1, tradable A-share markets and B-share markets in the 
PRC are segmented and they are strictly restricted to different investors so that 
arbitrage opportunities are likely to be limited (e.g., see Fleisher and Su, 1998; Mok
17 The Eastern Coastal region includes three autonomous cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin) and nine 
provinces (Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan). 
The Central region comprises the provinces o f Shanxi, Inter Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, 
Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan. The Western area consists o f Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shanxi, 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang. Generally speaking, the level o f economic development is 
highest in the Coastal region due to the regional orientation o f China’s economic reform policies as 
well as its geographical advantages such as good economic infrastructure (e.g., see Sun, Hone, and 
Doucouliagos, 1999).
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Table 2.2
Features of Different Types of Shares in PRC-based Publicly Listed Companies
This table describes the main features of each category of shares that are issued by Chinese 
publicly listed companies.
1 Share types Shareholders Tradability
State shares Various government departments 
or their delegated bodies (e.g., 
Bureau of State Assets 
Management (BSAM) and state 
assets investing companies).
Not publicly tradable, but may be transferred to 
domestic institutions upon the approval of the 
Ministry of Finance and the CSRC (Article 94 of 
China’s Securities Law (1998))
Domestic
Institutional
shares1
Corporate investors such as 
SOEs, non-State-owned 
companies, financial institutions 
(other than commercial banks)
Not publicly tradable (but may be sold to other I 
domestic institutions by negotiation outside the 
stock exchanges upon approval). Sales of 
institutional shares to foreign investors were 
suspended in May 1996 in order to avoid foreign 
investors’ dominance over the domestic 
companies.
Tradable
A-shares2
Mainly private individuals (and 
some domestic institutions and 
securities investment funds)
Publicly tradable at the SHSE and the SZSE
Staff shares'* Company employees and 
managers.
Initially prohibited from trading for one year after 
allocation, and thereafter, may become tradable 
A-shares upon approval from the CSRC. Shares 
held by the senior management of listed 
companies may not be sold during their term of 
office with the company (Article 174 of China’s 
Companies Law (1993)).
B-shares Exclusively foreign investors 
(typically financial institutions)
Publicly tradable at the SHSE and the SZSE
H-shares (N- 
shares, S- 
shares)
Exclusively foreign investors Publicly traded at overseas stock exchanges of 
Hong Kong (H-shares), New York (N-shares), 
Singapore (S-shares) and so on.
Foreign
institutional
shares
Foreign investors (these are 
institutional shares procured as 
founder shares or private 
placement shares)
Not publicly tradable (founder shares are not 
allowed to transfer within three years subsequent 
to the incorporation of company (Article 147 of the 
Chinese Companies Law (1993))
Source: Derived from various sources (e.g., Mok and t [ui, 1998; Xu and Wang, 1999)
Notes:
1. Article 43 o f China’s Commercial Bank Law (1995) forbids commercial banks to hold company shares directly.
2. Tradable A-shares must represent more than 25% of the total shares in issue (Article 156 o f China’s Companies 
L aw {1993)).
3. Issued only at the time o f initial public offering.
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Figure 2.2
PRC-based Publicly Listed Companies Categorized by Industry Sectors
This figure illustrates the classification o f Chinese publicly listed companies by 
industrial sectors.
E
10%
Key:
A: Manufacturing B: Services C: Utilities
D: Real Estate E: Conglomerates
Source: CSRC database (2000)
and Hui, 1998; Poon, Firth and Fung, 1998). As a result, the prices o f tradable A- 
shares and B-shares can differ dramatically -  with companies’ B-share prices often 
trading at a discount relative to their A-shares despite the same voting power and 
rights represented by both types of shareholdings (e.g., both shares receive the same
1 o
dividends, albeit in a different currency) (Chen et al., 2000) . Additionally, A-share 
markets are often highly volatile because tradable A-shareholders (mainly private
individuals) seem to be speculators seeking short-term trading profit. In contrast, B-
shareholders (typically foreign financial institutions) tend to be medium to long-term
18 Sun and Tong (2000) find that the existence of the H-share and the “red-chip” markets in HK (i.e., 
HK incorporated and listed companies which are majority Chinese-owned) provide good substitutes for 
the B-share market because HK stock market seems to be more liquid and transparent. This provides 
another explanation for the significant discount of B-share prices relative to A-shares.
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investors (i.e., typically with investment horizons of three years or more) with 
different risk-retum utility preferences from short-term investors/speculators (Gao, 
1997)19. Therefore, the risk management (and thus insurance) practices of Chinese 
publicly listed companies could reflect risk preference differences emanating from 
variations in their ownership structure.
2.2.33 Insurance Markets
Commercial insurance business in the PRC had been suspended between 1958 
and 1979 as under the Maoist centrally planned economy insurance was deemed to be 
replaceable by State finance and so redundant (Niu, 1995). In 1980, however, the 
Chinese government resumed commercial insurance practices in order to support the 
process of economic reform (Ma et al., 1998). Since then, the Chinese insurance 
market has experienced an exponential growth in the demand for insurance with real 
premium growth rate exceeding 30 percent per annum (Ma et al., 1998). In 1999, the 
size of Chinese insurance market in terms of aggregate annual insurance premiums 
written was RMB 139 billion (US$ 16.8 billion), with general insurance accounting 
for about 37 percent of the total. At the same time, the total number of insurance 
suppliers increased from a single monopoly insurer in 1980 (i.e., the State-owned 
People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC)), to 29 as at the end of 1999 (Xu, N., 
2000). Currently, the PICC, China Pingan Insurance Company and China Pacific 
Insurance Company are the top three composite insurance suppliers in the PRC in 
terms of their market share of written premium income -  amounting to 63 percent, 16 
percent and 9 percent, respectively (Wei et al., 1999) 20 . Industry market 
commentators (e.g., see Chen, 1998; A.M. Best, 1999; Shen, 2000) argue that the 
Chinese insurance market has the potential for even greater growth and development. 
For example, the insurance density (i.e., premium per capita) of China in 1998 was 
only US$ 12 (ranking 78th in the world); while the degree of insurance penetration
19 The reason, why B-shares are normally held by institutional investors is that B-shares are usually 
issued through private placements (Gao, 1997; Mok and Hui, 1998).
20 The Chinese Insurance Law (1995) requires the separation o f life insurance operation from general 
insurance operation (Article 91). Thus, in 1996, the PICC was split into three separate companies, i.e., 
China Life, China Insurance and China Reinsurance. The other two composite insurers -  China Pingan 
Insurance Company and China Pacific Insurance Company - are also disaggregating their life and 
general insurance business.
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(i.e., annual written premiums as a percentage of GDP) was less than 2 percent, 
lagging far behind the average level of 4 percent in other developing countries (e.g., 
Thailand) and 7 percent in more established insurance markets (e.g., the UK) (PBOC,
1999)21 china’s emerging insurance market has also attracted inward investment 
from foreign insurance companies. Indeed, by the end of 1998, 113 foreign insurance 
companies from 17 countries had set up 202 representative offices in China in attempt 
to obtain a licence to transact insurance business (Wei et al., 1999). As at the end of 
1999, eight of these foreign insurers (including the UK’s Royal Sun Alliance 
company) had been granted a licence to open a branch office and operate general 
insurance business, while eight multinational insurers (e.g., Canada’s Manulife) had 
been approved to form life insurance joint-ventures with Chinese business partners.
For economic and political reasons (e.g., the comprehensive job security and 
welfare rights afforded to employees under the old planned economy), general 
insurance has been the dominant sector of the insurance market in the PRC prior to 
1997 in terms of the volume of annual generated premium income. Indeed, as 
mentioned earlier in section 1.1.2, corporate property insurance is currently by far the 
largest class of general insurance business in China with generated premiums 
accounting for over 70 percent of the non-motor general insurance market (Xu, N.,
2000). This indicates that corporations are important purchasers of property insurance 
in the PRC. At present, there are 14 general insurance suppliers (including eight 
foreign insurers) in China, offering more than 300 types of commercial products, 
ranging from property to liability insurance coverage (Wei et al., 1999). This degree 
of insurance supply enables managers of Chinese companies to have considerable 
choices of insurance products that are best suited to their needs. Liability insurance, in 
contrast, only contributed approximately 3 percent of total underwritten insurance 
premium in 1999 and thus represents only a small amount of corporate insurance 
procurement in the PRC.
In view of the foregoing it is not surprising that many industry commentators 
(e.g., Ma et al., 1998; A.M. Best, 1999; Shen, 2000) forecast that the corporate 
demand for insurance in the PRC will continue to increase in line with the country's
21 The terms - insurance density and penetration - are often used to measure the degree o f maturity o f  
insurance markets and their potential for future growth (Falush, 1996).
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rapidly expanding rate of inward investment and developing economic infrastructure. 
Indeed, investors (particularly foreign investors) are likely to be reluctant to commit 
funds to promising, but uncertain, emerging market-based projects without adequate 
insurance cover (e.g., see Beamish, 1993; Child and Markoczy, 1993; Falush, 1996). 
Furthermore, it is expected that future growth in corporate insurance procurement will 
emanate from the ongoing market reform of SOEs in the PRC and enhanced 
managerial awareness of business risk management (e.g., see Ma et al., 1998; Shen, 
2000; Xu, N., 2000).
2 3  REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
23.1 Regulation of Securities Markets
The CSRC is the regulatory authority for securities markets in the PRC. 
Cross-listing between the SHSE and the SZSE is not allowed in China -  thus a 
company can either apply to be listed at the SHSE or the SZSE, but not both markets 
concomitantly (Lee and Rui, 2000). Until 2000, China adopted a quota allocation 
system by setting an annual limit on new share issues (Aharony et al., 2000). Thus, if 
an enterprise wished to apply for IPO it must go through a rigorous and lengthy 
approval process covering such matters as the adequacy of business plans, managerial 
expertise and financial condition, amongst other things. This means that only a 
handful of applicants are likely to be approved to make an IPO, thus making corporate 
listing qualifications relatively rare events (Aharony et al., 2000). Consequently, 
many unlisted companies in the PRC may wish to gain access to the securities 
markets indirectly by acquiring a “shell company” rather than through a direct IPO 
(Chi and Ma, 2000)22. This factor, together with the absence of an enforceable 
bankruptcy law and the government’s concern over social stability, means that the 
authorities are often reluctant to delist or liquidate a poorly performing company (Xu
22 The term “shell company” in the PRC refers to those listed companies that are financially poorly 
performing and therefore disqualify themselves in raising additional financing from the stock market 
(Chi and Ma, 2000). According to the CSRC’s requirements, in order to be entitled to raise additional 
capital after IPO, a publicly listed company must report a return o f no less than ten percent on equity 
for three consecutive years (Provisional Ordinance on the Issue and Trade o f  Shares, 1993).
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and Wang, 1999)23. Not surprisingly, for those financially poorly performing 
companies, local government often tries all means to rescue them through providing 
financial subsidies and/or coordinating asset reorganizations (Chi and Ma, 2000). 
Consequently, until 2000, no companies had been delisted permanently in the PRC. 
Companies that experienced material asset reorganizations during the research period 
(1997-99) may result in the problem of incomparable time-series data, thereby 
affecting the results of the present study. This potential problem will, however, be 
dealt with in the process of sample selection (see Chapter 5, section 5.3).
23.2 Insurance Regulation
Prior to November 1998, the insurance industry in China was regulated by the 
PBOC; thereafter, the industry has been administered by the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission (CIRC). The Insurance Law (1995) is the first statute in the 
PRC that sets forth the basic principles of transacting commercial insurance and thus 
it acts as the “mother law” for other insurance related rule-making.
Property insurance prices in the PRC have long been tightly controlled 
compared with that of many established insurance markets (e.g., UK) (Wu, 1996; 
Shen, 2000; Wang, 2000). The important laws relating to property insurance pricing 
are the Nationwide Insurance Clauses and Premium Rates (1993), the Insurance Law 
(1995), the Provisional Ordinance on Insurance Administration (1996) and the 
Clauses, Premium Rates o f Property Basic Risks Covers and Property Comprehensive 
Risks Covers (1996). Under these regulations, rates of insurance premium and basic 
contract terms for the majority of corporate insurance products are controlled by the 
CIRC (Shen, 2000). Only a limited fluctuation in premium rates (up to a maximum 30 
percent) is allowed on intra-provincial business with the CIRC approval. Additionally, 
the risk rating practice of insurance companies is also unified by the Clauses, 
Premium Rates o f Property Basic Risks Covers and Property Comprehensive Risks 
Covers (1996). This document contains guidelines covering the classification of 
insurable hazards and the scaling of industrial risks. Furthermore, the Insurance Law
23 The existing Bankruptcy Law (1986) in the PRC only applies to wholly State-owned industrial 
enterprises. Gao and Yao (1999) report that this law has proven to be difficult to enforce as economic 
reform has meant that an all-embracing social security system no longer exists in China.
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(1995) forbids insurers to compete by granting their customers premium rebates 
(Article 106). PRC-based insurers are also restricted (Article 101) in their ability to 
transfer assumed risks to the international reinsurance market (e.g., they have to give 
preference to PRC-based insurers/reinsurers) (Shen, 2000). The above-mentioned 
laws and regulations were in effect over the three-year period (1997-99) covered by 
the empirical component of this study (with no additional legislation and/or regulation 
affecting property insurance prices being enacted during this period). Consequently, 
property insurance prices in the Chinese market have been fairly stable in recent years 
thereby avoiding the possibility of premium level distortions due to extraneous 
environmental (e.g., regulatory) effects.
2 3 3  Corporate Regulation
233.1 Companies Law (1993)
China’s Companies Law (1993) sets out the general requirements on company 
incorporation. The 1993 Law includes, amongst other things, matters such as 
corporate governance, the issue, listing and trading of shares, corporate accounting 
and reporting, dissolution and liquidation. The 1993 law further divides PRC-based 
companies into LLCs and joint-stock companies according to the number of 
shareholders and the divisionability of equity capital. The former are only allowed to 
have up to 50 shareholders and their equity capital cannot be divided into equal shares 
(Article 3). On the other hand, a joint-stock company can be incorporated through a 
combination of sponsor subscriptions and an IPO (termed faqi sheli)(Aitic\e 74). 
However, sponsors must subscribe no less than 35 percent of the total shares in issue 
and the proportion of shares for an IPO must be greater than 25 percent of total shares 
in issue (Articles 83 and 152). The Companies Law (1993) also mandates a corporate 
governance structure for companies incorporated in the PRC (see section 2.4.2). A 
joint-stock company applying for listing status must also report annual operating 
profits for each of the previous three years (Article 152). Publicly listed companies 
must further produce interim (six monthly) and audited annual financial statements 
and publish them in the public domain (Articles 156 and 175). Under the legislation, a 
Chinese company can also be delisted temporarily for a “period of improvement” if it
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has been loss making over all the previous three years, and delisted permanently, if 
that losses persist upon the expiry of the improvement period agreed previously with 
the CSRC (Article 157).
23.3.2 Securities Law (1998)
Amongst other things, China’s Securities Law (1998) dictates the procedures 
for share issuance, share transactions, information disclosure requirements of publicly 
listed companies, and the rules of corporate takeover. For instance, consistent with the 
Companies Law (1993), publicly listed companies are required to publish regular 
reports at least twice a year (i.e., the interim and annual reports). The annual report 
should incorporate a profile of the company, its audited annual financial statements 
(i.e., balance sheet, profit and loss account and cash flow statement), business review, 
senior management profile, and the number of outstanding shares and bonds 
(including the top ten shareholders and their respective holdings). Listed companies in 
the PRC are also required to publicly prepare occasional reports giving details of 
expected “material incidents” that may substantially affect their share prices. For 
example, the 1998 Securities Law regards the write-off and/or disposal of more than 
30 percent of company’s operating assets as “material incidents”. Corporate takeover 
can take two forms -  bidding purchase (yaoyue shougou) or a negotiation purchase 
(xieyi shogou). The former involves buying shares through stock exchanges; the latter 
is conducted in negotiation with the shareholders of the acquired company outside of 
the stock exchanges. Such arrangements should be approved by the CSRC and the 
Ministry of Finance if State-held shares are involved. The five percent of 
shareholding is the “cutting point” adopted by the 1998 Law to distinguish between 
large and small shareholders (Article 68). Therefore, investors need to report to the 
CSRC and the stock exchange authorities once they hold five percent of the total 
shares in issue of a publicly listed company through the stock exchanges and any five 
percent change onward.
2 3 3 3  Accounting and Financial Reporting Requirements
Currently, business accounting rules in the PRC consist of Accounting 
Standards for Business Entities (ASBE) and 13 industry-specific accounting
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promulgations. These were introduced in 1993 and effectively constitute local 
generally accepted accounting practice (Chinese GAAP) (Lin and Chen, 1999; Xiao, 
1999). In addition to the ASBE, publicly listed companies in China are required to 
comply with the Accounting System for Joint-stock Companies (1993) which is more 
conservative and thus much closer in format and content to international accounting 
standards (IAS). For financial disclosure, publicly listed companies have to abide by a 
standard format of annual disclosure as contained in the CSRC’s Contents and 
Formats o f Annual Report for Joint-stock Companies (1997-99). This format is also 
subject to annual review and improvement by the CSRC. Consequently, the nature 
and amount of information disclosure by publicly listed companies in their annual 
report and accounts over the last three years have become more detailed and 
transparent than was hitherto the case (Xiao, 1999).
There are some notable differences in accounting and financial reporting 
between A-share companies and companies with foreign investors (typically B-share 
companies and H-share companies, as referred to “foreign-invested companies” 
hereafter) (e.g., see Mok and Hui, 1998; Chen et al., 2000). For example, the latter 
should prepare two sets of financial statements in accordance with IAS (for foreign 
investors) and Chinese accounting standards (for domestic investors), respectively. 
Additionally, foreign-invested corporations normally employ international accounting 
firms (e.g., Price Waterhouse Coopers) as auditors (Defond et al., 2000). Moreover, 
Mills and Cao (1996) and Mok and Hui (1998) report that there are more 
requirements on information disclosure for foreign-invested companies than A-share 
companies. For instance, in addition to the Contents and Formats o f Annual Report 
for Joint-stock Companies (1997-99), H-share companies need to comply with the 
information disclosure requirements of Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE).
233 .4  Corporation Tax
China’s tax reform in 1994, among other features, unifies the income taxation 
rate for non-foreign invested enterprises at nominally 33 percent of taxable income 
(Perotti, Sun and Zou, 1999). It also prescribes tax-deductible items (e.g., insurance 
premiums paid and losses incurred). Additionally, the Chinese income taxation law 
allows the operating losses of current year to be made up by the pre-tax operating
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profits of next five years. In respect of the important roles played by publicly listed 
companies in the local economy and as a preferential tax policy, local government has 
discretion to partially exempt the income tax burden of publicly listed companies 
(e.g., through tax rebates). As Wang (1999) reports, this practice seems to bring the 
average rate of income tax of the majority of publicly listed companies down to about 
15 percent of taxable annual profits. As a way to attract overseas investment, foreign- 
invested companies also normally enjoy various forms of tax preferential treatment. 
For example, in the first two operating years, newly founded foreign-invested 
companies can obtain a full tax exemption and a 50-percent exemption in the 
following three operating years.
The tax-induced explanation for corporate hedging holds that hedging can 
reduce the expected tax liability for a firm facing a convex effective tax schedule by 
reducing the volatility o f the firm’s expected taxable income stream (e.g., see Mayers 
and Smith, 1982; Main, 1983; Smith and Stulz, 1985). The convexity of effective tax 
schedule often results from both the statutory progressivity (e.g., in the US) and the 
presence of tax preferential items (e.g., tax-loss carry-forwards and investment tax 
credits) (e.g., see Nance et al., 1993; Mian, 1996). The existence of operating loss 
carry-forwards and some other tax concessions could introduce modest convexity in 
some Chinese firms’ tax position, which could potentially affect the insurance 
decisions of Chinese managers. This possibility is examined further and controlled for 
in the model development section of this thesis (see section 4.4.5).
2.4 SALIENT FEATURES OF CHINESE PUBLICLY LISTED COMPANIES
2.4.1 Ownership Structure
Most publicly listed Chinese companies have a mixed form of ownership 
structure (see Figure 2.3). Specifically, the State, domestic institutional investors and 
indigenous private individuals are the three dominant groups of shareholders. 
However, only about one-third of shares in issue are traded at the SHSE and the SZSE. 
As at the end of 1998, the State held stakes in more than 90 percent of publicly
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Figure 2.3
The Average Ownership Structure of PRC-based Publicly Listed Companies (1998)
This figure describes the component o f the ownership structure o f a typical Chinese 
publicly listed company, including the categories o f shares and their approximate 
proportions of total shareholdings.
Key:
A: State-held shares 
B: Domestic institutional 
shares 
C: Tradable A-shares 
D: B-shares 
E: H-shares 
F: Staff shares 
G: Foreign institutional 
shares
Source: CSRC database (2000)
listed companies, retaining a controlling interest in about half o f these entities (e.g., 
see Cheng, Zheng and Huang, 2000). A recent trend in the change o f ownership 
structure is that the proportion o f State-held shares is falling gradually in contrast to 
the slow rise in the fraction o f tradable A-shares and institutional investor-owned 
shares. This is because the government often does not have the resources to exercise 
rights offerings and some State-held shareholdings have in recent years been sold out 
(Ma, 1998; Xu and Wang, 1999). Also, the average proportion o f government-owned 
shares has declined from 51 percent in 1992 down to 34 percent at the end of 1998 
suggesting a gradual privatization of Chinese publicly listed companies (Yuan and 
Wang, 1999). However, the ownership of publicly listed companies in the PRC is still 
highly concentrated (among the State and institutional shareholders) compared with 
the US and Japanese corporations (e.g., see Xu and Wang, 1999; Chen et al., 2000;
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Tian, 2001). For instance, as at the end of 1998, the main, the largest three and five 
shareholders in the PRC-based publicly listed companies held 45 percent, 57 percent 
and 60 percent of the total shares in issue, respectively. This suggests that many PRC- 
based publicly listed companies are dominated by one or two large State/institutional 
shareholders. The closely-held nature of share ownership in the PRC and the 
concomitant concentrated business risk for owners could thus encourage managerial 
spending on property insurance to mitigate the systematic and unsystematic risks of 
investment (see Chapter 4, section 4.4.1).
2.4.2 Corporate Governance Structure
Since 1993, the Chinese government has made the establishment of a “modem 
enterprise system” the key focus of its SOE reform programme (Ma, 1998). The 
Anglo-American-type corporate governance model, as contained in China’s 
Companies Law (1993), has also been installed in PRC-based publicly listed 
companies (Tam, 2000)24. Under this fabric, the annual general meeting of 
shareholders is the forum at which the board of directors (including the board 
chairman) and the supervisory board are appointed (Article 103 of China’s 
Companies Law (1993)). Under Article 112 of the 1993 Law, the board of directors 
represents the interests of shareholders and has the right to make important corporate 
decisions such as the approval of investment plans, the appointment of management 
and the determination of managerial remuneration. Thus, the board of directors plays 
an important part in the corporate governance process of PRC-based publicly listed 
companies. Indeed, Xu and Wang (1999) argue that both the State and institutional 
investors rely heavily on the board of directors acting in a pmdent and responsible 
manner. Many prior studies (e.g., see He, 1998; Li and Deng, 1999; Xu and Wang,
1999) also show that the board of directors in Chinese publicly listed companies is 
often dominated by large shareholders’ representatives and/or (internal) executive 
directors25. Additionally, insider directorship normally accounts for over 40 percent of
24 The term “Anglo-American” model o f corporate governance refers to the arrangements usually 
found in the English-speaking mature market economies such as the US, the UK, Australia and Canada 
(Mayer, 1994; Tam, 2000).
25 In this study, executive directors (or internal directors) refer to managerial board members, while 
external directors refer to those directors who are independent o f both the company and its 
shareholders.
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the board membership; in contrast, prior studies report that the proportion of non­
executive external directors is typically less than 10 percent of the membership26.
Another corporate governance feature provided by the 1993 Law (Article 124) 
is the appointment of a supervisory board, consisting of representatives of 
shareholders and employees. This body is empowered ta monitor the economic 
behavior of company directors and managers. Ma (1998) and Li and Deng (1999) 
argue that as shareholder and employee representatives tend not to be independent of 
board directors and management, they frequently fail to discharge their duties in an 
independent and objective manner. Although company managers should be appointed 
by the board of directors, their appointment, particularly in publicly listed companies 
where the State remains as the majority shareholder, is often subject to government 
intervention (e.g., see Chi, 1999; Willhelm, 1999; Wu, G.S., 2000). In contrast, those 
publicly listed companies controlled by institutional shareholders tend to operate with 
less government interference. For instance, large institutional shareholders can 
nominate board members and choose managers at their will (Xu and Wang, 1999). 
Moreover, chief executive officer (CEO) duality (i.e., where the same person serves 
as both the board chairman and the CEO) is reported to be common to almost one- 
third of PRC-based publicly listed companies (e.g., see He, 1998; Wu, Bai and Xi, 
1999; Li and Deng, 1999).
Prior studies also report that managers in many PRC-based listed companies 
either do not own company shares or their shareholdings are very minor (with each 
person normally holding less than 0.01 percent of total shares in issue) (e.g., see Li, 
2000; Qi, Wu and Zhang, 2000; Sun, Tong and Tong, 2002). Some authors (e.g., see 
Li and Deng, 1999; Xu and Wang, 1999; Wei, 2000) also note that traditionally the 
allocation of shares to managers, where it existed, was introduced mainly as an 
employee benefit-in-kind rather than a specially designed incentive scheme (as, for 
example, with share option schemes in the US and UK corporations). In most
26 The term “inside directors”, as used in this project, is defined as company managers and executive 
directors. Also, the term o f “insider control” in this study refers to the phenomenon that insiders may 
exercise control over the corporate governance process but not act in the interests o f shareholders. This 
is different from the term that is often used in the analysis o f the privatization o f firms in Russia and 
former socialist countries in Eastern Europe. In those studies, the term refers to the capture o f majority 
ownership by the incumbent directors, managers and workers in the company (e.g., see Wu, L.J.,
2000).
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instances, staff shares are allocated at the time of the IPO rather than as an annual 
reward for improved financial performance (Li and Deng, 1999; Xu and Wang, 1999). 
Wei (2000) also finds that in about 30 percent of Chinese publicly listed companies, 
the CEO and the board chairman are non-remunerative, as these positions are 
frequently held by government officials and/or representatives of the parent company
onon a part-time basis .
In view of the substantial insider directorship, the ill-functioned supervisory 
board and the lack of compensation incentive structures, agency problems between 
managers and shareholders/debtholders could be severe in Chinese publicly listed 
companies. This therefore could have important implications for corporate risk 
management policies. For instance, it could be interesting (e.g., from a public 
policymaking stand point) to examine the role played by company managers in 
corporate insurance decisions -  either to deliver welfare gains for shareholders and/or 
to serve their own interest. These issues are examined and empirically tested in 
Chapters 4-6 of this thesis.
2.5 MERITS OF THE RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT
The forgoing institutional analysis indicates that the PRC is a large economy 
with growing financial markets and rapidly developing legislative and regulatory 
infrastructures. As several commentators (e.g., Shen, 2000) acknowledge, insurance 
will undoubtedly play a major role in the future development and growth of the 
Chinese corporate sector, particularly in alleviating financial uncertainty and 
enhancing risk management. More specifically, however, China is considered to be an 
interesting environment within which to conduct this study in four important regards 
as follows:
1. Ostensibly, insurance could be more important to the PRC-based corporations
than to companies operating from more developed countries. For instance, as
27 In October 1998, the CSRC issued a rule to require the separation o f the management o f  listed 
companies from that o f their parent companies. Thus, it is expected that the number o f “dual positions” 
in PRC-based publicly listed companies will decrease over the next few years.
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noted in section 2.4.1, it is not common for Chinese investors to hold well- 
diversified portfolios of investments as share ownership tends to be heavily 
concentrated in most PRC-based publicly listed companies. Additionally, 
shares held by the State and institutions are not publicly tradable (e.g., see Xu 
and Wang, 1999; Chen et al., 2000). Furthermore, as Tian (2001) notes, most 
Chinese publicly listed companies tend not to be sufficiently large (in terms of 
their total asset size) to self-retain insurable risks effectively and few o f them 
can diversify their businesses geographically (e.g., most Chinese enterprises 
only operate in one business location - see Hussain and Zhuang, 1997). These 
observations thus underscore the need for Chinese companies to use property 
insurance to manage their asset-loss risk.
2. As noted earlier in section 2.3.2, as a result of regulatory control over property 
insurance premium rates and insurers’ underwriting practice, property insurers 
operating in the PRC do not have much scope to vary policy contract 
conditions in order to protect themselves effectively against information 
asymmetries (between themselves and insureds). This inability of PRC-based 
insurers to charge risk-commensurate premium rates implies that, prima facie, 
high-risk companies are unlikely to be seriously deterred from purchasing 
property insurance28. This feature thus provides us with an unique opportunity 
to investigate differences in the insurance behavior of both low- and high-risk 
Chinese corporation.
3. As mentioned previously in section 2.3.2, property insurance prices are tightly 
regulated in the PRC, but the insurance purchase decisions of managers per se 
are not regulated (e.g., see Wu, 1996; Shen, 2000; Wang, 2000). In China, all 
insurance underwriters have to comply with the benchmark premium rates and 
the risk-rating rules set by the insurance regulatory authority. Only a limited 
range of premium-rate fluctuation is allowed by the insurance industry 
regulator to reflect short-term changes in market conditions. In addition, there 
were neither legislative changes nor regulatory alterations that could have
28 However, managers in high (physical asset loss) risk companies will have the choice to adopt 
alternative risk management solutions to commercial insurance (e.g., self-insurance) if  the premium 
rate offered in the market is deemed to be greater than the expected value o f prospective losses.
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substantially affected property insurance premium rates over the period 1997- 
99. Therefore, insurance premium rates in the PRC are expected to be 
influenced less by competitive market forces and differences in the risk-rating 
practices of underwriters than might be the case in some more developed 
countries (e.g., the UK). As a result, variations in the corporate spending on 
property insurance incurred by PRC-based publicly listed companies are more 
likely to reflect the changes in managerial discretion over insurance decisions 
rather than the confounding changes in insurance companies’ underwriting 
practices and/or sharp movements in market prices. In other words, in China, 
annual total insurance premiums will primarily vary because of firm-specific 
differences in the volume of coverage29. It is considered that this feature 
constitutes an important institutional advantage for this project as it enables 
more robust test of the hypotheses derived in this thesis (Chapter 4) to be 
carried out.
4. As noted earlier in section 2.3.3.3, PRC-based publicly listed companies are 
required to comply with uniform and mandatory accounting practices (i.e., 
Accounting System for Joint-stock Companies (1993)) and financial 
information disclosure formats (i.e., Contents and Formats o f Annual Reports 
for Joint-stock Companies (1997-99) (Lin and Chen, 1999; Xiao, 1999). 
Consequently, the research results reported in this thesis (Chapter 6) are 
unlikely to be adversely affected by major differences in accounting 
treatments and financial reporting practices among companies. Additionally, 
published data on PRC-based publicly listed companies should enable 
potentially interesting empirical tests of hypotheses to be carried out. For 
instance, the mix of the State, private and foreign ownership structures in the 
Chinese corporate sector could influence the extent to which companies are 
subject to the risk of financial distress. The desire to manage solvency risk 
could thus influence the corporate decision to purchase property insurance in 
the PRC.
29 To some degree, the level o f annual premiums paid by Chinese companies may also vary because o f 
differences in expected claims costs arising from (omitted) firm-specific effects (e.g., in terms o f 
potential adverse selection/moral hazard problems). However, using a fixed-effects panel design that 
allows the intercept to vary cross-sectionally, I am able to capture the potential influence o f omitted 
variables (see section 5.5.42).
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2.6 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
This chapter provides background information on the institutional 
environment within which this study is conducted and the salient traits of PRC-based 
publicly listed companies. Additionally, the chapter considers that the PRC provides a 
unique and interesting environment within which to study the determinants of 
corporate demand for property insurance. For example, the tightly controlled and 
generally stable property insurance pricing over the period 1997-99 means that 
corporate insurance spending could reflect on closely the managerial discretion over 
insurance decisions rather than the influence of external market conditions. It is 
considered that these attributes will enable a cleaner and more robust test of the 
research hypotheses to be carried out. The various theories and hypotheses that could 
help to identify the determinants of corporate purchase of property insurance are 
reviewed in the next chapter of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY SELECTION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The extant academic literature contains several positive-descriptive theories 
and hypotheses that could usefully explain and predict the corporate purchase of 
insurance. The objectives of this chapter are two-fold. First, the chapter introduces the 
key features and main merits/criticisms of positive-descriptive theories. Second, the 
chapter reviews critically the relevant positive-descriptive literature in order to 
determine an appropriate theoretical framework within which the empirical part of 
this study can be carried out. The literature review encompasses the following 
theoretical frameworks.
(1) Expected-Utility Theory.
(2) Contingency Theory.
(3) Market Signalling Theory.
(4) Option Pricing Theory.
(5) Stakeholder Theory.
(6) Transaction Cost Economics.
(7) Agency Theory.
Table 3.1 summarizes the above-mentioned theories and hypotheses employed 
in the literature, together with their important characteristics. The extent to which 
each of these theories and hypotheses provides a tenable framework for the study of 
the determinants of the corporate purchase of property insurance is examined in 
sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.7 below.
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3.2 POSITIVE-DESCRIPTIVE THEORIES
3.2.1 Key Features
There are two distinct types of economic theories - normative-prescriptive and 
positive-descriptive (e.g., see Jensen, 1983; Keita, 1997). The former utilizes 
researchers’ value judgments (either explicitly or implicitly) to generate prescriptions 
of the best practice on “what ought to be”. In contrast, the latter adopts an objective 
(i.e., “value-free”) view to describe, explain and predict economic activities such as 
financial management behavior (e.g., see Leftwich, 1979; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1990; Walton, 1991). In view of their different nature, researchers have suggested that 
normative-prescriptive and positive-descriptive theories should be investigated 
through the use of different research methods (e.g., see Mayers and Smith, 1981; 
Lipsey, 1989; Keita, 1997). For example, positive-descriptive prepositions can 
normally be confirmed/refuted by means of observation and/or empirical testing. 
Normative-prescriptive theories, however, are often interpreted using personal value 
judgments of observed phenomena (e.g., see Keita, 1997). Owing its philosophical 
and methodological allegiance to positivism, contemporary neoclassical economics 
that began to flourish in the 1950s is viewed by scholars to attain a cognitive status 
that qualifies itself “scientific” (e.g., see Keita, 1997). Since the mid-1950s, 
positive-descriptive research questions have also become the primary focus of finance 
and insurance research (e.g., see Smith, 1986). Indeed, as researchers (e.g., Jensen, 
1983; Smith, 1986) claim, this research orientation is important because normative 
economic questions (e.g., what is the optimal action(s) in policymaking?) cannot be 
answered effectively without a correct understanding of how alternative actions might 
affect outcomes. This understanding, as such scholars contend, can only be 
established through the use of a positive-descriptive research paradigm. As a result, 
various positive-descriptive theories have been developed and advanced in the 
academic literature to explain observed economic phenomena including the corporate 
purchase of insurance (e.g., see Smith, 1986).
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3.2.2 Main Criticisms and Merits
Debate continues in the academic literature regarding the relative criticisms 
and merits of the normative-prescriptive and positive-descriptive theories (e.g., see 
Keita, 1997). Positive-descriptive theories have tended to be subject to two major 
types of criticism - namely, the conceptual basis employed and the type of research 
methods used (e.g., see Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). For example, critics like Tinker, 
Merino and Neimark (1982) argue that positive-descriptive theories are value-laden 
on the grounds that academic research is not socially neutral. Indeed, proponents of 
positive economic theory (e.g., see Watts and Zimmerman, 1990) acknowledge the 
importance of values (e.g., researcher’s and user’s preferences) in aspects of research 
design, such as the choice of topics, methods, and assumptions. Positive-descriptive 
theories have also been criticized for research method-related issues such as the lack 
of explanatory power in empirical tests and the possibility that unstated “alternative 
hypotheses” (often socio-cultural-based) could be relevant to the phenomena under 
investigation (e.g., see Ball, Foster, Nicholas and Jensen, 1982). However, in their 
defense, advocates of positive-descriptive theories (e.g., see Christie and Richard, 
1990; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990) maintain that these issues could arise from 
researchers’ limited understanding of theory and the lack of econometric skills rather 
than due to shortcomings in positive-descriptive theories per se. They add that many 
procedural problems can be addressed by using alternative proxies, incorporating tests 
for omitted variable bias and improving the linkage between theory constructs and 
empirical tests through better variable definition and measurement. On the whole, 
Watts and Zimmerman, (1990, p. 149) point out that “ . . .  [these] criticisms have failed 
in [practical] tests because they had little influence on research. Researchers have not 
changed their approach. Referees and editors of journals have not asked researchers to 
alter their methodology. [Thus] the debate . . .  has been less useful than the discovery 
and explanation of empirical regularities”.
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A major attribute of positive-descriptive economic theories lies in the fact that 
tthey have been successful in discovering empirical systematic patterns in many 
complex economic activities, and providing explanations/predictions of them (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1990). Therefore, positive-descriptive theories provide intuitively 
plausible frameworks to guide empirical research (e.g., see Demski, 1988; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). The corporate purchase of insurance, as a part o f the 
organization’s managerial financial decision-making set, could thus be explained by 
the application of financial economics-based positive-descriptive theories (e.g., see 
Smith and Stulz, 1985; Smith, 1986; Caillaud, Dionne and Jullien, 2000; Doherty, 
2000a). As such, the main positive-descriptive-type theories that have been used in 
prior insurance-based research are reviewed extensively in the remainder o f this 
chapter. Normative-prescriptive-type theories (e.g., Marxist theory) that critique and 
prescribe improvements to corporate financial behavior, however, are deemed not to 
be appropriate for the stated purpose of this study. As such, this body of theoretical 
literature is considered to be outside of the ambit of the literature review in this study.
3.3 ANALYSIS OF POSITIVE-DESCRIPTIVE THEORIES
3.3.1 Expected-Utility Theory
Expected-utility theory, first developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstem 
(1947), postulates that investors are typically expected utility maximization agents 
and risk averters (i.e., with concave expected utility functions)30. Therefore, the 
decision rule under uncertainty for such an investor is to select a course of action that 
either maximizes the expected return for a given level of risk or minimizes risk for a 
given level of return (e.g., see Copeland and Weston, 1992). An important feature of 
this theory is that it incorporates individual risk preferences in decision-making under 
uncertainty. As a result, expected-utility theory has been widely used in the analysis of
30 Utility is a scale of measurement of the satisfaction derived from having monetary wealth.
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risk choice decisions in the neo-classical economics literature (e.g., see Doherty, 
2000b).
Expected-utility theory also has implications for the analysis of insurance 
purchases, because it could help to reveal the propensity for an individual to insure 
(e.g., see Garven, 1996; Caillaud et al., 2000; Doherty, 2000b). For instance, Doherty 
(2000b) notes that an individual with a concave utility function is likely to insure 
either fully at actuarially fair prices or partially in the presence of the transaction costs 
of insurance. Additionally, risk aversion has long been regarded as the primary factor 
that motivates the insurance purchases by individuals and corporations in the 
insurance literature (e.g., see Mossin, 1968; Schlesinger, 1981; Szpiro, 1985). 
Therefore, the expected-utility framework provides important insights into risk 
decision-making and hence, could be a conceptually useful basis for the analysis of 
corporate hedging (e.g., insurance) by individuals, individual proprietorships, 
partnerships, or closely-held corporations (e.g., see Smith and Stulz, 1985; Smith, 
1986).
However, expected-utility theory has been subject to extensive critique in the 
insurance literature. There are three main shortcomings that weaken substantially the 
application of expected-utility theory in this study. First, as Doherty (2000b) observes, 
a technical difficulty with applying the expected-utility theory is that researchers have 
to calculate the expected utility of the decision-maker according to the precise form of 
hisfrier utility function. However, this information is often unavailable to researchers. 
Second, expected-utility theory is frequently criticized for its failure to consider the 
influence of external factors, such as competitive markets and industry regulation, 
upon corporate insurance decisions (e.g., see Garven, 1987). Third, expected-utility 
theory cannot satisfactorily explain the purchase of insurance by large and 
widely-held companies (e.g., see Mayers and Smith, 1982, 1986; Main, 1982a, 1982b, 
2000; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Garven, 1996). This is because, according to the CAPM 
(Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966) and its later variants, shareholders can
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reduce diversifiable risk cost-effectively through the management of their personal 
investment portfolios in the capital markets. Therefore, on the surface, the reduction 
of diversifiable (firm-specific) risk through (actuarially unfair) insurance may not by 
itself add value for the shareholders of large and widely-held companies (e.g., see 
Mayers and Smith, 1982; Main, 1982a, 1982b; Doherty, 2000b)31.
Additionally, Smith (1986) reports that the corporate risk management 
literature using the expected-utility framework has paid insufficient attention to the 
fundamental differences between individuals and large and widely-held corporations 
(e.g., in terms of multiple contracting parties). Consequently, many applications of 
expected-utility theory have been developed on the over-simplified assumption that a 
firm can be treated as a risk-averse individual that can be represented by a single 
utility function (e.g., see Borland and Garvey, 1994; Doherty, 2000b; Main, 2000). 
This treatment thus ignores the “nexus of contracts” nature of the firm and the role of 
insurance in controlling agency conflicts (e.g., between debtholders and shareholders) 
(e.g., see Garven, 1987; Mayers and Smith, 1990; Doherty, 2000b)32. Indeed, Doherty 
(2000b, p. 50) adds that “ . . . corporate risk management is more complex [than an 
individual’s] and [thus] requires a study of interaction between [its] stakeholders . . . 
the [appropriate] description process must reflect the mechanisms with which these 
claims [of stakeholders] are resolved and how this resolution affects the value of the 
firm”.
While some researchers claim that risk aversion by stakeholders of a company 
- for example, managers (Tufano, 1996), bondholders (Davidson et al., 1992), and/or 
employees (Parry and Parry, 1991) - could to some extent induce the corporate 
purchase of insurance, it is in essence the application of risk aversion within the
31 In view o f the significant premium loading factors in transacting insurance (e.g., insurer’s expenses 
and profit), investors may be worse off as a result of insurance hedging (Main, 1982a).
32 According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), a firm is a nexus o f contracts among various constituents 
such as shareholders, bondholders, managers, employees and customers.
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general context of agency perspective that is arguably more important. Brennan (1995) 
thus argues that to provide meaningful insights into the corporate purchase of 
insurance, the notion of risk aversion must incorporate contracting relationships in the 
modem corporation. As such, expected-utility theory is deemed not to be an 
appropriate framework for the present study.
3.3.2 Contingency Theory
Contingency theory derives from the organizational science discipline and is 
predicated largely on the notion that organizational structures and management 
systems are determined by a combination of external factors (e.g., market competition) 
and firm-specific characteristics (e.g., technology and size) (e.g., see Ginzberg, 1980; 
Anderson and Lanen, 1999; Donaldson, 2001). The extent to which organizations are 
influenced by such contingent factors is deemed to be reflected in their business 
performance/effectiveness -  i.e., a close fit leads to high performance and misfit 
results in low performance (e.g., see Woodward, 1965; Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985; 
Donaldson, 2001). In contingency theory, managers are thus predicted to seek a fit 
and/or avoid misfit by adapting organizational structures and systems to accommodate 
environmental and firm-specific changes (e.g., see Astley and Van de Ven, 1983; 
Donaldson, 2001). As a result, Donaldson (2001) argues that organizational 
performance is dependent upon the effectiveness of organizational structure 
responding to key contingencies such as business cycles, market competition, 
investment diversification, and operational and financial risk. Reported financial 
performance, in turn, could drive and induce changes in organizational structure and 
management systems (e.g., through divestment strategies).
In the contingency theory literature, organizational performance/effectiveness 
is defined broadly to include financial profitability and operational efficiency (Child, 
1975), stakeholders’ satisfaction (Dewar and Werbel, 1979), and product and service 
quality (Argote, 1982). In contrast, organizational structures and systems invariably
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incorporate various management functions, such as strategic decision-making 
processes (Frederickson, 1984), human resource management procedures (Delery and 
Doty, 1996), and corporate accounting and reporting systems (Nair and Frank, 1980; 
Cooke and Wallace, 1990; Anderson and Lanen, 1999). Important contingencies 
identified in prior studies embrace external influences (e.g., environmental 
uncertainties, market competition and industry regulation) and internal (firm-specific) 
factors such as firm size, the state of technology, form of strategy (e.g., diversification 
versus consolidation), operational and financial risks and so on (e.g., see Donaldson, 
2001).
Proponents of contingency theory (e.g., Ginzberg, 1980; Anderson and Lanen, 
1999) posit that the framework helps to promote one’s understanding of complex 
organizational phenomena such as the inter-entity differences in organizational 
structure and management practices (e.g., corporate hedging). Indeed, Ashby and 
Diacon (1998) employ a contingency-type approach to examine the motives for 
companies to purchase insurance in an oligopolistic market, which is characterized by 
a small number of relatively large companies competing with each other. They argue 
that corporate hedging activities, such as the purchase of insurance, could be 
influenced by managers’ strategic responses to external market competition. For 
instance, Ashby and Diacon (1998, p.45) show that to maximize profitability, market 
participants may collectively purchase insurance in order to reduce industry-wide 
business risks such as those affecting firms’ outputs and prices. Additionally, Das and 
Teng (2001) point out that strategic risk management (including insurance) might 
vaiy across companies depending on managers’ perceptions of contingent factors such 
as environmental uncertainty. Thus, contingency theory could be an intuitively 
attractive theoretical framework within which to examine the relation between the 
level of corporate insurance and contingency factors. For example, external 
(environmental) contingencies (e.g., market competition and industry regulation) and 
internal (firm-specific) characteristics (e.g., company size and leverage) could be 
important determinants of the corporate decision to purchase insurance.
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Despite its conceptual appeal, contingency theory has been subject to 
extensive critique in the literature (e.g., see Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978; 
Schoonhoven, 1981; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Donaldson, 2001; Spekle, 2001). In 
essence, there are three main shortcomings that weaken substantially the case for 
employing contingency theory in this study. First, Barney (1990) raises the criticism 
that contingency theory has traditionally drawn little inspiration from the economics 
o f the firm and rather appears to be isolated from it. This means that economic 
motives for organizational change (e.g., managerial self-interest objectives) tend to 
have been underplayed conceptually and thus remain largely unaddressed in 
contingency theory literature. Second, as Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978) and Hopper 
and Powell (1985) argue, contingency theory is not based on a finite and clearly 
defined set of propositions that are easy to measure consistently and test empirically. 
Indeed, Spekle (2001, p.420) further adds that “ . . . this approach is more a general 
idea than an articulated theory in the sense that it has no a priori intuition of its own 
as to what the pertinent factors are and as to their likely consequences . . . [thus] 
notions about the variables and their effects . . . [often] come from [diverse] sources 
outside contingency theory per se”. Given the dynamic socio-economic environment 
facing companies in China (e.g., with regard to State policies), extreme complexity 
could arise from applying a contingency theory-based approach in this research 
project. Third, support for the propositions of contingency theory inevitably involves 
demonstrating empirically that the fit between organizational structure/management 
systems and contingencies can affect positively organizational (financial) 
performance. However, due to the lack of insurance-related empirical studies using 
contingency theory, the nature of the fit and the extent to which environmental and 
organizational factors underpin the corporate insurance decision is not clear from the 
literature (e.g., see Anderson and Lanen, 1999; Spekle, 2001). For these reasons, it is 
felt that contingency theory does not provide a sufficiently developed framework 
within which to conduct this research project.
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3.3.3 Market Signalling Theory
Market signalling theory is predicated on the notion that there are 
information asymmetries between corporate insiders (e.g., company managers) and 
outsiders (e.g., investors) with the former possessing private firm-specific knowledge 
(e.g., regarding investment opportunities) that the latter does not have (see Ross, 1977; 
Miller and Rock, 1985; Levy and Lazarovich-Porat, 1995). Signalling theory posits 
that to reduce information asymmetries and distinguish a particular company from 
others in the market, managers have incentives to signal inside information to 
uninformed outsiders by various means such as the voluntary disclosure of “good 
news” and/or the withholding of “bad news” (e.g., see Verrechia, 1983; Dye, 1985)33. 
Signalling devices could also include dividend policy choice, capital structure mix 
and the type of hedging activities, amongst others (e.g., see Talmor, 1981; Darrough 
and Stoughton, 1986; Brennan, 1995). Although the signalling process may be costly, 
firms might benefit from it in that the public dissemination of information could help 
to reveal the true value of the firm to the market without their managers disclosing 
potentially costly proprietary (confidential) information (e.g., see Talmor, 1981).
Various signalling-type hypotheses have also been developed to explain the 
corporate purchase of insurance and other hedging activities (e.g., see Doherty, 
2000a). For example, efficient managers might use insurance to signal their 
professionalism and managerial ability to outsiders (e.g., see DeMarzo and Duffie, 
1995; Han, 1996; Tufano, 1996). This is because hedging can help to reduce the 
amount of “noise” in the reported annual financial performance of firms, thereby 
making reported performance a more credible signal of the efficiency of managers34.
33 These incentives could include the desire to increase the traded value o f the firm (Fishman and 
Hagerty, 1989), reduce the market cost o f capital (Diamond and Verrechia, 1991), or enhance the 
corporate public image (Firth, 1979). “Good news”, for example, could be the successful launch of a 
new product, while “bad news” may arise where annual earnings are worse than expected.
34 “Noise” refers to exogenous factors that are outside management control such as accidental losses 
(e.g., due to flooding), economic cycles, business interruption and technical problems o f production 
that could not have been foreseen.
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Similarly, Doherty (2000a) contends that corporate insurance may also be used to 
Ihedge earnings risk arising out of transient events and so leave the remaining 
persistent earnings fluctuations as a better signal for the underlying value of the 
company35. Grace and Rebello (1993) and Rebello (1995) further argue that insurance 
can be used by company managers with private information on expected cash 
flows/insurable losses to signal the “quality” of the firm to financial markets. 
Additionally, the purchase of insurance by a highly levered firm may signal to 
bondholders that managers are serious about maximizing the total value for all 
stakeholders rather than shareholders only (e.g., see Thakor, 1982; Campbell and 
Kracaw, 1990; Han, 1996). Main (1982b, 2000) also suggests that management may 
use insurance as a signal of their financial expertise and as such, the true risk profile 
o f the company will accordingly be revealed to markets through the process of 
commercial insurance underwriting.
Levy and Lazarovich-Porat (1995) argue that signalling theory, by providing a 
plausible explanation, has conceptual appeal in bridging the gap between theoretical 
predictions and firms’ actual financial management practices, Paul (1992, p.483) 
further adds that “ . . . investors are interested in a signal to the extent that it resolves 
uncertainty about the firm’s ultimate payoffs. The more uncertainty it resolves about 
firm payoffs, the more weight the signal receives in the stock price”. This view thus 
could provide useful explanation for observed corporate risk management activities 
such as the purchase of insurance. Indeed, managers of publicly listed companies 
operating in an uncertain emerging market, like China, might disclose insurance 
details to the business community both formally (e.g., via prospectuses and/or the 
published annual report and accounts) and/or informally (e.g., through private 
communication) in order to signal their underlying economic value to prospective
35 The tom “transient events” refers to events occurred accidentally (e.g., a fire damage) and contain 
little information of a company’s future earnings potential. In contrast, “persistent events” (e.g., a 
product liability claim) often arise from inherent operational reasons (e.g., weakness in the product 
quality control system) and so are likely to have implications for future trends in annual earnings 
(Doherty, 2000a).
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investors.
Signalling theory, nevertheless, has been subject to some controversy in the 
academic literature. First, some researchers (e.g., Teoh and Hwang, 1991; Skinner,
1994) contest that signalling could produce biased predictions in that managers will 
disclose only “good news” and withhold “bad news”. In contrast, Skinner (1994) 
argues that managers may have incentives to disclose “bad news” in order to avoid 
possible litigation from investors. Second, the predictions of signalling theory are 
often difficult to test and so not surprisingly, the framework lacks widespread 
empirical support. Indeed, Levy and Lazarovich-Porat (1995, p.39) also observe that 
“ .. . virtually all [extant] signalling studies are theoretical. . . however, it is difficult, 
if  not possible, to test signalling effects empirically”. Such difficulty can arise from 
the ambiguity of theoretical predictions (e.g., see Miller and Rock, 1985; Puelz, 1992; 
Brennan, 1995). For instance, Brennan (1995, p. 13) claims that “.... [signalling 
models] generally fail to yield empirical predictions beyond the ones for which they 
were custom tailored . . . [and] fail to show why one [signalling] instrument should 
be chosen over another. Moreover, the choice of objective function for the informed 
insider in signalling models has remained a matter of ad hoc convenience, and 
sometimes controversy”. Difficulties associated with the application of empirical tests 
car further arise from technical problems such as the inability to hold all other 
parameters constant (Levy and Lazarovich-Porat, 1995) or the lack of key information 
(Kjdwell, Sorensen and Wachowicz, 1987). For example, testing the signalling effect 
o f debt insurance could involve comparing the borrowing costs with insurance 
puichase (allowing for the cost of insurance) with the borrowing costs without 
Insurance for an issuer. However, the latter form of information is “ . . . often not 
dirsctly observable and must be estimated for each insured bond issue” (Kidwell et al., 
1957, p.304).
As Puelz (1992) notes, such limitations with the empirical testing of signalling 
tihory have severely restricted its application in empirical studies and therefore,
signalling theory is not considered to be an appropriate framework for the stated 
purpose of this project.
3.3.4 Option Pricing Theory
Option pricing theory postulates that decision choices (options) are contingent 
claims on the value of an underlying asset whose value can be modelled by five 
factors -  the price of the underlying asset, the risk of the underlying asset, the 
risk-free rate of return, the exercise price, and the time to maturity (e.g., see Black and 
Scholes, 1973; Brennan, 1979; Cox, Ross and Runbinstein, 1979)36. Option pricing 
theory is relevant to many areas of corporate finance as securities could be interpreted 
as portfolios of puts and calls on the firm (Cox et al., 1979). Copeland and Weston 
(1992, p.289) also note that 44 . . . almost all financial assets are really contingent 
claims . . . [common shares,] risky debt, insurance, warrants, and convertible debt 
may all be thought of as options”. For instance, equity in a levered company can be 
interpreted as a call option on the market value of the firm with the striking price 
equal to the face value of debt (e.g., see Black and Scholes, 1973). Thus, rational 
shareholders should exercise the call option by paying off the debt and keep any 
excess for themselves when the firm value exceeds the debt payoff. In contrast, they 
may choose to let the option expire and pass the ownership of the firm to creditors 
when the value of the firm drops below the face value of debt. Doherty (2000b) terms 
the latter as 44the default put option” of shareholders. He further suggests that the 
value of equity can be denoted as the value of the firm minus the face value o f debt 
plus the value of default put option; while the value of debt can be determined as the 
face value of debt minus the value of default put option by shareholders. Such 
reasoning thus adds clear option-type characteristics to corporate financial structure 
and the claims of various stakeholders on the firm (e.g., see Copeland and Weston,
36 Options are derivative instruments that give the holder the discretion to buy/sell an underlying asset 
at an agreed price before or at a future date. However, there is an obligation for the option writer to 
fulfill the contractual terms if  the holder chooses to exercise the option (e.g., see Copeland and Weston, 
1992).
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1992; Doherty, 2000b).
Option pricing theory also has important implications for corporate risk 
management in at least three regards as follows. First, options can be used to form 
investment portfolios in order to hedge corporate risk. Second, option pricing theory 
can be applied to the economic analysis of insurance because insurance policies, as 
contracts contingent upon the occurrence of insured events, tend to have 
“forward-like” or “option-like” features (Doherty, 2000b). For example, Doherty 
(2000b) argues that to insured, an insurance contract (policy) with deductible is 
essentially a call option with an exercise price equal to the deductible. Indeed, Hsieh 
et al. (1994) argue from a different angle that purchasing insurance is similar to 
holding a put option written by an insurance company. Third, as Doherty (2000b) 
contends, managing the default put option held by shareholders can be perceived as 
being at the heart of corporate risk management. This is because rational stakeholders 
are expected to behave strategically to affect the value of the default put option to 
their respective advantages -  for example, the shareholders to increase the value of 
the put option and the bondholders to reduce it. According to option pricing theory, 
the value of the default put option by shareholders is affected by the overall level of 
risk associated with total firm value. For instance, if a firm’s activities become more 
risky, the value of default put option held by shareholders increases. This, in turn, 
should have a direct adverse effect on the value of debt and the market cost of capital. 
It may also cause distortions in investment decisions as a consequence of the asset 
substitution and underinvestment problems37. Thus, managing risk and lowering the 
value of default put option by shareholders could help to “ . . . eliminate this 
opportunistic game playing and make everyone better off [through the saving in 
agency costs and the improved investment decision making]” (Doherty, 2000b, p. 184).
37 The asset substitution problem refers to the behavior for company managers to switch to a high-risk 
investment project after debt has been issued. In contrast, the underinvestment problem, first advanced 
by Myers (1977), refers to the possibility that after an event loss, projects with a positive net present 
value might be rejected by companies because their managers feel that the benefits of such investment 
will be realized mainly by debtholders rather than the shareholders with whom managers’ economic 
interests may be aligned via share option plans (e.g., see Doherty, 2000b).
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Therefore, option pricing theory could provide useful insights into the analysis of 
corporate risk management activities, including the purchase of insurance. Indeed, 
some prior studies have applied option pricing models to examine the demand and 
supply of insurance (e.g., see Hsieh et al, 1994; Doherty and Garven, 1996).
Some researchers (e.g., Rubinstein, 1974; Brennan, 1979) note, however, that 
the conceptual appeal of option pricing theory rests on the measurability of the value 
of the underlying assets on which an option is written. However, Doherty (2000b) 
observes that in contrast to an option that is written on another type of traded financial 
asset (e.g., shares), an insurance policy is written to cover an insured from accidental 
perils (e.g., a fire loss or liability suit). Therefore, he avers (p. 189) that “ . . .  it would 
be inappropriate to price the insurance policy using [the] Black-Scholes [option 
pricing model], because the probability distribution that underlies insurance losses is 
unlikely to be the same as that which is assumed to specify the movement o f stock 
prices”. Doherty and Garven (1996) apply a discrete-time option-pricing model to 
estimate the “fair” rate of return for a property-liability insurance company. But as 
they acknowledge (p. 1048), “ . . . the rationale for the use of this model is that the 
financial claims [of stakeholders] can be modelled as options written on the income 
generated by the insurer’s asset portfolio. This portfolio consists mostly of traded 
financial assets and is therefore relatively easy to value. . . . [However,] such 
conditions do not necessarily prevail in other [non-financial] industries”. It is felt that 
this major limitation thus inhibits the use of option pricing theory as a framework for 
the empirical test of the determinants of property insurance purchase in the Chinese 
corporate sector where the asset portfolios of many companies are likely to be 
extremely difficult to value from published sources of information.
3.3.5 Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theory, as mainly developed by Freeman (1984), postulates that 
various constituents, such as capital suppliers (i.e., shareholders, debtholders) and
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I non-investor stakeholders (e.g., managers, employees, customers), possess legitimate 
and equal claims on a modem corporation (e.g., see Donaldson and Preston, 1995) . 
Legitimacy can be established either through explicit contractual obligations (e.g., 
debt covenants) and/or by unwritten implicit arrangements (e.g., continuing after-sale 
service promises to customers) (e.g., see Adams and Hardwick, 1998). Stakeholder 
theorists - Cornell and Shapiro (1987), amongst others - also develop the concept of 
net organizational capital as an analytical tool to link a firm’s market value and its 
implicit claims39. Predicated on the notion that the market value of a firm depends on 
the price at which both its explicit and implicit claims can be sold, stakeholder theory 
posits that corporate management aims to strike a balance between the diverse 
legitimate claims of its stakeholders -  both explicit and implicit claimants - in order to 
achieve better economic performance, ceteris paribus (e.g., see Cornell and Shapiro, 
1987; Roberts, 1992; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Stakeholder theory suggests that 
non-investor stakeholders also “ . . . play an important role in corporate financial 
policy, and [thus] constitute a vital link between corporate strategy [e.g., hedging] and 
corporate finance . . . [this] leads to new interpretations of classic problems in 
finance” (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987, p.5). Therefore, proponents of stakeholder 
theory (e.g., Barton et al., 1989; Hill and Jones, 1992; Roberts, 1992) conclude that 
stakeholder theory provides a viable framework within which to examine 
management decision-making strategies40.
38 As Freeman (1984, p.31) reports, a widely accepted definition of stakeholders is “ . . .  those groups 
without whose support the organization would cease to exist”.
39 Organizational assets represent intangible resources (e.g., reputation for prudent management) 
arising from the selling of implicit claims and equals the potential revenues from using these assets. 
Organizational liabilities equal the expected costs o f honoring a firm’s current and future implicit 
claims. The difference between such assets and liabilities thus represents the net organizational capital 
accruing to shareholders. Positive net organizational capital should increase the firm value (e.g., see 
Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Barton, Hill and Sundaram, 1989).
40 For instance, Cornell and Shapiro (1987) maintain that stakeholder theory can help to explain the 
cross-sectional variation of capital structure among companies. They hypothesize that firms with higher 
levels o f net organizational capital are more likely to be predominantly financed by equity.
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Cornell and Shapiro (1987) report that the relevance of stakeholder theory to 
explaining corporate behavior (e.g., hedging through insurance) lies in its ability to 
link firm value to the impact of corporate policy on the expected pay-offs to a firm’s 
implicit claimants. Because the expected pay-offs on implicit claims are uncertain 
ex-ante and contingent on the future condition of the firm, tacit claimants thus run the 
default risk by the firm even when the possibility of bankruptcy is remote41. 
Therefore, the value of implicit claims (e.g., of customers) tends to be sensitive to 
information about the firm’s financial condition, including its influential financial 
policy (e.g., capital structure and corporate hedging). For instance, an announcement 
of shocks, such as a major uninsured loss and/or product recall, should induce 
stakeholders to anticipate the possible reduction in the pay-offs on implicit claims. 
This expectation should thus reduce the prices of current and future implicit claims of 
the firm and often this tends to have a larger negative impact on the value of the firm 
than the actual cash outlays involved. Indeed, following such reasoning, some 
researchers (e.g., see Grillet, 1992b, 1993) have attempted to explain the motives for 
corporate purchase of insurance from a stakeholder perspective. For instance, Grillet 
(1992b, 1993) argues that insurance can help to reduce the uncertainty with the 
expected pay-offs on implicit claims by lowering the possibility of financial distress 
and reducing the cash flow volatility risk of a firm42. This, in turn, could raise the 
price at which a firm’s future implicit claims can be sold, thereby boosting a firm’s 
net organizational capital and market value.
Nevertheless, many researchers (e.g., Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Barton et al.,
1989) recognize the technical difficulties of testing empirically stakeholder theory. 
For example, Barton et al. (1989, p.37) recognize that “ . . .  the main obstacle . . .  lies
41 Cornell and Shapiro (1987, p.6) argue that implicit claims are often “ . . .  too nebulous and state 
contingent to reduce to writing at a reasonable cost, [and thus,] they [normally] cannot be unbundled 
and traded independently from the goods and services the firm buys and sells”. Therefore, implicit 
claims have little legal standing.
42 Wruck (1990, p.421) defines financial distress as “ . . .  a situation where cash flow is insufficient to 
cover current obligations”. Financial distress does not, therefore, necessarily lead to actual bankruptcy.
i
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in the difficulty of operationalizing the net organizational capital construct and to 
assess the nature of the information possessed by the firm’s stakeholders. . . [This is 
because] implicit organizational assets and claims are neither formally stated nor 
formally priced . . . [and] are not traded in any public market place. Hence the direct 
measurement of net organizational capital is problematic”. As a result, stakeholder 
theory often lacks widespread empirical support (e.g., see Donaldson and Preston,
1995). It is considered that such limitation precludes the use of stakeholder theory in 
explaining insurance purchases in the developing Chinese corporate sector. The 
Chinese market is also one where the explicit and implicit claims of certain 
stakeholders (notably the State) predominate over the interests of others.
3.3.6 Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is predicated on two major assumptions of 
contracting bahavior -  bounded rationality and opportunism (e.g., see Williamson,
1990)43. TCE also posits that economic transactions differ in three key regards - 
namely, asset specificity44, uncertainty and frequency (e.g., see Williamson, 1985). 
Therefore, transaction costs can vary depending upon the interaction between 
bounded rationality, opportunism, and transaction-specific factors such as asset 
specificity (e.g., see Blair and Karserman, 1983). In addition, proponents o f TCE 
(e.g., Williamson, 1985, 1988, 1990) argue that there is usually more than one form of 
institutional arrangement/governance structure available to organize economic
43 Bounded rationality means that although economic agents intend to behave in a purely rational 
maimer, they are limited by their inability to anticipate, describe, or pre-specify responses for all future 
contingencies involved in a contract (e.g., see Hart, 1995). Opportunism, which is similar to moral 
hazard, refers to self-interest seeking behavior with guile - Le., the ability of contracting parties to use 
cunning to extract residual profits or quasi rents (e .g , see Williamson, 1990). Quasi rents are returns in 
excess o f that required to maintain a resource’s service, to recover sunk investment costs and short-run 
opportimity costs o f the resources committed (e.g., see Jensen, 1986).
44 Williamson (1990, p. 12) defines asset specificity as “ . . .  the degree to which an asset can be 
redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value”. Asset 
specificity can further be classified into site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset 
specificity, and dedicated asset specificity. For a discussion o f asset specificity in an insurance 
industry context, see Adams (1997).
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transactions. Such structures may range from centralized hierarchies at one extreme to 
fragmented individual market contracting at the other, with mixed or intermediate 
modes (i.e., hybrids) in-between. However, these governance structures are expected 
to differ in both the type of control mechanisms that they employ and their relative 
efficiency (e.g., see Williamson, 1985). The main tenet of TCE is for managers and 
other parties to align contractual relationships with governance structures in a 
transaction cost economizing way (e.g., see Shelanski and Klein, 1995). Therefore, 
the likelihood of observing integrated governance structures (e.g., vertical 
integration/hierarchies) is expected to depend directly on the degree of asset 
specificity, the level of uncertainty, and the frequency of transactions (Coles and 
Hesterly, 1998). Indeed, Shelanski and Klein (1995, p. 336) note that TCE is “ . . . 
now used to study a variety of economic relationships [in firms], ranging from vertical 
and lateral integration to transfer pricing, corporate finance, marketing, the 
organization of work, long-term commercial contracting, franchising, regulation, the 
multinational corporation,. . .  and many other contractual relationships”.
There are two main rationales for applying TCE to explain insurance 
purchasing decisions. First, Williamson (1988, 1990) contends that the notion of 
transaction includes the process of exchange between parties and the form of contract 
covering such aspects as product purchase, labor employment, finance and so on, with 
governance structures covering aspects such as transactional administration and 
organization. Therefore, by analogy, the exchange of risks between a firm and a 
commercial insurer formalized through an insurance policy could be regarded as a 
hedge transaction, while the risk pooling of a commercial insurer could be treated as a 
form of governance structure for multiple hedges. In other words, the decision to 
retain/self-insure or transfer corporate risks via insurance is essentially a kind of 
“make-or-buy” decision - the so-called “paradigm problem” of TCE (e.g., see 
Shelanski and Klein, 1995). Second, corporate insurance can be viewed as another 
type of financial contract - namely, a contingent post-loss financing mechanism (e.g., 
see Mayers and Smith, 1982; Caillaud et al., 2000; Doherty, 2000a). Indeed, Grillet
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(1992a) suggests that effective property/liability risk management should be viewed 
ais an integral part of capital structure optimization in that by reducing the expected 
costs of financial distress through insurance, a firm can expand its debt capacity. 
Therefore, a TCE framework could help to explain the economic rationale for the 
corporate purchase of insurance45.
Some studies have indeed sought to analyze insurance purchases using 
concepts derived from the TCE. For example, Bjuggren (1995) argues that given the 
possible influence of asset specificity on the choice of capital structure and the
f
; inter-relation between capital structure, costs of financial distress and insurance, the 
degree of asset specificity of a firm may motivate the corporate purchase of insurance.
i
! Others (e.g., Grillet, 1992a, 1993; Main, 2000) maintain that insurance could enable
i
| firms to economize on the transaction costs of hedging because insurance companies
| are able to realize cost efficiencies by pooling low-frequency/high-loss risks. Such
j
j  efficiencies could also arise from other factors such as insurers’ expertise in risk
|
| pricing and loss prevention; their skills in writing, monitoring and enforcing contracts;
!
their comparative advantages in areas of loss adjustment and claims handling. 
Additionally, insurance can help firms to cost-effectively reinvest after a major 
accidental loss at a priori fixed cost rather than seeking potentially costly external 
financing (e.g., see Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Caillaud et al., 2000; Doherty, 
2000b). Furthermore, Skogh (1989, 1991) contends that insurance underwriters could 
play an important external monitoring role in inhibiting opportunistic behavior by 
company managers (e.g., the passing up value-increasing safety project investments), 
thereby enhancing the degree of co-operation among company stakeholders and so 
further reducing frictional (e.g., monitoring) costs for firms. This is because writing 
insurance gives insurers incentives to screen policyholders’ risk profile (adverse
45 While commercial insurance may economize on the management of property/liability risk, it is not a 
panacea for all corporate risks. For instance, it may not be optimal for many core business risks (e.g., 
credit risk), wherein insurers do not possess comparative advantages in risk bearing, to be hedged 
through commercial insurance (e.g., see Sung, 1997; Doherty, 2000a).
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selection) ex-ante and monitor policyholders’ behavior (moral hazard) ex-post (e.g., 
see Grillet, 1993; Han, 1996). Grillet (1992a) also recognizes that the (social) costs of 
limited shareholder liability46 can to some extent be internalized within firms through 
the purchase of insurance and this could help to enhance “ . . . the optimal risk 
allocation for [and economization on the payouts to] the firm’s [non-shareholder] 
claimants” (p. 245).
Despite its conceptual qualities, TCE has also been subject to extensive 
critique in the academic literature (e.g., see Kay, 1992; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; 
Spekle, 2001). Three major limitations, in particular, appear to hamper its application 
in this research project as follows. First, TCE has been charged with having a too 
narrow economic view of individual and firm behavior (e.g., see Shelanski and Klein, 
1995; Spekle, 2001). TCE thus neglects some important factors on the corporate 
insurance decision such as the social satisficing behavior of managers, the risk 
alleviation effects arising from business diversification, and the regulatory status of 
firms. Second, Shelanski and Klein (1995) cite the technical problems in testing 
empirically TCE theory in multi-industry studies as key variables (e.g., asset 
specificity, uncertainty, frequency) are often hard to operationalize and measure 
consistently across firms and industries. As a result, “ . . . the bulk of the empirical 
literature [in TCE] consists of case analyses [where variables] are estimated based on 
surveys or interviews [e.g., asset specificity is often measured by interviewee’s 
ranking on the degree to which an investment has value in outside uses]. . .  Such data 
are of course subject to the general limits of survey data [- for example,] . . . 
[subjective] valuations . . . [and] hard to compare [among industries]” (Shelanski and 
Klein, 1995, p.339). In the Chinese corporate sector, TCE-related information (e.g., 
the frequency of transactions) is neither always available from the public sources nor 
easily collectable through field research due to regulatory/legislative restrictions on 
data access. Third, Williamson (1988, p.589) admits that “ . . .  by contrast with the 
formal modelling apparatus associated with much of the financial economics literature, 
the [TCE] approach to corporate governance and corporate finance is of a relatively
46 The costs of limited liability include the economic as well as the social costs (e.g., job losses) 
imposed on a firm’s non-equity stakeholders when the shareholders default on the downside risk of 
firm value triggered by a major accidental loss (e.g., see Grillet, 1992a).
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pre-formal kind”. Main (2000, p.235), in reviewing the major arguments for applying 
TCE to corporate insurance, also notes that transaction cost is such a comprehensive 
concept that “ . . . there remains substantial uncertainties over how wide or 
encompassing the notion of transaction cost is in its influence on the motivation for 
corporate insurance purchase, and hence there [is] substantial scope for more precise 
analysis”. In view of the above limitations, TCE is not considered to be the best 
framework to guide the present study.
3.3.7 Agency Theoiy
l
i Agency theory is predicated on the notion that economic groups are
I
(unlimitedly) rational and self-interest utility maximizers, and that the agency 
relationships between such constituents (principals and agents) are established 
through contracts (e.g., see Eisenhardt, 1989; Baiman, 1990)47. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) were amongst the first to advance the view that the modem corporation 
comprises a nexus of contracts among different interest groups. In the finance 
literature, two main types of agency problems/incentive conflicts tend to predominate 
when there is a separation of ownership from operational control -  namely, 
manager-owner and debtholder-owner conflicts (e.g., see Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Wong, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989).
|
I
| The interests of managers may diverge from shareholders’ value-maximizing
interests either because of their different utility functions (e.g., with regard to 
maximizing rewards) or risk aversion (e.g., due to their inability to diversify their 
human capital investment in the firm) (e.g., see Wong, 1988; Scordis and Porat, 1998;
47 An agency relationship exists when one or more owners (called principals) employ others (called
I agents) in order to delegate some decision-making authority and responsibilities to the latter through
contracts (either explicitly or implicitly). Agency costs are the sum of monitoring expenditures by the 
principals, bonding expenditure by the agents, and residual loss borne by the principals (e.g., see 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). While both monitoring and bonding costs are out-of-pocket costs, the 
residual loss represents the potential decrease in the welfare o f the principals resulting from the agent’s 
I deviation from the optimal behavior (e.g., see Smith, 1986).
I
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Tihanyi and Ellstrand, 1998). Likewise, agency problems between managers, 
shareholders and debtholders can arise from differences in the nature o f their 
economic claims (e.g., see Wong, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989). For instance, in a  firm 
with risky debt, managers (whose interests can be aligned with those of shareholders 
through share options) may act to increase the wealth of shareholders at the expense 
of debtholders via financing and investment decisions (e.g., see Wong, 1988; Doherty, 
2000b). Typically, managers/owners are able to reduce debtholders’ utility by means 
of asset substitution and/or underinvestment. Therefore, in situations where incentive 
conflicts can arise, contracting constituents have incentives to introduce monitoring 
mechanisms (e.g., audits) and contracts (e.g., insurance) to ensure that their economic 
interests are protected. Agents could also have incentives to engage in bonding 
activities in order to signal their integrity to the principals, because rational principals 
can anticipate and adjust for their potential opportunism in ex-ante pricing of payoffs 
to them.
Opponents of agency theory (e.g., see Kaplan, 1983; Baiman, 1990; Nilakant 
and Rao, 1994) criticize the key assumption of (unlimitedly) rational behavior on the 
grounds that it neglects human attributes of trust and fairness in business relationships. 
Agency theory has also been criticized for its highly stylized and simplified 
principal-agent models (e.g., see Baiman, 1990). For instance, most principal-agent 
models take a restricted view of the environment in which the firm operates. However, 
in response, proponents of agency theory (e.g., see Ross, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989) 
argue that these criticisms do not reduce the empirical testability of the fundamental 
constructs of agency theory. They suggest that agency theory has, in fact, become the 
main framework in explaining managerial behavior in the financial-economics 
literature.
Many researchers (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1982, 1986; Smith, 1986; Fields 
and Tirtiroglu, 1991; Pottier and Sommer, 1997) also argue that agency theory 
provides an appealing framework for insurance research. For example, Smith (1986,
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p.699) notes that “ . . . one example of an insurance application of agency analysis is 
the corporate demand for insurance [where] since the demand . . . arises, not from an 
individual but from a corporation, agency analysis [thus] offers a quite productive 
framework for analysis . . .  In contrast, the [prior] insurance literature has paid 
insufficient attention to the-fundamental differences between individual and corporate 
purchasers ”. Indeed, a number of scholars have attempted to explain the motives for 
the corporate purchase of insurance using an agency theory perspective. For instance, 
several authors (e.g., see MacMinn, 1987; Mayers and Smith, 1987; MacMinn and 
Han, 1990; Garven and MacMinn, 1993; Doherty, 2000b) argue that commercial 
insurance can be used to mitigate asset substitution and underinvestment problems in 
firms, thereby reducing the risk of debt and ultimately lowering their market cost of 
capital. Other scholars (e.g., Campbell and Kracaw, 1987; Grillet, 1992a) also contend 
that insurance can help to control the manager-owner conflicts -  for example, by 
helping to protect job security following a catastrophe48. This can be achieved as a 
result of the efficient monitoring role of insurance companies vis-a-vis outside 
shareholders (e.g., see Main, 1982; Mayers and Smith, 1982; Holdemess, 1990)49, 
insurance’s bonding role for managers to signal their integrity (e.g., see Mayers and 
Smith, 1982), or insurance’s function in facilitating the design of efficient incentive 
compensation that helps to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders 
(e.g., see Han, 1996; Sung, 1997; Doherty, 2000b). These analyses have yielded some 
testable hypotheses regarding the motivation for the corporate purchase of insurance 
Indeed, several studies (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1990; Core, 1997; Hoyt and Khang, 
2000) have tested empirically some of these agency-based hypotheses in developed 
markets such as the US. These studies could provide a useful benchmark against 
which the results of this study in an emerging market can be compared and evaluated.
48 However, Tufano (1998) reports that insurance purchases may under certain circumstances actually 
exacerbate manager-owner conflicts. For instance, while cash flow hedging through insurance allows 
firms to mitigate underinvestment problem, it may be misused by managers for their own benefits - for 
example, to reinvest in a nan-economic project in order to protect their job security and/or promote 
their prestige.
49 Insurance company’s agreeing to compensate for potential loss automatically bonds the quality o f 
such monitoring (e.g., see Grillet, 1993; Han, 1996).
63
Accordingly, it is considered that on balance, agency theory provides the most 
appropriate and viable framework within which to conduct the empirical part o f this 
research project.
3.4 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
This chapter reviews critically the main extant positive-descriptive theories 
that have been advanced in the academic literature in order to explain the corporate 
purchase of insurance. Positive-descriptive theories and hypotheses are adjudged to be 
more compatible with the stated aim of explaining the determinants of discretionary 
purchase of property insurance by Chinese publicly traded companies than alternative 
normative-prescriptive approaches.
One appropriate and viable framework that can be utilized to explain 
corporate insurance purchase decisions is considered to be agency theory. The major 
thrust of agency theory is that it views the modem corporation as a nexus of contracts 
among various parties that have incompatible economic interests. The agency theory 
literature suggests that insurance is an important contracting mechanism that can help 
to resolve incentive conflicts between contracting constituents in firms - particularly 
managers, shareholders and debtholders. The results of prior agency theory-based 
insurance research also provide a useful comparative basis against which the findings 
of this China-based study can be evaluated. The major constructs of agency theory 
and their capacity for contributing insights into the determinants of insurance 
purchase by companies of diffuse ownership structure are examined in more detail in 
the next chapter of this thesis.
CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
To explain the motives for the discretionary purchase of property insurance 
by publicly listed Chinese companies, a theoretical framework is utilized in order to 
direct the empirical part of this study. A search of the academic literature carried out 
in Chapter 3 identifies agency theory as the most appropriate framework that can be 
used to provide guidance on the empirical part of this study. This chapter thus puts 
forward five main hypotheses derived from agency theory in order to facilitate 
empirical testing. The motivations for seven key control variables and three 
interaction terms are also provided in this chapter of the thesis.
4.2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
As Chapter 3 (section 3.3.7) makes clear, manager-owner and shareholder- 
debtholder conflicts are two important facets of agency theory. However, the purchase 
of insurance can help to mitigate such incentive conflicts between shareholders and 
managers and thereby reduce associated agency costs in four key regards as follows. 
First, by shifting business risk to insurance companies, a more efficient allocation of 
risk can be achieved -  for example, by reducing the level of insolvency risk borne by 
managers, companies can reduce the risk premiums paid to them (e.g., see Mayers 
and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Second, insurance can play an important 
role in mitigating the asset substitution and underinvestment problems resulting from 
incentive conflicts between shareholders and debtholders (MacMinn, 1987; Mayers 
and Smith, 1987). Third, insurance companies have advantages over outside 
shareholders in controlling and monitoring managerial behavior. For example, 
insurance can help to facilitate value-adding investment through the specification of 
loss prevention measures and/or by providing safety advice (Mayers and Smith, 1982; 
Grillet, 1992b; Hoyt and Khang, 2000). Such measures also reduce the risk o f value 
diluting opportunistic behavior by managers (Skogh, 1991). Fourth, by filtering out 
the adverse influence of incidental property/liability risks on company performance, 
not only can managers’ risk-bearing be lowered, but also the observability o f their
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| efforts and productivity can be improved In this way, incentive-based compensation
! contracts can be closely tied to managerial performance (e.g., see Campbell and
Kracaw, 1987; Han, 1996; Doherty, 2000b). Additionally, Stulz (1990) and Doherty 
(2000b) also note that manager-owner and shareholder-debtholder conflicts could 
vary among corporations of different organizational characteristics. As such, 
managerial decision to purchase property insurance and the extent to which it is used 
is also expected to vary amongst Chinese publicly listed companies depending upon 
j  their organizational features. Five hypotheses drawn from agency theory are thus put 
forward as follows.
| 4.2.1 Managerial Share Ownership
! Chen, Steiner and White (2001) argue that corporate risk management
! decisions reflect not only organizational capital structure, but also firms’ ownership
i
I.
| structure. The academic literature (e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985; Doherty, 2000b; Hoyt 
and Khang, 2000; Chen et al., 2001) has established that corporate hedging policy 
(e.g., through insurance) can be affected by the degree of managerial ownership. 
There are two competing hypotheses concerning the influence of managerial 
ownership on corporate risk management, namely, the managerial incentive- 
alignment and the managerial risk-aversion hypotheses.
! Proponents of the managerial incentive-alignment hypothesis (e.g., Saunders,
Strock and Travlos, 1990; Staking and Babbel, 1995) argue that the shareholders’ 
ownership rights position can be viewed as a call option on the assets of a firm, and 
that the value of this call option can appreciate (depreciate) by increasing (decreasing) 
the risk of the underlying assets. Therefore, as the managers’ ownership in the firm 
increases, their economic interests are expected to become more closely aligned with 
those of shareholders, thereby creating a strong agency incentive to maximize the 
value of their call options by increasing the level of risk (e.g., via investment 
strategy). Cummins and Sommer (1996), Core (1997), Hoyt and Khang (2000), and 
Chen et al. (2001) cite evidence supporting this hypothesis. On the other hand, the 
managerial risk-aversion hypothesis, advanced by Smith and Stulz (1985), posits that 
as their ownership increases managers are likely to become increasingly risk averse 
because they have a greater economic interest vested in the company. As a result,
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managers are likely to pursue hedging (e.g., via insurance) and other risk management 
activities even if risk-taking could increase the market value of owners’ equity. This is 
because optimizing their long-run compensation depends on the level of managerial 
job security and the survival of the company (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995). Indeed, 
May (1995), Rerkman and Bradbury (1996), and Chen et aL (1998) find evidence 
consistent with the managerial risk-aversion hypothesis.
Smith and Stulz (1985) and Doherty (2000b) further argue that the propensity 
for managers to engage in corporate risk management can be influenced by the nature 
of their compensation packages. More specifically, managers holding large blocks of 
ordinary shares would adopt hedging strategies, while those with substantial equity 
option rights would prefer a greater degree of risk taking, other things being equal. 
This is because the payoff of holding ordinary shares is expected to be linear function 
of firm value, whereas equity options provide managers with convex payoffs 
(Doherty, 2000b). Thus, hedging (e.g., through insurance) can reduce the downside 
payoffs related to ordinary shares and lower the value of equity options held. Smith 
and Stulz (1985) and Smith (1986) also contend that, in addition to equity options, 
other option-like compensation packages (e.g., bonuses based on the level of annual 
reported accounting earnings) that make manager’s expected utility/end-of-period 
wealth a convex function of firm value, can also discourage corporate hedging. In 
contrast, company managers mainly rewarded with a flat-rate salary are less likely to 
hedge as they have no direct pecuniary interests in hedging (Doherty, 2000b). 
Consistent with the above prediction, Tufano (1996) finds that in the US gold mining 
industry, firms whose managers held ordinary shares are more likely to hedge gold 
price risk; in contrast, those firms whose managers held large equity options are less 
likely to hedge.
Wei (2000) reports that about 60 percent of managers in publicly listed 
Chinese companies owned ordinary shares at the end of 1998; however, the extent of 
managerial shareholdings are minor (typically less than 0.01 percent of total shares 
outstanding) (Sun et al., 2002). In addition, equity-option plans are still very rare in 
China. Therefore, I expect that the managerial risk-aversion hypothesis is likely to 
dominate over the managerial incentive-alignment hypothesis. In other words, I
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expect a positive relation between managerial ownership and the incidence and level 
o f corporate purchase of property insurance. Therefore:
Hypothesis la: Companies with high managerial share ownership are more likely 
to purchase property insurance than companies with low managerial share 
ownership (ceteris paribus).
Hypothesis lb : I f  property insurance is purchased, companies with high 
managerial share ownership are likely to purchase greater amounts than 
companies with low managerial share ownership (ceteris paribus).
4.2.2 State Ownership
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Admati, PfLeiderer and Zechner (1994) argue 
that relative to small shareholders, large (institutional) shareholders are more likely to 
have the incentives and abilities to effectively monitor and control incumbent 
management. Consequently, the existence of a large shareholder in a firm’s ownership 
structure could help to mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and 
management. Tian (2001) notes that substantial State ownership is one of the main 
features associated with publicly listed Chinese companies. Indeed, the State (i.e., 
local and national government) is a major shareholder retaining a controlling interest 
in roughly 30 percent of publicly listed companies (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2000).
However, State ownership has traditionally been viewed as contributing to, if 
not causing, corporate inefficiency (Vickers and Yarrow, 1998). In China, while the 
ultimate ownership of State-held shares belongs to the central government, the “real” 
control rights and monitoring responsibilities are in practice delegated to government 
departments or their agencies (e.g., the Bureau of State-owned Assets Management 
(BSAM)). The official responsibility of these delegated bodies is defined as 
preserving and increasing the value of State-owned assets (Xu and Wang, 1999). 
However, as several scholars (e.g., see Jefferson, 1998; Perotti et al., 1999; Xu and 
Wang, 1999; Sun et al., 2002) observe, this unique institutional feature can lead to
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severe manager-owner agency problems in State-controlled publicly listed Chinese 
companies for two main reasons. First, State ownership is reported to be ambiguously 
defined and hence akin to a public good (Jefferson, 1998). Second, the government 
departments and agencies that represent State interests often fail to effectively fulfil 
their ownership functions (Xu and Wang, 1999; Sun et al., 2002). The incentives for 
these State agencies to monitor closely management in the companies they oversee 
invariably do not exist in practice and would, in any case, be hampered by acute 
information asymmetries between the government body and incumbent management 
(Willhelm, 1999). Additionally, Gul (1999) notes that State-based policies (e.g., with 
respect to social welfare issues) may sacrifice firms’ investment opportunities and 
adversely affect their prospects for long-term growth. Indeed, prior studies (e.g., Xu 
and Wang, 1999; Chen and Jiang, 2000; Qi et al., 2000) find evidence that the 
existence of a major State shareholder may have a deleterious impact on company 
financial performance. Gul (1999) further reports that in China State ownership tends 
to be negatively associated with corporate investment opportunity set. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that an inefficient State shareholder will encourage company managers to 
take out property insurance as a way of mitigating manager-owner conflicts. 
Nonetheless, Tian (2001) recognizes that the existence of a large State shareholding 
could be a positive influence on corporate value as the government may provide 
financial resources and other benefits (e.g., business contacts and subsidies). This 
suggests that where the State is a major shareholder, managerial incentives to 
purchase property insurance to hedge asset-loss risks (and control agency conflicts) 
could be reduced because of possible “charity hazard” effects (e.g., see Browne and 
Hoyt, 2000)50. Moreover, the greater the State’s shareholding interest in companies 
the less likely it is (e.g., for social welfare reasons) that shareholders will exercise the 
default put option in the event of a severe fortuitous loss. In other words, the value of 
the default put option held by shareholders declines the greater the value of the State’s 
interest in the total equity value of the firm. This implies that the underinvestment 
incentives following a major fortuitous loss could be reduced in State-owned 
companies. Therefore:
50 “Charity hazard” refers to the situation when external (free) financial support is available in the event 
of a major catastrophic loss (e.g., from the government or other sources), the managerial incentives to 
manage such risks are reduced.
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Hypothesis 2a: Companies with low State shareholdings are more likely to purchase 
property insurance than companies with high State shareholdings (ceteris paribus).
Hypothesis 2b: I f  property insurance is purchased, companies with low State 
shareholdings are likely to purchase greater amounts than companies with high 
State shareholdings (ceteris paribus).
4.2.3 Leverage
High leverage can be costly for corporate stakeholders because it can result in 
deadweight losses due to financial distress -  be it direct (e.g., legal fees) or indirect 
costs (e.g., the loss of goodwill) (Warner, 1977; Grillet, 1992a). Indeed, Warner
(1977) finds evidence that the indirect costs of financial distress are often greater than 
the direct costs. Financial distress (or insolvency) can arise following a major 
uninsured property/liability loss (MacMinn, 1987; Doherty, 2000b). The purchase of 
property insurance, however, can reduce the probability of financial distress triggered 
by uninsured accidental losses and hence reduce/eliminate the expected costs of 
financial distress (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985). As a result, firm 
value could increase as a result of a reduction in financial distress costs and agency 
costs (e.g., monitoring expenditures) among corporate stakeholders and/or increased 
economic benefits (e.g., tax-related) associated with increased debt capacity (Main, 
1983; Shapiro and Titman, 1986; Tufano, 1996). The magnitude of the costs of 
financial distress is expected to be a positive linear function of the probability of 
financial distress in the absence of hedging and the costs to be incurred if financial 
distress occurs (Smith and Stulz, 1985). The former is directly related to a company’s 
financial leverage and hence, a highly indebted company is likely to have a greater 
possibility of financial distress compared with a lowly levered company (Mayers and 
Smith, 1982). In contrast, as suggested by Warner (1977) and Mayers and Smith 
(1990), the (direct) costs of financial distress are non-proportionally determined by 
company size, i.e., the direct costs of financial distress are likely to be more 
significant for small companies. In emerging markets, such as the PRC, economic 
uncertainties would also enhance the risk of debt default and so increase the market 
cost of capital for companies (Karmel, 1996; Xu and Wang, 1999). Although publicly
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listed companies have until recently rarely become bankrupt in China (e.g., due to 
government intervention), this does not mean that such companies are free from the 
risk of financial distress. For them, such risks are mainly manifest in the high indirect 
distress costs -  for example, the loss of goodwill and the difficulty in raising future 
external capital. Thus, the greater the expected costs of financial distress the greater 
the likelihood that a firm’s managers will purchase property insurance, other things 
being equal.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that company shareholders have incentives 
to transfer wealth from bondholders through excessive ex-post risk taking. Two 
dimensions of this wealth transfer are asset substitution and underinvestment 
problems (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.4). Realizing that shareholders/managers can 
behave opportunistically ex-post, rational bondholders will either charge a higher rate 
of interest or require insurance coverage to give them ex-ante protection. Indeed, 
Davidson et al. (1992) attribute the primary reason for the corporate purchase of 
insurance to bondholders’ “me-first” rules that seek to protect them against 
insolvency risk.
MacMinn (1987) further shows that the corporate purchase of insurance can 
reduce the incentives for managers to substitute promised investment projects with 
risky ventures. This is because insurance makes debtholders’ payoffs relatively 
independent of project selection and so limits the ability for the company to shift 
business risk onto bondholders. On the other hand, Mayers and Smith (1987), 
Schnabel and Roumi (1989), and Garven and MacMinn (1993) demonstrate that a 
property insurance contract can be used to mitigate the underinvestment problem and 
bond subsequent corporate investment decisions. As a result, shareholders can capture 
a gain in value that is equal to the agency costs (e.g., the reduction in the market cost 
of capital) minus the premium loading (Garven and MacMinn, 1993). Following 
another line of reasoning, Grace and Rebello (1993) contend that the voluntary 
purchase of insurance helps to reduce the information asymmetry (agency) costs that 
debtholders face in screening borrowers’ creditworthiness ex-ante and monitoring 
their contractual compliance ex-post. Additionally, Doherty (2000b) suggests that 
hedging through insurance can reduce the level of business risk for a company and 
thus decrease the value of the default put option held by shareholders. Consequently,
distortions in investment decisions resulting from the asset substitution and 
underinvestment problems can be reduced by purchasing insurance. In this way, the 
purchase of property insurance can also act as an important signalling device about 
the quality of the future financial condition of firms and so help them to reduce their 
market cost of capital (Bessembinder, 1991). Moreover, the higher the degree of 
corporate leverage the greater the likelihood that debt default will result from cash 
flow volatility and the more valuable the default put option to shareholders (Doherty, 
2000a). Therefore, the underinvestment problem is likely to be more acute in highly 
levered firms given a fixed level of investment opportunities (Nance et al., 1993). 
Indeed, prior studies (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1990; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; 
Core, 1997; Hoyt and Khang, 2000) find evidence supporting this contention. 
Consequently:
Hypothesis 3a: Highly levered companies are more likely to purchase property 
insurance than lowly levered companies (ceteris paribus).
Hypothesis 3b: I f  property insurance is purchased, highly levered companies are 
likely to purchase greater amounts than lowly levered companies (ceteris paribus).
4.2.4 Investment Opportunity Set (IOS)
Myers (1977) views the traded value of the modem firm as a combination of 
the value of tangible assets-in-place and (the present value of) profitable 
growth/investment opportunities whose value depends on future investment by 
managers51. The nature of a firm’s IOS can affect the agency conflict between the 
firm’s debtholders and shareholders (Smith and Watts, 1992; Nance et al., 1993; 
Berkman and Bradbury, 1996). For example, Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and 
Gaver (1993) argue that relative to firms with a low IOS, firms with a high IOS are 
riskier in that they invariably give managers more discretion over investment 
decisions. Indeed, Chung and Charoenwong (1991) find evidence that the more
51 Smith and Watts (1992) interpret more growth options as greater access to positive net present value 
projects. They opine that firms with more growth options tend to have fewer assets-in-place. In 
contrast, Gaver and Gaver (1993) argue that the IOS is a broad concept and that virtually any 
discretionary expenditure item could be viewed as a growth option.
72
growth opportunities a firm has, the larger the portion of traded value represented by 
growth options and the higher its equity risk. Smith and Watts (1992) also suggest 
that as the proportion of a firm’s total value represented by growth opportunities (as 
opposed to assets-in-place) increases, the tangibility/observability of managerial 
actions would decrease. This calls for more effective monitoring by shareholders 
and/or the adoption of incentive contracts that sufficiently motivate managers to act in 
owners’ interests. In either case, insurance can be an effective mechanism vis-a-vis 
other means (e.g., costly external auditing) in monitoring opportunistic managerial 
behavior (Skogh, 1991; Grillet, 1992a; Main, 2000) and in shaping effective 
incentive-based schemes (Han, 1996; Sung, 1997; Doherty, 2000b). Additionally, 
intangible growth/investment opportunities are only valuable when a firm remains a 
going concern. As such, their value will drop dramatically if the firm faces 
bankruptcy, which suggests that the expected costs of financial distress for firms with 
greater growth opportunities are likely to be higher (e.g., see Myers, 1984; 
Williamson, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1990). Larger expected costs of financial 
distress, in turn, imply an increasing need to use property insurance to mitigate the 
risk of financial distress in high growth firms. Thus, the above reasoning combines to 
suggest that managers of companies with more growth options are expected to have 
greater incentives to purchase insurance than their counterparts in low growth 
companies.
Stulz (1990), Shapiro and Titman (1986) and Froot et al. (1993) also posit a 
strong link between cash flow and investment in firms with a large IOS given market 
imperfections (e.g., information asymmetries)52. They argue that when firms’ cash 
flows are low, obtaining external financing could become costly enough to force firms 
to scale down value-increasing investments. Thus, the underinvestment problem is 
likely to be particularly severe in firms with high growth options (Nance et al., 1993; 
Mian, 1996). Corporate hedging (e.g., through insurance), however, can reduce the 
variance of cash flow and so helps to avoid a shortfall in cash flow that could trigger a 
costly resort to the capital markets and/or a scaling down of investment in positive net 
present value projects (Froot et al., 1993). In this way, the purchase of property
52 A reason why raising external finance by companies with a large IOS could be costly is that there 
appears to be more asymmetric information about the quality of new projects between outside investors 
and managers (Myers and Majluf 1984). Further, growth options also do not normally provide good 
collateral for lenders of financial capital such as banks (Titman and Wessels, 1988).
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insurance could provide post-loss financing at an ex-ante fixed cost (i.e., at a given 
rate of premiums), thereby enabling managers to continue value-increasing 
investments following a major accidental loss (Tufano, 1996; Core, 1997). Indeed, the 
results from several prior studies (e.g., Nance et al, 1993; Berkman and Bradbury, 
1996; Gay and Nam, 1998; Hoyt and Khang, 2000) support this view. Hence:
Hypothesis 4a: Companies with high growth opportunities are more likely to 
purchase property insurance than companies with low growth opportunities (ceteris 
paribus).
Hypothesis 4b: I f  property insurance is purchased, companies with high growth 
opportunities are likely to purchase greater amounts than companies with low 
growth opportunities (ceteris paribus).
4.2.5 Company Size
Chung (1993) argues that large firms may have lower agency costs associated 
with the asset substitution and the underinvestment problems than small firms. This is 
because large firms normally have a more diffuse ownership structure comparing to 
small firms and hence the possibility of exploiting debtholders’ wealth by 
shareholders is likely to be less. This line of reasoning suggests a decreased 
incentive/need for managers in large companies to purchase property insurance to 
mitigate agency conflicts between owners and debtholders.
The corporate purchase of insurance may also be motivated by the desire of 
managers to benefit from the efficiencies provided by the (real) services of insurance 
companies (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1982, 1990; Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Main, 2000). 
These real service benefits derive from insurers’ expertise in risk pricing and loss 
prevention; their specialization in writing, monitoring and enforcing contingent 
contracts; the comparative advantages in loss adjustment and claims handling; and 
economies of scale in risk pooling (Grillet, 1992a). Indeed, Shapiro and Titman 
(1986) interpret the corporate motivation for purchasing insurance as taking 
advantage of insurance companies’ efficiency in claims processing and risk-bearing,
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amongst other benefits. A typical example of this is the existence of “claims only” 
insurance polices where the insured bears the risk elements of the policy while the 
insurer provides claims management and other advisory services (Mayers and Smith, 
1986). Also, combining insurance coverage with loss-prevention services (as is often 
the case with many commercial insurance policies) helps to guarantee the quality of 
such real services (Mayers and Smith, 1986). Mayers and Smith (1990) argue that 
insurers’ services are likely to benefit small companies more than large companies as
[
l the former often have limited financial capacity and generally lack risk management
| expertise. Additionally, the non-proportionate direct cost of financial distress implies
| that the purchase of property insurance is relatively more attractive to small
companies than large companies (Mayers and Smith, 1982). Mian (1996) further 
notes that the fixed costs associated with capital market visits are likely to make 
financing relatively more expensive for smaller firms. This suggests that small firms 
are more likely to hedge via insurance than large firms. In addition, insurance can act 
as an important signal for prospective investors of small companies concerning their 
future financial prospects.
However, some studies (e.g., Nance et al., 1993; Berkman and Bradbury, 
1996; Mian, 1996) find contrary evidence suggesting that large companies are more 
likely to hedge than small companies (in derivatives trading). They attribute this 
evidence to the high information and transaction cost scale economies that exist in the 
hedging activities such as derivative trading. Nonetheless, Mayers and Smith (1990) 
argue that this relation is unlikely to persist in the transactions of property/liability
F
insurance where similar scale economies may be less pronounced. Indeed, several 
insurance studies (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1990; Yamori, 1999; Hoyt and Khang, 
2000) report evidence that small companies tend to purchase relatively more 
insurance than their larger counterparts. Therefore:
Hypothesis 5a: Small companies are more likely to purchase properly insurance 
than large companies (ceteris paribus).
Hypothesis 5b: I f  property insurance is purchasedsm all companies are likely to 
purchase proportionately greater amounts than large companies (ceteris paribus).
\
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4.3 INTERACTION EFFECTS
In this section, possible interaction effects between key variables are 
examined.
4.3.1 Interaction Between Managerial Ownership and Leverage
The linkage between managerial ownership and the corporate purchase of 
insurance can be moderated by the level of leverage (Brewer, 1995; Knopf and Teall, 
1996; Downs and Sommer, 1999). With high leverage, the asset value of the firm (i.e., 
the underlying assets of the default put option held by shareholders) is close to the 
face value of debt (i.e., the striking price of the put option) (Furlong and Keeley, 
1989). Therefore, shareholders can benefit more from engaging in risk-taking 
activities when a company is highly levered since the value of default put option held 
by shareholders tends to appreciate with risk. Following this line of reasoning, Downs 
and Sommer (1999) argue that if the interests of shareholders and managers are 
aligned by managerial share ownership, company managers in highly levered 
companies are likely to be motivated to engage in risk-taking rather than risk-hedging. 
In other words, the relation between managerial ownership and corporate hedging is 
expected to be negative and the magnitude of this linkage should increase with the 
level of leverage. As a result, a multiplicative interaction term between managerial 
ownership and leverage is likely to have a negative influence on the corporate 
purchase of property insurance. Another line of reasoning raises doubts about whether 
the interests of shareholders and managers can be aligned effectively by managerial 
share ownership, particularly when the level of insider shareholding is low. As a 
result, managerial interests can diverge from that of shareholders (a feature referred to 
as managerial entrenchment). For example, company managers may be primarily 
concerned with the value of their human capital and job security rather than the 
maximization of shareholders’ wealth (Smith and Stulz, 1985). The managerial risk- 
aversion hypothesis thus predicts a positive relation between managerial ownership 
and corporate hedging insurance. Also managerial risk aversion is hypothesized to 
increase with leverage because the risk of financial distress is growing as 
indebtedness increases. Consequently, the magnitude of the positive linkage between 
managerial ownership could increase as company leverage increases. As such, the
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theoretical prediction of the influence of the (multiplicative) interaction term between 
managerial ownership and leverage is not clear from the extant literature. 
Nonetheless, as analyzed earlier in section 4.2.1, the generally low level of managerial 
share ownership is unlikely to effectively motivate Chinese company managers to act 
in the interests of shareholders. Therefore, consistent with the hypothesis of 
managerial ownership, I expect a multiplicative interaction term between managerial 
ownership and leverage to have a positive influence on the corporate purchase of 
property insurance.
4.3.2 Interaction Between Managerial Ownership and Company Size
Hoyt and Khang (2000) argue that the relation between managerial ownership 
and corporate hedging could also be moderated by company size. More specifically, 
they contend that for a given level of insider shareholdings, managers tend to become 
more risk averse as firm size declines. This is because managers of large companies 
are likely to be able to more effectively diversify their human capital and so reduce 
the risk of job security than managers of small firms. As a result, the linkage between 
managerial share ownership and corporate hedging through insurance could decrease 
in magnitude as the company size increases. In other words, a negative relation is 
expected to exist between the multiplicative interaction of managerial ownership and 
company size and corporate hedging through property insurance.
4.3.3 Interaction Between Leverage and Investment Opportunity Set
Many prior studies examining corporate capital structure have documented a 
negative relation between leverage and firms’ growth options (e.g., see Smith and 
Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver 1993; Lang, Ofek and Stulz, 1996). This is because 
management tends to choose leverage levels based on its private information about 
future firm growth (Myers, 1977). Specifically, managers of firms with valuable 
growth opportunities would choose lower leverage because equity financing can help 
to control for the potential underinvestment problem associated with risky debt. 
Therefore, leverage and corporate growth options could interact each other and exert a 
conjoint influence on corporate hedging (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Hoyt and 
Khang, 2000). Indeed, this is the case with the current data sample (see Table 6.3).
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Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 explain that when analyzed separately, both leverage and 
growth options are expected to be positively related to corporate hedging. However, 
the predicted negative relation between leverage and growth options could confound 
their respective effect on the corporate purchase of property insurance. To examine 
the possible conjoint effects of leverage and growth opportunities on managers’ 
decision to purchase property insurance in the Chinese corporate sector, I include a 
multiplicative interaction term between leverage and growth options. However, the 
expected direction of such influence on the corporate purchase of property insurance 
is ambiguous.
4.4 CONTROL VARIABLES
In this section seven non-agency-theory-based factors that might influence the 
purchase of property insurance by Chinese publicly listed companies are considered.
4.4.1 Systematic and Unsystematic Risks
Doherty (1997) argues that companies are likely to have different levels of 
systematic risk because they have variable cross-sectional exposures to physical assets 
loss arising from property risks, environmental hazards, and so on. Indeed, some 
physical asset-based risks (e.g., regional property damage arising from earthquakes or 
floods -  say on China’s densely populated East coast) could have a direct adverse 
impact on movements in the market value of companies. On the other hand, as section
2.4.1 makes clear, Chinese investors’ portfolios are likely to possess a high degree of 
unsystematic as well as systematic risks (Zhang, 1998). However, the lack of 
developed domestic derivative and captive insurance markets in the PRC thus 
suggests that publicly listed companies are likely to seek commercial insurance 
solutions to mitigate their systematic and unsystematic risks (Karmel, 1996; Adams 
and Hillier, 2000). In this study, the possible influences of systematic and 
unsystematic risks on the corporate purchase of property insurance are therefore 
controlled for.
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4.4.2 Industry Type
Industrial sector might also be a factor that influences the managerial decision 
to purchase property insurance as business risk may vary between industries and/or 
because of the existence of different cross-industry regulations (Mayers and Smith, 
1982; Hoyt and Khang, 2000). For example, Mayers and Smith (1982) predict that 
companies operating in a highly regulated industry (e.g., utilities) would tend to 
purchase more insurance than those entities operating in a relatively unregulated 
industry (e.g., retailing). This might be because industry regulators have public 
reputation protection-based incentives to compel companies to take out insurance in 
order to mitigate business risks (e.g., bankruptcy) and thereafter shift the transaction 
costs of hedging onto customers through market price rises. Mian (1996), however, 
argues that managers of firms in regulated industries are likely to have less discretion 
in their choice of investment policies; moreover, regulation could also makes it easier 
for debtholders to control aberrant managerial action ex-post. As a result, firms in 
regulated industries are likely to face lower contracting costs and so have less 
motivations to hedge through insurance than firms in less regulated sectors. 
Additionally, Hoyt and Khang (2000) contend that State-induced price controls might 
also help to reduce company risks thereby lowering managers’ propensity to engage 
in insurance. Indeed, in the PRC, some sectors - notably the utilities industries 
(including water, electricity and gas) - are strictly price-regulated and protected by the 
State against business risks associated with free market competition. As such, 
managers in the PRC-based utility companies may not have sufficient incentives to 
hedge property risks through the purchase of insurance. Thus far prior empirical 
evidence on this possibility is inconclusive. For instance, Mian (1996) and Hoyt and 
Khang (2000) find that regulated utilities hedge less; in contrast, Core (1997) and 
Yamori (1999) find evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the influence of regulatory 
status on the corporate purchase of property insurance is an open empirical question.
Chen and Jiang (2000) report that in the PRC many manufacturing companies 
tend to be both more competitive than entities operating in other industries (e.g., 
utilities and real estate) and less diversified than conglomerates. Consequently, the 
need for managers of PRC-based manufacturing companies to hedge business risks 
via the purchase of property insurance might be greater than that of managers working
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in other industries. The service firms in the current sample are mainly retailers. They 
might face severe asset-loss risk and thus have a greater propensity to purchase 
property insurance than other firms as they often have a large proportion o f their 
assets as inventories and many of these firms often operate in a single business 
location (Hussain and Zhuang, 1997). In contrast, managers of real estate and 
conglomerate firms are likely to have less incentives to purchase property insurance 
because the former often has less insurable assets than firms in other industries, while 
the latter will probably be able to diversify their business risk by entering into 
multiple lines of business.
4.4.3 Geographical Location
As mentioned earlier in section 4.4.1, systematic/unsystematic risks (and 
hence the corporate purchase of property insurance) could vary across geographical 
regions. Additionally, Sun et al. (1999) report that the coastal areas of China have 
been more successful in attracting foreign capital than internal regions because they 
enjoy a preferential investment status under the State’s current economic reform 
programme. As a result, industry commentators (e.g., Shi and Su, 2000) argue that the 
risk management awareness of company managers in China’s economically more 
developed coastal zones is likely to be greater than elsewhere. This implies that 
managers of companies located in China’s Eastern coastal regions are more likely to 
use property insurance than their counterparts in companies operating elsewhere in 
the country. However, the literature is not clear as to whether locational factors will 
influence the financial extent of property insurance. As such, geographical location is 
used as a selectivity bias identifier variable in the probit insurance participation 
decision model (e.g., see Ireland and Lennox, 2002).
4.4.4 Foreign Ownership
Foreign share ownership might also influence corporate insurance decisions. 
Companies with substantial foreign capital are more likely to procure property 
insurance than solely domestic-owned companies in order to alleviate the increased 
business risks associated with investing in a new and developing market (e.g., due to 
inadequate fire controls and safety procedures) (Falush, 1996). Lee and Rui (2000)
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further report that compared with domestic investors, foreign investors are more likely 
to incur high information acquisition and assessment costs -  for example, due to the 
different legislative and regulatory frameworks in the host country. These information 
asymmetries could thus motivate the managers of foreign-invested companies to 
purchase more property insurance than their counterparts in wholly domestic-owned 
companies.
4.4.5 Tax
The tax-induced explanation for corporate hedging holds that hedging can 
reduce the expected tax liability for a firm facing a convex effective tax schedule by 
reducing the volatility of the firm’s expected taxable income stream (e.g., see Mayers 
and Smith, 1982; Main, 1983; Smith and Stulz, 1985). The convexity of effective tax 
schedule often results from both the statutory progressivity (e.g., in the US) and the 
presence of tax preferential items (e.g., tax-loss carry-forwards and investment tax 
credits) (e.g., see Nance et al., 1993; Mian, 1996). Main (1983) further shows that 
additional tax benefit can arise from the involuntary conversions/replacement of 
destroyed assets following an insured loss providing that the tax rate accruing to the 
involuntary conversion is less than that of corporate profit tax .
China does not have a (statutory) progressive corporate income tax schedule 
(Wang, 1999). The tax code, however, allows a maximum of five-year carry-forwards 
of the tax-loss arising from operating losses. Therefore, the effective tax schedule of 
firms with tax-loss carry-forwards can be somehow convex. These companies are 
likely to purchase property insurance to reduce the variability of their taxable income 
and maximize the present value of their tax shields (i.e., accumulated operating 
losses) (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Mian, 1996). 
Additionally, the tax code treats some types of companies (e.g., foreign-invested 
companies and government approved high-tech companies) favorably by allowing 
some tax exemptions or rebates. For example, the newly foreign-invested companies
53 This additional tax benefit is equal to the insurance settlement less the book value of the asset at the 
time of loss multiplied by the difference between the corporate income tax and the tax rate applicable 
to this difference. Therefore, if  the latter rate is lower than the former, additional tax benefits will arise 
(Main, 1983).
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are exempt from tax for the first two operating years and are subject to a tax rate of 15 
percent for three operating years thereafter. These tax concessions constitute a kind of 
“tax shield” for the companies involved. The purchase of property insurance can help 
to reduce the downside risk of taxable income stream and thereby enable companies 
with tax concessions to make full use of their tax shields. In this study, I control for 
the effects of both tax-loss carry-forwards and tax concessions on the corporate 
purchase of property insurance (see Chapter 5, section 5.4.3).
4.4.6 Hedging Substitutes
Instead of managing risk exclusively through insurance contracts, firms could 
pursue diversification strategies and/or adopt conservative financial policies (e.g., 
maintaining high liquidity) that substitute for insurance strategies (Smith and Stulz, 
1985; Merton, 1993; Nance et al., 1993). Risk diversification can be achieved at the 
level of inter-company diversification (e.g., through mergers and acquisitions) and/or 
intra-company diversification (e.g., by entering different lines of business). However, 
few publicly listed Chinese companies in the current sample have experienced 
material asset reorganizations over the research period 1997-99 (see Chapter 5, 
section 5.3). As a consequence, cross-sectional differences in inter-firm-level 
diversification are unlikely to affect substantially companies’ hedging strategies. 
Additionally, the unavailability of segmental accounting information in the Chinese 
corporate sector inhibits the analysis of intra-company diversification. The 
conservative financial policies that a firm could employ to substitute for the purchase 
of property insurance include high liquidity, low payout ratio of cash dividends, the 
use of convertible debt and preferred shares in the capital structure (Nance et al., 
1993). Indeed, the results from prior studies (e.g., Nance et al., 1993; Berkman and 
Bradbury, 1996; Mian, 1996) support the substitutive relation between conservative 
financial policies and hedging via derivatives. However, according to the CSRC 
database (2000), convertible debt and preference shares are rarely used by Chinese 
publicly listed companies. Additionally, Peng (1999) and Gao (2000) report that most 
Chinese listed companies often prefer to use stock dividends and rights offerings 
rather than cash dividends as the major means of wealth distribution to shareholders. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that cross-sectional differences in corporate (cash) dividend 
policies will affect substantially the corporate property insurance decisions in Chinese
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publicly listed companies. Nevertheless, as Chapter 1 (see section 1.3) notes, it is 
considered useful to investigate the extent to which the level of corporate property 
insurance purchases substitutes for (or complements) other loss recovery mechanisms, 
such as State funding. Therefore, this study controls for the possible influences of 
government subsidies and liquidity on the corporate purchase of property insurance 
(see Chapter 5, section 5.4.3). ----
4.5 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
Drawing a framework from agency theory, this chapter argues that variations 
in the corporate purchase of property insurance by Chinese publicly listed companies 
could be explained by differences in agency conflicts that manifest themselves 
through differences in firm-specific characteristics. In this regard, five testable 
hypotheses representing important constructs of agency theory -  namely, managerial 
share ownership, State ownership, leverage, investment opportunity set and company 
size - are put forward in this chapter in order to facilitate empirical testing. 
Additionally, other factors (three interactive items and seven control variables) that 
might influence the corporate purchase of property insurance are identified in this 
chapter and tested in Chapter 6. The next chapter of this thesis discusses the research 
design of the study, including a description of data, the definitions of variables used, 
and the models employed.
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This study uses statistical analysis methods to test empirically the five main 
hypotheses (and control variables/interactive terms) put forward in Chapter 4. This 
chapter discusses the rationale for such an approach and considers the manner in 
which it is implemented in this research project. The chapter also describes the data 
used in this study, defines and measures the variables, and specifies the models 
employed.
5.2 SELECTION OF RESEARCH METHOD
5.2.1 Statistical versus Field-based Methods
Among the battery of research methods, three -  namely, statistical analysis, 
mail survey questionnaires and interviews - could potentially be used in order to 
achieve the stated aims of this study set forth in section 1.254. Statistical analysis is 
essentially a quantitative approach, while the latter two field-based methods can 
promote both quantitative and qualitative analyses (Sarantakos, 1993). Table 5.1 
summarizes the relative strengths of employing statistical techniques and field-based 
research through interviews and/or mail survey questionnaires. Statistical analysis is 
often adjudged by researchers to be “scientific” and appropriate for testing hypotheses 
drawn from a body of theory (Le., using deductive reasoning). Additionally, statistical 
results are considered to be capable of generalization and reproduction, and thus more 
defensible than other research methods (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Sarantakos, 
1993). In contrast, the data collected from mail survey questionnaires and/or personal 
interviews, for example, often suffer from response bias and measurement errors 
(Snow and Thomas, 1994). Moser (1968) also notes that mail survey questionnaires
54 Case study and other observation techniques may also provide useful details on the insurance 
purchasing practices of individual companies (e.g., managerial perceptions). However, such methods 
typically lack cross-sectional variation and generalization qualities that are required in order to test 
rigorously the explanatory power of theories such as those concerning corporate hedging (Tufano, 
1996).
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may also be afflicted by non-response bias. However, these field-based techniques 
can furnish a more detailed and in-depth picture of the phenomenon under 
investigation than statistical techniques if their application is managed well (Patton, 
1990; Sarantakos, 1993). Therefore, supplementing statistical analysis with one or 
more field-based methods would be ideal if it could assist in providing additional 
explanations and understanding of the corporate insurance decisions in the PRC. 
However, data access limitations, together with the time and cost constraints, preclude 
the application and use of supplementary field-based techniques, such as mail survey 
questionnaires or personal interviews, in this study. Some China-specific constraints 
that arise in field-based research are outlined briefly in section 5.2.2 below.
5.2.2 Institutional Constraints in China
There are two main constraints affecting the application and use of field-based 
research methods in China. First, Roy, Walters and Luk (2001) report that 
statutory/regulatory constraints - for example, the requirement to obtain authorization 
from the relevant authorities prior to undertaking research work in locations and/or 
contexts that might be deemed to be politically sensitive - are important factors that 
greatly hamper the use of field-based research methods in State-controlled economies 
like the PRC. Indeed, in August 1999, China’s State Statistical Bureau (SSB) issued a 
regulation that legally restricts formal field-based data collection to those users (e.g., 
market research and consulting companies) that are licensed by the SSB. Though the 
intent of this regulation is not clear, it can nonetheless hinder individuals from 
collecting data from PRC-based companies by means of mailed questionnaires and/or 
personal interviews55. Second, various socio-cultural features and traditions in China 
also constrain the use of field-based methods. For instance, Whitley (1992) notes that 
business systems in China are embedded in social and cultural settings that differ 
substantively from those of the Western economies. Indeed, while recent economic 
changes have influenced the ways of conducting business in China, many company 
managers are still unfamiliar with interviews and/or surveys-based data collection 
methods and often take a cautious, if not suspicious, attitude towards them (e.g., Roy 
et al., 2001). Roy et al. (2001) also report that many Chinese managers fear that
55 Source: People’s Daily (in Chinese), 2nd August 1999, p.2.
86
outsiders may uncover sensitive commercial information and that this feeling leads to 
a lack of co-operation or more commonly, a declination to participate in
!
surveys/interviews carried out by outsiders. Other institutional factors noted by Roy et
i
| al. (2001), such as the regional diversities, a relatively high level of illiteracy,I
infrastructure inadequacies (e.g., regarding the national mail system), also pose 
potential difficulties to the successful implementation of field-based work in China. 
For these reasons, the use of field-based research techniques in the present study is 
I deemed not to be feasible.i
|
5.2.3 Advantages of Statistical Methods
In view of the above constraints, this study employs statistical analysis as the 
preferred empirical research method. The rationale for undertaking this approach is 
further motivated in two respects. First, hypotheses regarding the corporate purchase 
of property insurance can be efficiently and effectively tested using statistical 
techniques. Also, it is considered that the results generated from the statistical analysis 
of variations in the corporate purchase of property insurance by publicly listed 
Chinese companies can be more readily generalized to other non-sampled Chinese 
companies. Hence, the results of this study are considered to have wider academic and 
commercial appeal. Second, the use of accounting information from audited company 
accounts can help to minimize biases (e.g., response bias) and error (e.g., due to mis- 
measurement) that can sometimes afflict field-based data collection. This attribute 
thus helps to ensure that the results generated from the statistical analysis of data are 
robust and efficient (e.g., see Mian, 1996).
5.3 DATA DESCRIPTION
From the 745 companies listed at the SHSE and SZSE at the end of 1997, 87 
companies that experienced material asset reorganizations between 1997-99 are 
excluded as it is felt that such activity could distort the interpretation of the results56.
56 In order to avoid the effect of structural changes before and after listing, each company in the sample 
has to be listed for two full accounting years during the research period (1997-99). The most prevalent 
forms of corporate structural reorganization in China include asset swaps and divestitures among 
associated companies. The materiality o f such asset reorganization is determined in this study by
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Additionally, six financial services companies (e.g., banks, investment companies) are 
not included in the research sample because they account and report under different 
rules from other companies and are active in the trading of risk management services. 
Moreover, 17 companies with dual listing status at both the SHSE/SZSE and the 
HKSE are also excluded in order to avoid the potentially confounding effects that 
institutional differences (e.g., with regard to legislation and degree of financial market 
development) could have on the empirical results (e.g., seeNaser and Wallace, 1995). 
I then identified ninety-six companies that disclosed annual property insurance 
spending in their annual financial statements during 1997-99. A telephone-based 
survey was also conducted to obtain information on the discretionary property 
insurance spending from Financial Directors/Treasurers in the remaining 539 
companies. This survey used a simple instrument developed with the assistance of a
57SSB approved user (see Appendix) and resulted in 146 responses . A further seven 
companies with missing annual accounting data had to be excluded, resulting in cross- 
sectional/time-series panel data for 235 non-financial companies (approximately 32 
percent of the population over the period of analysis) . The period 1997-99 
represents the earliest and latest years for which complete data were available at the 
time the study was carried out. Firm-specific non-insurance accounting data are 
obtained from the Genius Securities Information Database (GSTD) and the Hong 
Kong & Macao Securities Information System (HKMSIS). In addition, measures of 
systematic risk (i.e., betas) are computed from financial markets information supplied 
by the Huaxia Yirong Securities Information System. Data on the GSID and the 
HKMSIS are derived from the audited annual financial statements of PRC-based 
publicly listed companies and so are assumed to be reliable (see Chapter 1, section
1.5.1). Furthermore, the share price data used in the calculation of company betas are 
adjusted for dividends, rights offerings and share splits over the period 1997-99 in 
order to make the time-series data more comparable. Finally, to eliminate variations
applying the official criteria laid down by the CSRC -  i.e., more than 30 percent change in the value of 
physical assets.
57 The instrument only elicited financial information on annual corporate insurance spending. It was 
checked and piloted with the assistance of a China-based financial consulting firm. However, this 
instrument did not constitute a full questionnaire survey under the current SSB rules and as such, it did 
not infringe Chinese statutory requirements.
58 The data set is an unbalanced panel of 668 company/year observations comprising 203 cases in 1997, 
234 cases in 1998 and 231 cases in 1999.
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due to annual price changes, all monetary values are adjusted by China’s retail 
purchase index (RPI) (base year = 1997).
To examine the extent to which the sample of companies is representative of 
the population, I also collected data on company size and leverage for companies not 
included in the current sample. I then conducted a Mann-Whitney U-test to compare 
the medians of size and leverage between the sample companies and the non-included 
companies year by year (see Chapter 6, Table 6.1 Panel B). Clearly, no statistically 
significant differences in company size and capital structure were found between 
these two groups in two-tailed tests. However, it is not possible to obtain information 
on other firm-specific financial and operational characteristics (see section 5.4.2) for 
the non-included companies. Nonetheless, the average and median of State ownership 
in the current sample are both about 30 percent (see Chapter 6, Table 6.1 Panel A), 
which is similar to the reported average level of State shareholding for all companies 
listed at the SHSE and SZSE (CSRC database (2000)). Therefore, it appears that the 
ownership structure of the sample companies is representative of the total population.
5.4 VARIABLES AND PROXIES
5.4.1 Dependent Variables
In this study, two dependent variables are used in multivariate regression 
analyses. The first dependent variable (INSCHO) is a dummy that takes the value one 
if a company purchases property insurance in a certain year and zero otherwise. The 
second dependent variable (INS) is a continuous variable that denotes the financial 
extent of property insurance use by companies. INS is defined as the annual corporate 
spending on property insurance scaled by the total book value of insurable physical 
assets (which include buildings, plant, equipment and so on).
5.4.2 Independent Variables
The independent variables representing the main constructs of agency theory 
framework used in this study are as follows:
(1) Managerial Share Ownership (MAN)
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As in Core (1997), Hoyt and Khang (2000) and Chen et al. (2001), managerial 
(inside) share ownership is measured by the fraction of the year-end value o f total 
ordinary shares owned by company managers relative to the total value of shares in 
issue.
I
i
r
| (2) State Ownership (STATE)
\
[
As in Gul (1999), the year-end proportion of the value of ordinary shares held 
by the State to the total value of ordinary shares in issue is used as a proxy for the 
State ownership.
(3) Leverage (LEV)
In the finance literature, leverage is commonly measured in two ways - the 
ratio of debt to equity/total assets (e.g., Yamori, 1999; Hoyt and Khang, 2000) and the 
ratio of financial expenses (i.e., interest) to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
(e.g., Nance et al., 1993; Yamori, 1999). The interest-to-EBIT ratio could vary 
according to the fluctuations in the annual earnings of companies even when the debt 
policy remains unchanged. Therefore, the interest-to-EBIT ratio could be a “noisy” 
measure for financial leverage as it may also proxy for changes in companies’ 
business risk profile. For this reason, only the debt-to-equity ratio is employed as the 
measure of financial leverage in this study. Both the book value and the market value 
| of total assets can be used in constructing the debt-to-equity ratio. Given the nascent
I and volatile securities markets in the PRC (Karmel, 1996; Xu and Wang, 1999), I
I
| define the debt-to-equity ratio as the year-end total (long and short-term) debt divided
! by the book value of equity as the leverage measure.
i
| (4) Investment Opportunity Set (GROW)
Market-based measures of a firm’s investment opportunity set (IOS) often 
include the ratio of market-to-book value (e.g., Hoyt and Khang, 2000), Tobin’s Q
90
(e.g., Gay and Nam, 1998), the ratio of research and development expenses (R&D) to 
firm value (e.g., Berkman and Bradley, 1996), and the price-eamings ratio (P/E ratio) 
(e.g., Berkman and Bradley, 1996). This study could not use R&D as an IOS measure 
because under existing accounting rules there is no requirement for this item to be 
disclosed in the annual reports of PRC-based publicly listed companies. Also, R&D 
expenditure may be an imprecise measure of a firm’s IOS as it might proxy for costly 
external financing and/or financial distress costs (Froot et al., 1993; Gay and Nam, 
1998). The P/E ratio is also considered to be inappropriate in this study because it can 
be distorted by small earnings. As in Gay and Nam (1998), this study therefore uses 
Tobin’s Q to capture the IOS of firms. Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the sum of 
the book value of debt and market value of equity to the replacement cost of the 
firm’s assets. To avoid the difficulties often associated with computing replacement 
costs noted in Lang et al. (1996) (e.g., due to the lack of replacement cost 
information), the approximate value of Q recommended in Chung and Pruitt (1994) is 
used. That is, Q = (MVE+PS+DEBT)/TA, where MVE is the product of a firm’s 
share price and the number of common shares in issue; PS is the liquid value of a 
company’s preference shares; DEBT is the book value of long-term debt plus short 
term liabilities; and TA is the book value of total assets. Since Chinese companies do 
not issue preference shares, the approximate value of Q is, in essence, equal to the 
market-to-book value ratio59. On the other hand, Pilotte (1992) argues that 
accounting-based indicators such as percentage growth in total assets and earnings 
could be used as ex-post proxies for IOS. However, Chung and Charoenwong (1991) 
contend that the essence of growth is not the expansion of assets and earnings but the 
existence of profitable investment opportunities. Therefore, an entity is not a growth 
firm merely because its assets and earnings are growing over time. As such, only the
59 As Chapter 2 (section 2.2.3.2) makes clear, A-shares and B-shares are openly traded in China, but 
large blocks of equity held by the State and institutional investors (roughly 60 percent of total shares 
issued) are not openly and freely traded in order to avoid excessive volatility in local markets. Rather, 
these large blocks o f equity can be transferred between parties through negotiation subject to the 
approval from the CSRC. The common practice is for such share interests to be exchanged at a price 
based on the RMB value of net assets per share plus a margin for traders’ profit and expenses. 
Therefore, the market value of the equity of Chinese publicly listed companies can be substantially 
overstated using the figure of total shares in issue multiplied by the price of tradable A-shares and/or B- 
shares. In order to address this problem and as an improvement on Xu and Wang (1999), this study 
calculates the market value of equity as the sum of market value o f tradable A-shares and/or B-shares 
plus the product of non-tradable shares and the year-end RMB value of net assets per share. As in 
Gaver and Gaver (1993), the average monthly price of tradable A-shares and/or B-shares are used in 
this study.
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market-based measure of investment options (approximate Tobin’s Q) is used in this 
study.
(5) Company Size (SIZE)
As in prior insurance-related studies (e.g., Hoyt and Khang, 2000), the (year- 
end) book value of total assets is used to represent company size. The natural 
logarithm of total assets is applied to reduce the potentially confounding effect of 
extreme values and mitigate potential heteroscedasticity.
5.4.3 Control Variables
In order to control for non-agency-theory-based factors that might influence 
the corporate purchase of property insurance, three interaction terms and seven 
control variables are used in this study and they are defined as follows:
(1) Interaction Terms (LEVMAN, SIZEMAN and LEVGROW)
Three multiplicative interaction terms -  LEVMAN (i.e., MAN*LEV), SIZEMAN 
(i.e., MAN*lnSIZE) and LEVGROW (i.e., LEV*GROW) are included in the empirical 
models to capture the possible interaction effects between corresponding variables. 
However, Gordon (1986) notes that because multiplicative interaction terms often 
exhibit strong correlations with the component parts, the introduction of interaction 
terms could lead to high levels of multicollinearity in the regression models. To 
overcome this econometric problem, I employ the procedure recommended by 
Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan (1990). That is, for those components of the interaction 
terms, I first “center” these variables by subtracting their means from them before 
constructing the multiplicative interaction terms. The centered form of corresponding 
component variables is then used in the regression analysis. For example, for the 
interaction term between managerial ownership and leverage, I first center managerial 
ownership and leverage by subtracting their means. Then I computed the product of 
these centered variables as the multiplicative interaction effect. Such a “centering” 
transformation effectively reduces the correlation between the product terms and the 
component parts of the interactive effects.
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(2) Corporate (Systematic (SYS) and Unsystematic  ^UNSYS)) Risks
Systematic risks (also referred to as non-firm-specific risks) are risks common 
to individual companies while unsystematic risks are risks specific to individual 
companies: By definition, unsystematic risks can be diversified by managing a 
balanced investment portfolio, whereas systematic risks are non-diversifiable 
(Coperland and Weston, 1992). Systematic risks that could lead to loss in physical 
assets might include regional floods, earthquakes and other environmental hazards. In 
contrast, unsystematic risks can relate to physical assets loss due to events like fire or 
theft.
In this study, systematic risk is measured by company beta ( fiis) (s = 1997- 
99)60. This beta for company i in year s is computed by regressing the (monthly) total 
risk premium of company i on the (monthly) market risk premium in the manner 
prescribed by Bemdt (1991, pp. 34-35) as follows:
Rit - R f i =  <*i +  (R m  -  Rfi) + Eu [5 .1]
In equation [5.1], Rit and Rmi are the respective monthly return on the shares of 
company / and the market portfolio in period t (t = months 1-12 in year s)61. R/t is the 
risk-free rate of return, as measured by the interest rate of three-month bank savings; 
cti is the constant and sit is an error term, reflecting the effects of specific
£f\
(unsystematic) risk .
60 In the PRC, share price volatility varies between shares held by domestic investors (i.e., A-shares) 
and those held by foreign investors (i.e., B-shares). The beta values for the 50 or so companies that 
issue both A-shares and B-shares in the period of analysis are computed from the monthly returns on 
the two types of shareholdings weighted by the proportion o f registered equity capital. The SHSE and 
SZSE A-share indices are chosen as the market portfolio for A-share companies in these two markets, 
respectively. Also, the SHSE and SZSE composite indices (which include both A-share and B-share 
companies) are chosen as the market portfolio for B-share companies in the two markets.
61 Due to the high cost and time involved in the collection of daily/weekly trading data, monthly share 
return data had to be used. As in Borde, Chambliss and Madura (1994), a beta for each company/year is 
computed using 12 months’ market data.
62 In the finance literature, returns on short-term Treasury Bonds are usually used as a measure of the 
risk-free rate of return. However, such measures are not available in the PRC due to the fact that 
government-issued treasury bonds are normally for mid-term or long-term (typically three to five
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Unsystematic risk (UNSYSis) is calculated as in Copeland and Weston (1992, 
pp. 198-199) as follows:
i
i
i
UNSYSj = o o J  [5.2]
i
In equation [5.2], o ^ is the computed variance of company f s  monthly 
returns in year s (s = 1997-99) (i.e., total risk); 0  J  represents the square of the 
computed beta for company i in year s (s = 1997-99) (as per equation 5.2); o & is the 
computed variance of the market indices’ monthly returns in year s (5 = 1997-99).
(3) Industry Type (INDU)
A categorical variable - industry type (i.e., INDU - a value of 1, 2 ,. . ., 5 for 
services (mainly retail), real estate, utilities, conglomerates and manufacturers, 
respectively (see Chapter 6, section 6.6)) is used in the sub-group comparison of 
volume of property insurance purchased. Also, four industry dummies (INDU 1-4, 1,0) 
are used in the regression analysis.
(4) Geographical Location (GEOG)
Geographical location is measured by a dummy variable that is coded as 1 for 
the Eastern coastal economic zone and 0 otherwise.
| (5) Foreign Ownership (FOWN)
|
| Foreign ownership is measured by the fraction of ordinary shares owned by
! foreign investors.
years). Thus, the Chinese government guaranteed three-month interest rate for bank savings is used in
this study. This rate of interest is also subject to frequent review and modification by the PBOC to
I reflect changing macroeconomic circumstances.
I[
i
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I
|
j  (6) Taxation (TAXLOSS and TAXRATE)
i
In order to capture the effect of the existence of tax-loss carry-forwards on the 
corporate purchase of insurance, some prior studies have used continuous measures, 
which are defined as the amount of tax-loss carry-forwards scaled by the book value 
of total assets (e.g., Nance ^ t al., 1993), or firm value (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Gay and 
: Nam, 1998). However, as noted by Nance et al. (1993), continuous tax measures
| might be “noisy” surrogates because of the scaling problem (i.e., these measures
i
| could also reflect the effects of company size). As a result, this problem could make
|
the empirical results difficult to interpret and hence render the corresponding tests less 
powerful. In order to overcome the above scaling problem, others researchers have 
used a discrete measure (dummy variable) to capture the existence of tax-loss carry­
forwards (e.g., Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Mian, 1996; Colquitt and Hoyt, 1997). 
In the same spirit, a tax dummy (TAXLOSS), with 1 indicating presence of tax-loss 
carry-forwards and 0 otherwise, is used in this study to capture the effect of the tax 
convexity introduced by the existence of tax-loss carry-forwards.
As China has a nominally uniform rate of corporation tax, the existence of tax 
concessions in some companies could result in lower effective tax rate vis-a-vis the 
higher (nominal) tax rates in other companies without tax concessions. To capture the 
effect of any “tax shield” arising from fiscal concessions, another variable 
(TAXRATE) -  the effective tax rate -  is used. TAXRATE is defined as the ratio of the 
actual corporate income tax to the taxable income in the current year. A negative 
relation between TAXRATE and the likelihood of insuring and the amount of property 
I insurance purchased is predicted. This is because companies with various tax
preferential items (and hence a lower effective tax rate) could be motivated to hedge 
I (via insurance) to exploit fully such tax advantages.
s
i
! (7) Hedging Substitutes (SUBSIDY and LIQUID)
Two measures of hedging substitutes are used in this study. Government 
| subsidies (SUBSIDY) are measured by the total subsidies received from local/national 
government in the current accounting year scaled by the annual operating profit. As in 
Nance et al. (1993), liquidity (LIQUID) is measured by the ratio of liquid assets-to-
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current liabilities. Where liquid assets are defined as the sum of cash and cash 
equivalents that can be easily transferred into cash (e.g., short-term bank savings and 
investments in publicly tradable shares).
The variables used in this study and their proxies are further summarized in 
Table 5.2. ----
5.5 STATISTICAL PROCEDURES
iI
I This study employs three main statistical procedures to analyze the data
collected and test the direction and significance of causality predicted by the five 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter 4. These statistical procedures include univariate and 
bivariate analyses and multivariate regressions. The approach followed in each case is 
discussed in sections below.
5.5.1 Rank Transformations
The data are highly skewed; however, the existence of many zeros/negative 
values in the data set precludes me from taking log or square root transformations to 
mitigate the problem of skewness (see Chapter 6, Table 6.1). Therefore, as in Kane 
and Meade (1998) and Ireland and Lennox (2002), I take rank transformations of the 
metric variables (i.e., variables other than INDUj.4 , GEOG, TAXLOSS and YEAR97.98) 
and replace them with their rank equivalents in the analysis63.
|
i
1
i
I -------------------------------------------
63 For the vector [XUj X^, . . ., Xu] of variable X for year t, I replace each value of Xt with its 
corresponding rank (ranging from 1 to n in ascending sequence) divided by n+1. Observations are then 
aggregated and result in pooled data that are uniformly distributed between zero and one. Kane and 
Meade (1998) demonstrate that rank transformations have advantages of preserving comparative 
information, avoiding arbitrary sample trimming and improving fit. As a result, rank transformations 
generally perform better than log or square root transformations in resolving the problem of skewed 
data.
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Table 5.2 
Summary of Variables and Proxies
i
This table describes the names, the definitions and the predicted signs of the variables used in this
stuciy-
Variables Proxies Label Sign I 
(+/-)
Dependent variables
1 Participation INSCHO Insurance participation decision dummy with one for purchasing insurance and zero otherwise
2 Volume INS Corporate annual spending on property insurance scaled by total book value of insurable physical assets
Independent variables
1 Managerialownership MAN
The fraction of the year-end value of total shares owned by 
company managers relative to the total value of shares in 
issue
+
2 Stateownership STATE
The year-end proportion of the value of State shareholdings 
to the total value of shares in issue -
3 Leverage LEV The ratio of year-end book value of debt to book value of equity +
4
Investment
opportunity
set
GROW
Approximate Tobin’s Q, which is equal to the sum of market 
value of equity, book value of debt and preference equity 
divided by book value of total assets (year-end)
+
5 Firm size SIZE Natural log of year-end book value of total assets -
| Control variables
1 Interactions LEVMAN Multiplicative interaction term MAN*LEV +
2 Interactions SIZEMAN Multiplicative interaction term MAN* LnSIZE -
3 Interactions LEVGROW Multiplicative interaction term LEV*GROW +/-
4 Systematicrisk SYS Company betas +
5 Unsystematicrisk UNSYS
The decomposed unsystematic portion in the total risk of a 
firm’s share movements +
6 Industry sector 1 INDU, One for service (retailing) firm and zero for otherwise +
7 Industry sector 2 in d u 2 One for real estate firm and zero for otherwise -
8 Industry sector 3 INDU3 One for regulated (utilities) firm and zero for otherwise +/-
9
Industry 
sector 4 in d u 4 One for conglomerate firm and zero for otherwise -
10 Industry sector 5 INDU5 One for manufacturing firm and zero for otherwise +
11 Geographicallocation GEOG
Dummy variable with one for coastal regions and zero for 
otherwise +
12
Foreign
ownership FOWN The fraction of shareholdings owned by foreign investors +
13 Tax 1 TAXLOSS
Dummy variable with one for the existence of tax-loss carry­
forwards at the beginning of each accounting year and zero 
for otherwise
+
14 Tax 2 TAXRATE Effective tax rate, defined as the ratio of actual corporate income tax to the taxable income -
15 Hedgingsubstitutes SUBSIDY
Total subsidies received from local government scaled by the 
annual operating profits
16 Hedgingsubstitutes LIQUID The ratio of liquid assets to current liabilities
Source: Research Literature Review
97
5.5.2 Univariate Analysis
The cross-sectional and time-series data are first pooled and described using 
descriptive statistics including mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, 
minimum and maximum. This practice helps to summarize the overall characteristics 
of the dataset and ascertain the patterns (e.g., the distribution) for each variable. For 
example, a highly skewed variable could suggest that a natural logarithm 
transformation needs to be taken in order to reduce the variability and the influence of 
extreme values. Second, the means of firm-specific characteristics for insurance users 
and non-users are computed and the Student’s t-tests for the significance of the 
differences between the means of these characteristics for users and non-users are 
conducted (see Chapter 6, section 6.2).
Finally, in order to determine whether statistical differences exist between the 
means/medians of the level of property insurance usage across sub-groups of time- 
invariant control variables (i.e., GEOG and INDU) that cannot be included in the 
volume decision model (see section 5.5.4), both parametric (i.e., Student’s t-test) and 
non-parametric statistical tests (e.g., Mann-Whitney U-test) are performed. The 
rationale for using non-parametric tests as a supplement to their parametric 
equivalents is that such tests are less sensitive to the distributional differences (e.g., 
variance) between two or more sample groups and hence more likely to produce 
robust results (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). The results of these tests are reported in 
Chapter 6, section 6.6 (Table 6.7).
5.5.3 Bivariate Analysis
The bivariate analysis conducted in this study involves testing for associations 
between the dependent and independent variables. To achieve this aim, pair-wise 
correlation analyses are performed, where the correlation coefficients between metric 
variables are calculated using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients, while 
those involved non-metric variables are computed using the non-parametric Spearman 
rank test. Indeed, Bryman and Cramer (1997) argue that the investigation of 
associations among variables through correlation analysis is an initial but important
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step in explaining the underlying phenomena in which researchers are primarily 
interested. Chow (1982) further notes that from econometric point of view, correlation 
analysis should be performed prior to carrying out multivariate tests. He reasons that 
such an approach helps to minimize the risk that variable measurement errors and/or 
inter-correlated variables may remain undetected, and so distort the statistical 
significance of multivariate results. In addition, correlation analysis could reveal high 
and statistically significant collinarity between independent variables. Thus, 
additional diagnostic tests (e.g., variance inflation factors, VIFs) may have to be
i
! carried out in order to ascertain whether coefficient estimates derived in multivariate
I
! tests are rendered inefficient by muhicollinearity (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980).
5.5.4 Multivariate Regressions
The relation between the dependent variables and independent variables 
detected from the bivariate correlation analysis can be spurious if they both interact 
with other variable(s). Therefore, in order to determine the “real” underlying relation 
between the corporate purchase of property insurance and firm-specific 
characteristics, multivariate analysis is carried out in addition to univariate /bivariate 
tests (Bryman and Cramer, 1997).
5.5.4.1 Insurance Participation Decision Model
As Chapter 1 (section 1.2) makes clear, the aims of this study are twofold, 
namely, to examine empirically the determinants of both the managerial propensity to 
| purchase property insurance and the financial extent of property insurance use by
| publicly listed companies in the PRC. To achieve these aims, a Heckman’s two-stepi
| sample selection procedure is employed to determine the linkage between the
| corporate purchase of property insurance and firm-specific characteristics. This
| approach is consistent with that taken in prior research into the derivatives hedging
! activities of companies (e.g., Colquitt and Hoyt, 1997; Hardwick and Adams, 1999).
In the first stage of the analysis, a probit model with a binary dependent variable 
(INSCHO) is utilized to examine the effect of firm-specific characteristics on the 
probability of purchasing property insurance (i.e., the participation decision model).
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The second stage of the multivariate analysis involves a panel model incorporating the 
sample selection correction (i.e., the inverse Mill’s ratio) derived from the first-stage 
probit model. This procedure enables one to analyze the linkage between firm-specific 
characteristics and the financial extent of the use of property insurance (INS) (i.e., the 
volume decision model). The rationale for this approach is twofold. First, a 
conventional (ordinary least square (OLS)) linear regression model does not 
accommodate the binary nature of the decision-choice dependent variable (e.g., see 
Greene, 1999). Second, a single Tobit model is considered to be inappropriate, as it 
cannot achieve the stated aim of investigating both the determinants of the insurance 
participation and volume decisions. Indeed, both Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) and 
Haushalter (2000) acknowledge the importance of investigating the nature o f these 
two types of managerial decision.
The probit insurance participation decision model used in this study is thus:
I
i
! Yu = $Q+f’\MANu+$iSTATE,&?,iLEVu+$iGROWu+$5SIZEi,+$6LEVMANu +
p1SIZEMANa+ foLEVGROWu + p9SYSU +faoUNSYSu + p nINDU,,u+ ■ ■ ■+ 
fiHINDU<ii„+pil5 GEOGu+fii6FOWN„+pinTAXLOSSi!+fiisTAXRATEu+ 
^SUBSIDY,,+ fcoLIQUIDu + P21 YEAR,? + p2 2 YEAR9 8  + £„ [5.3]
|
In equation [5.3], the latent variable, Yit, is not observable; its observable 
counterpart is Yit (INSCHO), which is equal to 1 if F/>0, denoting a company with 
insurance purchase; and 0 if Yit* < = 0, denoting a company without insurance
I purchase. The other variables are the same as what are defined previously in section 
5.4.2-5.4.3 and Table 5.2. However, YEAR9 7  and YEARgg are year dummy variables 
included in the regression to control for the possible time-related effects; eit~ N(0,1) is 
a disturbance term.
5.5.4.2 Insurance Volume Decision Model
The panel data design also controls for omitted/unobservable firm-specific 
effects (e.g., differences in inter-company risk management expertise) and/or period- 
specific effects (e.g., insurance underwriting cycles), thereby producing more 
informative and reliable parameter estimations than separate single period and/or
; simple pooled OLS analysis (Baltagi, 1995; Greene, 1999) (also see footnote 6).
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Subject to the different assumptions made about the distribution of these effects, the 
main estimation techniques are usually the fixed-effects and random-effects (error 
components) models. The former model treats omitted firm-specific variables as 
constant over time and/or period-specific variables as invariant across companies. In 
contrast, the random-effects model treats firm and period-specific factors as random.
To determine the appropriate regression model for the volume decision model, 
a two-stage diagnostic procedure is followed (see Table 6.6). First, Wald and Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests are conducted to examine the relative 
efficiency of the heterogeneous fixed/random-effects estimation against the 
homogeneous pooled OLS model (e.g., Das and Siinivasan, 1999; Ragan, Warren and 
Bratsberg, 1999). The Wald F-statistic and the LM Chi-square value are both 
statistically significant at the level 0.01 (one-tailed). These results thus suggest that 
fixed/random-effects models are more efficient than the pooled cross-sectional OLS 
model. Second, the Hausman (1978) specification test, which is based on the 
differences between the coefficients estimated from fixed or random-effects models, 
is performed to determine which kind of panel model -  fixed or random-effects -  
should be used in this study (Greene, 1999). The computed Chi-square statistic is also 
found to be statistically significant at the level 0.01 (one-tailed), indicating that the 
null hypothesis of zero correlation between the unobservable firm-specific effects and 
the explanatory variables in the model can be rejected. In this case, the fixed-effects 
model can still derive consistent estimates but the random-effects model cannot and 
so the former is used in this study. Additionally, because the data are not a random 
sample drawn from a large population, random-effects model is considered not to be 
appropriate and hence, a fixed-effects model is employed (Baltagi, 1995). However, 
the fixed-effects model could not produce parameter estimates for two time-invariant 
control variables (i.e., GEOG and INDU) because of the multicollinearity between 
them and the fixed-effects64. Instead, these time-invariant variables are analyzed 
separately using parametric and non-parametric statistics (see Chapter 6, section 6.6). 
The fixed-effects insurance volume decision model with Heckman’s sample selection 
correction that is employed in this study can thus be expressed as:
64 Though GEOG and INDUj^ are not included explicitly in the volume decision model, it is important 
to note that the use of firm-specific and time-invariant fixed-effects is able to control for the influence 
of GEOG and INDU^ (e.g., see Sun et al., 2002).
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INSjt = a 0 + a i + y t + $xMANit + fi2STATEit + &LEVU + |3 4 GROWit + p>5SIZEit + 
PeLEVMANu + ^SIZEMANt A foLEVGROWlt+ p9SYSit +pi0UNSYSit+ PuFOWNit+ 
P12 TAXL OSSiA P13 TAXRA TElt + p l4SUBSIDYit+ ^LIQ U ID  it + f>l6Xit+ St [5.4]
In equation [5.4], INSit, the financial extent of property insurance use by 
Chinese listed companies, is defined as the annual corporate spending on property 
insurance scaled by the total book value of insurable physical assets, a / represents the 
time-invariant firm-specific effect dummies that capture the unobservable differences 
among companies; Y t is the firm-invariant period-specific effect dummies that 
capture the possible time-related changes; Xit is the inverse Mill’s ratio generated by 
the first-step probit decision model that controls for the possible sample selection bias 
in the volume model where only companies purchasing property insurance are 
selected; a o is the intercept; Sit is an error term that is assumed to have a zero mean 
and constant variance; u are the company/year observations over the period 1997-99.
5.6 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
This chapter examines the rationale for using statistical analysis techniques in 
this study. The chapter also describes the research design, including the sources of 
data, definition and measurement of the variables used. The chapter suggests that due 
to the existence of regulatory and other institutional constraints, statistical analysis is 
the most appropriate and viable research method that can be employed in this study. 
The statistical procedures employed include univariate/bivariate techniques and 
multivariate tests. Parametric and non-parametric statistics are both deemed to be 
appropriate given the use of metric and non-metric variables in this study. A 
Heckman’s two-step sample selection approach that consists of a probit participation 
decision model and a volume decision model with sample selection correction is 
adopted for the multivariate tests. The rationale for selecting these regression 
procedures is also outlined in this chapter. The empirical results obtained from these 
statistical analyses are analyzed and discussed in the next chapter of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND EVALUATION
6.1 INTROUDUCTION
The implications of agency theory for explaining the discretionary purchase of 
property insurance by publicly listed Chinese companies have been examined in Chapter 
4 of this thesis. From this analysis, the five hypotheses, three interaction terms and seven 
control variables that are put forward in Chapter 4 (sections 4.2-4.4) are now tested using 
the statistical procedures described in Chapter 5.
6.2 UNIVARIATE RESULTS
Panel A of Table 6.1 gives the descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
explanatory variables for the pooled company/year sample of PRC-based publicly listed 
companies for the period 1997-99. Clearly, Panel A shows that many variables are highly 
skewed and have zero/negative values. As such, the use of rank transformations (section
5.5.1) appears to be justified. Additionally, TAXRATE, TAXLOSS, FOWN, MAN and 
SIZE vary more substantially than the other variables in the sample. This suggests that the 
sample of PRC-based publicly listed companies exhibits diverse firm-specific 
characteristics, thus implying possible differences in the use of property insurance. Panel 
C of Table 6.1 reveals that roughly 85 percent of the sampled companies purchased some 
amount of property insurance over the research period. However, amongst those insuring 
companies, about 95 percent spent less than one percent of the book value of insurable 
physical assets on property insurance. This level of property insurance expenditure is 
much lower compared with the figures reported in some more developed economies. For 
example, Hoyt and Khang (2000) report that in the US, the average annual value of 
property insurance premiums spent by publicly listed US corporations is roughly 5 
percent of the book value of insurable assets. In China, the relatively low levels of 
property insurance purchased by publicly listed companies could reflect the substitutive
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Table 6.1
235 Chinese Publicly Listed Companies -  Descriptive Statistics
This table gives the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables for the 
pooled firm/year observations for 235 Chinese publicly listed companies for 1997-99 (n=668). 
Supplementary information covering comparison with non-included firms and insurance 
spending groupings are also given in Panels B and C, respectively.
Panel A: Edescriptive Statistics [SIZE is measured in RJV B m illions)
Mean Median Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum
UNSCHO 0.887 1.000 0.316 -2.454 7.023 0.000 1.000
\lNS 0.0026 0.0012 0.0044 3.7890 19.9404 0.0000 0.0330
MAN 0.0006 0.0003 0.0009 3.4010 18.0940 0.0000 0.0071
STATE 0.297 0.299 0.257 0.189 1.677 0.000 0.886
\l e v 1.027 0.851 0.719 1.311 5.153 0.019 4.3371
\g r o w 2.001 1.720 0.957 2.172 9.364 0.858 8.51 d
S/ZE 127.867 80.223 134.689 2.676 12.106 11.928 1,034.040
LEVMAN 0.000 0.000 0.0005 0.052 18.539 -0.0038 0.0028
SIZEMAN 0.000 0.000 0.0007 -1.096 36.503 -0.0076 0.0051
LEVGROW -0.227 -0.040 0.632 -1.852 10.938 -4.437 2.496
STS 1.056 0.980 0.537 0.788 4.661 -0.930 3.746
\UNSYS 9.875 9.362 3.924 1.484 7.574 0.228 36.071
INDU, 0.617 1.000 0.487 -0.479 1.228 0.000 1.006
in d u 2 0.159 0.000 0.366 1.864 4.472 0.000 1.006
INDU3 0.048 0.000 0.213 4.249 19.053 0.000 1.000
in d u 4 0.055 0.000 0.228 3.902 16.223 0.000 1.000
INDUs 0.121 0.000 0.327 2.319 6.375 0.000 1.000
GEOG 0.634 0.000 0.482 -0.551 1.303 0.000 1.000
\fOWN 0.076 0.000 0.147 1.686 4.537 0.000 0.664
TAXLOSS 0.106 0.000 0.308 2.553 7.516 0.000 1.000
TAXRATE 0.322 0.146 4.652 25.836 668.999 -0.797 120.812
[SUBSIDY 0.098 0.000 0.445 9.825 116.049 -0.088 6.323
|LIQUID 0.955 0.683 0.950 3.233 17.682 -0.051 8.681
Panel B: Comparison of Sample Firms with Non-included Firms (Mann-Whitney U test)
Year Sample Non-incluc ed Firms Zrstatistic
(two-tailed)No. o f Firms Median No. o f  Firms Median
InSIZE 1997 203 11.180 542 11.080 1.304
1998 234 11.310 651 11.280 0.471
1999 231 11.400 745 11.380 0.308
LEV 1997 203 0.847 542 0.867 -0.291
t 1998 234 0.836 651 0.825 0.144
t 1999 231 0.859 745 0.844 0.156
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Panel C: Insurance Spending (INS) Groupings
INS Groups I
0 0.000-0.005
0.005-
0.010
0.010-
0.015
0.015-
0.020
0.020-
0.025
0.025-
0.030
0.030-
0.035
Frequency 75 512 48 12 9 5 4 3
Pencent% 11.23 76.64 7.19 1.80 1.35 0.75 0.60 0.44 I
Source: Research Data
Notes:
INSCHO = insurance participation variable, 1 = insure and 0 = uninsure; INS = extent of property 
insurance use, defined as annual corporate property insurance spending scaled by total insurable physical 
assets; MAN = managerial ownership -  measured by the proportion o f the number of common shares held 
by company managers; STATE -  State shareholdings, defined as the fraction o f the number of State-held 
shares over the total shares in issue; LEV=  financial leverage -  represented by the ratio o f debt (long-term 
plus short-term)-to-equity; GROW = Tobin’s Q, defined as the ratio of the sum of the book value of debt 
and market value of equity to the replacement cost of the firm’s assets; SIZE = company size -  the book 
value o f total assets; LEVMAN = multiplicative interaction term between LEV and MAN; SIZEMAN = 
multiplicative interaction term between SIZE and MAN, LEVGROW = multiplicative interaction term 
between LEV and GROW; SYS = systematic risks, measured by company beta which is derived by 
regressing the monthly risk return of company shares on the market risk return; UNSYS = unsystematic 
risks, measured by the difference between the total risks (i.e., the standard deviation o f share return) and 
systematic risks; INDUj.s = industry dummies with 1 for service, real estate, utilities, conglomerate and 
manufacturing firms, respectively, and 0 otherwise; GEOG = geographical location -  dummy variable, 
coastal economic zones = 1, inland economic zones = 0; FOWN = foreign ownership -  measured by the 
proportion of shareholdings held by foreign investors; TAXLOSS = tax-loss carry-forwards dummy, 1 = 
the existence o f tax-loss carry-forwards in the beginning of an accounting year and 0 = otherwise; 
TAXRATE = effective tax rate, measured by corporate income tax scaled by taxable income in the current 
year; SUBSIDY = government subsidies, measured by the total subsidies received from the local 
government scaled by the annual operating profit in the current accounting year; LIQUID = liquidity, 
measured by the ratio of liquid assets-to-current liabilities, where liquid assets are defined as the sum of 
cash and cash equivalents that can be easily transferred into cash (e.g., short-term bank savings and 
investments in publicly tradable shares).
protectionist role still played by the State in the national economy (producing the so- 
called State “charity hazard” effects -  e.g., see Browne and Hoyt, 2000).
Panel A of Table 6.2 reports the means of explanatory variables for insurance 
users/non-users as well as Student’s t-tests of differences in the means of continuous 
variables between the insurance users/non-users. These parametric tests suggest that 
consistent with what was hypothesized, property insurance users tend to have higher 
leverage and generally lower liquidity than non-users. However, property insurance users 
are unexpectedly large companies with low Tobin’s Q values (GROW). Additionally, 
statistically significant differences in LEVMAN and LEVGROW are found between
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Table 6.2
Comparison of Firm Characteristics Between Insurance Users and Nonusers
This table presents the results of Student’s t and % 2 tests of differences in the firm- 
specific characteristics between insurance users and nonusers from the pooled and rank 
transformed data (n=668).
Panel A; Student’s t-tests Using Metric Variables
Variables Predicted Sign
Users (n1=593) Non-users (n2=75)
t-statMean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
MAN Users>Non-users 0.497 0.283 0.523 0.319 -0.674
STATE Users<Non-users 0.504 0.284 0.471 0.275 0.982
LEV Users>Non-users 0.515 0.280 0.379 0.318 3.519"'
GROW Users>Non-users 0.490 0.288 0.580 0.277 -2.590
SIZE Users<Non-users 0.510 0.287 0.414 0.279 2.756
LEVMAN Users>Non-users 0.519 0.282 0.346 0.286 4.987
SIZEMAN Users<Non-users 0.505 0.283 0.457 0.318 1.239
LEVGROW Indeterminate 0.507 0.285 0.442 0.300 1.834
S Y S Users>Non-users 0.501 0.286 0.494 0.302 0.173
UNSYS Users>Non-users 0.500 0.286 0.501 0.299 -0.006
FOWN Users>Non-users 0.502 0.217 0.482 0.199 0.817
TAXRATE Users<Non-users 0.497 0.287 0.523 0.292 -0.751
SUBSIDY Users<Non-users 0.507 0.257 0.541 0.246 -1.120
LIQUID Users<Non-users 0.487 0.284 0.602 0.297 -3.280'" |
Panel B: %2 Tests of Independence Between Non-Metric Variables and Insurance 
Participation
Variables X Stat d.f. p-value (one-tailed)
GEOG 3.853 1 0.050
IN D U i 0.453 1 0.501
in d u 2 1.908 1 0.167
in d u 3 0.320 1 0.572
INDU4 19.980 1 0.000
INDUS 8.053 1 0.005”'
| TAXLOSS 5.746 1 0.017
Source: Research Data
Note:
1. INSCHO = insurance participation variable, 1 = insure and 0 = uninsure; INS = extent o f property 
insurance use, defined as annual corporate property insurance spending scaled by total insurable physical 
assets; MAN = managerial ownership -  measured by the proportion o f the number of common shares held 
by company managers; STATE = State shareholdings, defined as the fraction of the number of State-held 
shares over the total shares in issue; LEV=  financial leverage -  represented by the ratio o f debt (long-term 
plus short-term)-to-equity; GROW = Tobin’s Q, defined as the ratio of the sum of the book value o f debt 
and market value of equity to the replacement cost of the firm’s assets; SIZE = company size -  the book 
value o f total assets; LEVMAN = multiplicative interaction term between LEV  and MAN; SIZEMAN = 
multiplicative interaction term between SIZE and MAN; LEVGROW = multiplicative interaction term
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between LEV and GROW; SYS = systematic risks, measured by company beta which is derived by 
regressing the monthly risk return of company shares on the market risk return; UNSYS = unsystematic 
risks, measured by the difference between the total risks (i.e., the standard deviation o f share return) and 
systematic risks; INDU us = industry dummies with 1 for service, real estate, utilities, conglomerate and 
manufacturing firms, respectively, and 0 otherwise; GEOG = geographical location -  dummy variable, 
coastal economic zones = 1, inland economic zones = 0; FOWN = foreign ownership -  measured by the 
proportion of shareholdings held by foreign investors; TAXLOSS = tax-loss carry-forwards dummy, 1 = 
the existence o f tax-loss carry-forwards in the beginning of an accounting year and 0 = otherwise; 
TAXRATE = effective tax rate, measured by corporate income tax scaled by taxable income in the current 
year, SUBSIDY = government subsidies, measured by the total subsidies received from the local 
government scaled by the annual operating profit in the current accounting year; LIQUID = liquidity, 
measured by the ratio o f liquid assets-to-current liabilities, where liquid assets are defined as the sum of 
cash and cash equivalents that can be easily transferred into cash (e.g., short-term bank savings and 
investments in publicly tradable shares). The rank-transformed equivalents of these variables are used.
2. *** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level * Statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level. Reported p-values are one-tailed unless a variable is not uni-directionally 
predicted.
property insurance users and non-users. This finding suggests that leverage and 
managerial ownership, leverage and growth options could interact to influence the 
corporate property insurance decision. Otherwise, no statistically significant differences 
in MAN, STATE, SYS, UNSYS, FOWN, SUBSIDY  and TAXRATE are found between 
property insurance users and non-users. Panel B of Table 6.2 reports the results of non- 
parametric x2 test of independence between the insuring decision and the non-metric 
variables. The results reveal that there are geographical (GEOG) and industrial (JNDU4 
and INDU5) differences in the insuring behavior of sample companies. The existence of 
tax-loss carry-forwards {TAXLOSS) also appears to influence the corporate insuring 
decision. While these x2 tests are indicative of a possible linkage between the insuring 
decision and corresponding independent variables, they do not indicate the direction of 
such relations.
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6.3 BIVARIATE RESULTS
Table 6.3 presents the correlation coefficients between the dependent and 
explanatory variables for the pooled firm/year observations for 1997-99. The pair­
wise correlation coefficients (Spearman rank) reveal statistically significant positiveI
} associations between the insurance participation decision variable (INSCHO) and LEV
\
and SIZE (though the latter is inconsistent with expectations) (p<0.01, two-tailed). 
These results suggest that large and highly levered Chinese companies are more likely 
to insure than small and lowly levered companies. As expected, the insuring 
propensity of managers appears to vary from industry to industry -  for example, 
manufacturing firms are more likely to insure than other types of firms; whereas 
conglomerate firms appear to be less likely to insure than firms in other industries. 
Among the hedging substitutes, only LIQUID seems to have an expected (and 
statistically significant) correlation with the corporate insurance decision (p<0.01, 
two-tailed). That is, the higher a company’s liquidity, the less likely managers are to 
purchase property insurance. Contrary to hypothesis (H4a), GROW is found to be 
inversely related to INSCHO. Also different what was expected, GEOG is found to be 
negatively associated with INSCHO, implying that companies incorporated in 
economically more developed Eastern coastal regions are less likely to purchase 
property insurance than inland-based companies. The correlation analysis results 
provide little support for taxation-induced explanation for the corporate purchase of 
insurance. Again, the significant correlation between some of interactions terms (e.g., 
LEVMAN) and INSCHO suggests that some key variables could have joint influence 
on the corporate decision to participate into property insurance use.
i
Turning to the extent to which property insurance is used, it is interesting to 
note that consistent with what was expected, large companies appear to insure to a 
relatively lesser extent than small companies - though the former seems more likely to 
take out property insurance in the first place. Additionally, as predicted, GROW is 
found to be positively and significantly related to INS (p<0.01, two-tailed). However, 
inconsistent with what was hypothesized, highly levered companies tend to buy less 
property insurance than their lowly levered counterparts despite the formers’ greater 
likelihood to insure. The correlation results regarding the impact of industry and 
geographical factors on the volume of insurance purchased are generally consistent
I l l
with those of insurance participation. TAXLOSS is found to be unexpectedly and 
negatively related to both the likelihood and extent of property insurance usage. No 
other explanatory variables are found to exhibit predicted and statistically significant 
correlations with INS. It is worth noting, however, that some independent variables 
(e.g., LEV and SIZE) appear to have different directional of influences on the 
insurance participation and volume decisions, respectively. Thus, the determinants of 
these two decisions could be different, thereby justifying the need for a two-stage 
multivariate analysis in this study (Haushalter, 2000).
The statistically significant correlation between some of the explanatory 
variables also raises the possibility of multicollinearity. However, the correlation 
coefficients between pairs of independent variables are generally low (all less than 
0.6), suggesting that a serious collinearity problem is unlikely (e.g., see Judge, Hill, 
Griffiths, Lutkepohl and Lee, 1982, p.620). On the other hand, collinearity can be 
present between more than two independent variables. To test for this, variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) for each independent variable and condition indices for each 
regression model are computed (see Table 6.4)65. The calculated VIFs of independent 
variables in both participation and volume models were all less than 2.5 and the 
(largest) condition index in each model was about 11. Therefore, it is felt that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a severe problem in this study (e.g., see Kennedy, 
1998, p. 190).
6.4 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
To allow for potential interactions among the independent variables, two 
multivariate regression models - the probit participation decision model and the fixed- 
effects volume decision model - are estimated. The results (including diagnostics) are 
analyzed in sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 below.
65 VIF is calculated by regressing each independent variable in turn on all other independent variables 
and then calculating 1/(1-R2). Condition indices are the square roots o f the ratios o f the largest 
eignvalue to each successive eignvalue. According to Kennedy (1998, p. 190), a condition index 
greater than 15 indicates a possible collinearity problem and an index greater than 30 suggests a 
potentially serious collinearity problem.
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6.4.1 Participation Decision Model Results
Equation [5.3] (see Chapter 5, section 5.5.4) is estimated and several 
diagnostic statistics are calculated. The parameter estimates and relevant test statistics 
are shown in Table 6.5. The coefficients for LEV are found to be positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.05, one-tailed). This is consistent with the univariate and 
bivariate results. As mentioned in Chapter 4, section 4.2.3, managers of highly levered 
companies are motivated to purchase property insurance in order to reduce the costs 
of financial distress and/or control for agency problems (e.g., the underinvestment 
problem) associated with the use of debt. Therefore, this finding supports the 
hypothesis (H3a) that highly levered companies are more likely to use property 
insurance than companies with less debt in their capital structure in order to mitigate 
shareholder-debtholder incentive conflicts. Indeed, Ma et al. (1998) report that in 
China it is becoming increasingly common for major creditors to request 
collateralized assets-related insurance coverage to give them ex-ante protection 
against ex-post losses.
Consistent with what was hypothesized (HIa), MAN is found to have positive 
influence on a company’s propensity to purchase property insurance (despite its 
insignificance). As noted earlier (section 4.3), the linkage between managerial share 
ownership and the corporate purchase of property insurance in China needs to be 
considered jointly with two interactive terms -  LEVMAN and SIZEMAN. The former 
is found to be positive and statistically significant (p<0.01, one-tailed), suggesting that 
for given levels of insider ownership, the managerial propensity to purchase property 
insurance increases with leverage66. This finding is consistent with the managerial 
risk-aversion hypothesis of Smith and Stulz (1985), but runs counter to the 
managerial incentive-alignment hypothesis (e.g., see Downs and Sommer, 1999). 
This is because when company leverage increases, the risk of financial distress 
becomes higher thus enhancing the equity price risk of managers’ shareholdings and
66 To see this, the partial derivative o f Y* with respect to MAN is calculated to derive the relation 
between MAN and property insurance participation decision. This relation is
0.026+0.151 *LEV+0.Q26*SIZE. Clearly, the relation between MAN and property insurance 
participation decision is positively moderated by LEV.
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Table 6.5
Multivariate Results of the Probit Participation Decision Model 
(pooled data -  668 company/year observations)
This table presents the regression results of the probit participation decision model.
Predicted Signs 
(+/-)
Coefficient
Estimate Standard Errors t-stat p-value
Intercept +/- 0.048 0.105 0.455 0.649
MAN + 0.026 0.039 0.673 0.250
STATE - -0.030 0.040 -0.751 0.226
LEV + 0.118 0.053 2.195 0.014**
GROW + 0.005 0.048 0.112 0.455
SIZE - 0.069 0.043 1.589 0.056*
LEVMAN + 0.151 0.039 3.861 0 .000***
SIZEMAN _ 0.026 0.036 0.732 0.232
LEVGROW +/- -0.036 0.038 -0.931 0.352
SYS + 0.005 0.034 0.133 0.447
UNSYS + -0.013 0.036 -0.369 0.356
INDUi + -0.015 0.036 -0.424 0.335
INDU2 - -0.178 0.102 -1.736 0.041**
in d u 3 +/- 0.019 0.040 0.469 0.638
INDU4 _ -0.115 0.050 -2.301 0 .010***
GEOG + -0.051 0.023 -2.252 0 .012**
FOWN + 0.021 0.062 0.346 0.364
TAXLOSS + -0.078 0.050 -1.563 0.059*
TAXRATE - -0.079 0.038 -2.085 0.018**
SUBSIDY - -0.091 0.098 -0.925 0.177
LIQUID _ -0.013 0.059 -0.214 0.415
y e a r 97 +/- -0.040 0.028 -1.425 0.154
y e a r 98 +/- -0.008 0.025 -0.308 0.758 I
Diagnostics
x2 test that parameters are jointly zero y2 (22) ~ 82.52, p-value=0.000***
Pseudo-R2 0.466
LM test for hetroscedasticity X2 m = 0.144, p-value=0.704 |
Source: Research Data
Note:
1. The univariate probit participation decision model estimated is:
Yu = P o + P i  MANit + $2STATEit + foLEV,t + faGROWit + &SIZEU + §(JLEVMANit + ^SIZEMANit + fcLEVGROW» + 
|%SYSit+ p l0UNSYSit+ $nINDUUt +...+ pl4INDU4M+ p l5GEOGit+ p l6FOWNit+ pl lTAXLOSSit+ $n TAXRATE»+ 
$ l9SUBSIDYit+ fcoLIQUIDu + p2i YEAR97 + $12YEAR98 + eit
Where the observable dummy variable INSCHOj is equal to 1 if  the latent variable, 7,*>0, denoting a company with 
an insurance purchase; and 0 if Y* <=0, denoting a company without an insurance purchase. Other variables are 
defined as previous.
2. Reported in the column of coefficient estimates in Table 3 are marginal effects o f  corresponding variable that are 
computed at the means o f all observations (see LIMDEP version 7.0).
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3. *** Statistically significant at the 0.01 ** Statistically significant at the 0.05. Where the predicted 
sign o f a variable is uni-directional, one-tailed p-value is calculated; otherwise two-tailed p-value is 
reported.
potentially adversely affecting their job security. As a result, managers are more likely 
to purchase property insurance in highly indebted corporate states than would 
otherwise be the case when leverage is low. However, SIZEMAN is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels, suggesting that company size does not significantly 
affect the relation between managerial share ownership and property insurance 
participation decisions in the Chinese corporate sector.
As predicted, TAXRATE is found to be negative and statistically significant 
(p<0.05, one-tailed). This appears to support the view that companies with more tax 
credits (and hence lower effective tax rate) are more likely to use property insurance 
in order to make full use of existing tax shields. Interestingly, TAXLOSS, however, is 
found to be unexpectedly related to the likelihood of insurance purchase (p<0.10, one­
tailed). This suggests that the convexity of tax position arising from the tax-loss carry­
forwards does not effectively motivate the managerial purchase of property insurance 
in Chinese companies. One possible reason for this might be that Chinese managers 
are failing to recognize the existence of cumulative operating losses as a tax shield 
and the potential taxation advantages associated with hedging (in terms of the 
effective use of such tax shield). Alternatively, this negative relation between the 
existence of cumulative operating losses and property insurance participation could 
reflect that Chinese managers in (financially) poorly performing companies might be 
under pressure (e.g., from shareholders) to curtail business expenses including 
insurance.
Contrary to expectations (but consistent with the results of the correlation 
analysis), company size is found to have a positive and significant influence on a 
company’s probability to purchase property insurance (p<0.10, one-tailed). At first 
sight, this is counter-intuitive, as unlike hedging through derivatives trading, 
information and transaction cost-based scale economies are reported not to be 
pronounced in insurance transactions (Mayers and Smith, 1990). A possible 
explanation for this observation is that given the strong market competition and the
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drive for market shares of premiums income in China, large companies could be more 
likely to be targeted by insurers than small companies.
Additionally, the insurance participation decisions of Chinese managers 
appear to vary according to industrial sector. Specifically, real estate (INDU2 ) and 
conglomerate companies (INDU4) are found to be less likely to purchase property 
insurance than companies from other industries (p<0.05, one-tailed). This is not 
surprising because a large proportion of the assets of Chinese real estate companies 
are (statutorily) uninsurable land. Additionally, conglomerate firms can achieve risk 
diversification through multi-line business operation and thus, have less need for
property insurance compared with other companies, all else being equal.
Also different from previously expected, GEOG is found to be negatively 
associated with property insurance participation decision, implying that Chinese 
publicly listed companies incorporated in inland regions have greater propensity to 
use property insurance than their counterparts in coastal areas. One possible reason is 
that compared with managers in companies located in the economically more 
developed Eastern costal regions, inland-based company managers might have few 
risk hedging alternatives to insurance (e.g., financial derivatives) and less expertise in 
risk management. Alternatively, in-land based companies may face a greater risk of 
asset loss -  for example, due to generally poor loss prevention and/or inadequate 
safety systems. As a result, they tend to be more likely to rely on the usage of 
(potentially expensive) commercial insurance to manage asset-loss risk than other 
forms of hedging. Therefore, it is felt that this does not necessarily constitute counter­
intuitive evidence for the reported greater risk management awareness of company 
managers in the coastal regions (Shi and Su, 2000).
While STATE and GROW are “correctly” signed, they are not statistically 
significant. Thus, there is no evidence to support the notion that State ownership could 
reduce the likelihood that company managers purchase property insurance. This could 
reflect the possibility that while delegating business operations to management, the 
State has neither the incentives nor the capability (e.g., due to information asymmetry) 
to monitor and effectively influence corporate risk management, including insurance
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| decisions (e.g., see Xu and Wang, 1999). Alternatively, the available financial
j assistance from the government may not be sufficient enough to effectively substitute
| for the use of commercial property insurance in managing asset-loss risks. Indeed, this
is evidenced by the negative, but insignificant parameter estimation for SUBSIDY.
\
Otherwise, corporate systematic and unsystematic risks and hedging substitutes are 
not found to have significant impacts on the propensity of Chinese listed companies to 
use property insurance. The insignificance of year dummies further suggests that there 
have not been (material) time-related changes regarding the managerial decision to 
participate into property insurance amongst the current sample of publicly listed 
Chinese companies.
The diagnostics presented in Table 6.5 include a %2 statistic for testing the null 
hypothesis that regression coefficients (excluding the intercept) are jointly zero. The
9 9computed % statistic allows one to reject this null hypothesis. A second % statistic is 
calculated using a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for heteroscedasticity that compares 
i  the estimated model with an alternative model that allows for multiplicative
i ^
heteroscedasticity regarding InSIZE in the disturbance term. The calculated % and 
associated p-values reject the null hypothesis, implying that heteroscedasticity is 
unlikely a severe problem in the probit model. Additionally, the calculated pseudo-J?2
fnvalues are around 0.50 indicating the limited predictive power of the probit models .
6.4.2 Volume Decision Model Results
The empirical linkage between the financial extent of property insurance use 
and the hypothesized firm-specific characteristics (i.e., equation 5.4 in Chapter 5, 
section 5.5.4) is examined by estimating a (two-way) fixed-effects panel model with 
Heckman’s sample selection correction. Only those sample companies that purchased 
property insurance are included in this model (n = 593). The results are presented in 
Table 6.6.
67 The computed pseudo-R2 measures the goodness o f fit o f the probit model (Zavoina and McElvey, 
1975). That is, R =var(Yf)/[l+var(Yf)], where Yf=E[Y*|Y]. Out o f 593 company/year cases purchasing 
property insurance, 588 are correctly predicted; in contrast, out o f 75 company/year cases not 
purchasing property insurance, 12 are correctly predicted. Therefore, the probit model is deemed to be 
quite successful in predicting the probability o f purchasing property insurance; but it has limited 
predictive power in estimating the likelihood of not purchasing property insurance.
Table 6.6
Multivariate Results of Two-way Fixed-Effects Volume Decision Model 
with Heckman’s Sample Selection Correction 
(panel data - 593 company/year observations)
This table presents the regression results of the volume model and associated diagnostics. 
Panel A: Estimation Results
I
Predicted Signs 
(+/-)
Coefficient
Estimate Standard Errors t-stat p-value
|MAN + 0.172 0.041 4.188 0.000*"
I STATE _ 0.039 0.050 0.784 0.216
LEV + 0.043 0.048 0.890 0.187
GROW + 0.081 0.032 2.553 0.005***
SIZE _ -0.304 0.058 -5.226 0.000***
ILEVMAN + -0.047 0.035 -1.351 0.088*
SIZEMAN . -0.056 0.030 -1.778 0.037**
LEVGROW +/- -0.028 0.022 -1.294 0.196
SYS + 0.029 0.015 1.933 0.027**
\uNSYS + -0.026 0.013 -2.035 0.021 **
\f o w n + 0.508 0.225 2.260 0.012**
7AXZ.OSS + 0.024 0.026 0.936 0.174
TAXRATE - 0.023 0.024 0.960 0.168
SUBSIDY - -0.002 0.021 -0.073 0.470
LIQUID _ 0.001 0.035 0.033 0.486
X +/- -0.073 0.102 -0.715 0.474
y e a r 97 +/- -0.021 0.009 -2.439 0.015**
YEARss +/- -0.002 0.007 -0.333 0.739
Panel B: Diagnostics
Testing parameters are jointly zero: F23i,36i = 17.95, p-value=0.000*~ (one-tailed) Adjusted R2= 0.87
Wald test for a pooled OLS model versus a fixed-effects model, F212,364= 16.76, is significant at 0.01 level (one­
tailed), suggesting a heterogeneous fixed-effects model is superior to the pooled OLS model.
A LM test for a pooled OLS model versus a random-effects model, x2(2) = 350.67, is significant at 0.01 level (one­
tailed), supporting that a heterogeneous random-effects model is superior to the pooled OLS model.
A Hausman test for a random-effects model versus a fixed-effects model, x2(16) = 34.02, is significant at 0.01 
level (one-tailed), indicating that the unobservable firm-specific effects are correlated with the explanatory 
variables. Thus a fixed-effects model is better than a random-effects model.
White test of heteroscedasticity: x p m ) ~ 392>298 (critical value at 0.01 level, one-tailed), suggesting the 
presence of heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term. Consequently, the standard errors reported are computed 
using White’s correction for heteroscedasticity.
Test for normality of residuals: Jarque-Bera test: x22) = 51.00, p-value = 0.000, indicating that normality is 
rejected.
Ramsey’s RESET test for functional misspecification error for the volume decision model (order 3): F2l36o = 1.040, 
p-value = 0.356, indicating that no misspecification error cannot be rejected.
Source: Research Data
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Notes:
1. The two-way fixed-effects model estimated in this study is:
INS,, = a 0+ a  ,+  r , +  piMANit + fcSTATE,, + foLEV,, + P4GROWit + p 5SIZEit + fcLEVMANn +
fhSIZEMANu + feLEVGROWi, + foSYS,,* h 0UNSYS,t + PuFOWNit+ Pn TAXLOSSit+ $n TAXRATEu+ 
PuSUBSIDYit+ ^LIQUID,, + p16/L„ + <*>,
Where, a , is time-invariant firm-specific effect dummies to capture the unobservable differences 
among companies; Y, is firm-invariant period-specific effect dummies to capture any time-related 
changes; Xu is the inverse Mill’s ratio generated by the first-stage probit decision model to control for 
the possible sample selection bias in the volume decision model where only companies purchasing 
insurance are selected; is an error term that is assumed to have a zero mean and constant variance; it 
are the company/year observations over 1997-99. Other variables are defined in Table 5.2.
2. *** Statistically significant at the 0.01 ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 * Statistically
significant at the 0.10. Where the predicted sign of a variable is uni-directional, one-tailed p-value is 
calculated; otherwise two-tailed p-value is reported.
3. Standard errors reported in the table are heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors computed 
using White’s correction for heteroscedaticity.
4. This high value o f the adjusted R2 is attributable to the inclusion o f group-effects dummies. 
Dropping these dummies reduces the adjusted R2 to roughly 020.
First, White’s test is conducted to test for the presence of heteroscedasticity in 
equation 5.4. The computed %2 value (d.f. = 244) is statistically significant (p<0.01, 
one-tailed), indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity in the volume decision model. 
Thus, the two-way fixed-effects model is re-estimated and reported using White’s 
(1980) heteroscedasticity corrected covariance matrix in order to derive consistent 
parameter estimates.
Consistent with what was hypothesized (Hlb), the coefficient for MAN is 
found to be positive and statistically significant in the volume model (p<0.01, one­
tailed). This finding suggests that managers with relatively high levels of (insider) 
share ownership are more likely to be engaged in hedging company asset risks via the 
use of property insurance than their counterparts with relatively low levels of insider 
ownership. This observation is also consistent with Smith and Stulz (1985)’s 
managerial risk-aversion hypothesis, but inconsistent with the managerial incentive- 
alignment hypothesis reported in Chen et al. (2001). Moreover, it is worth noting that, 
however, this result is contrary to the evidence documented in some prior US-based 
studies (e.g., Hoyt and Khang, 2000). This is not necessarily surprising because with 
the generally low levels of insider ownership in publicly listed Chinese companies 
(Sun et al., 2002), managerial interests may not be effectively aligned with those of 
shareholders. This is because relative to their Western counterparts, Chinese managers 
tend to have less diversified personal wealth outside firms (Sun et al., 2002). They are
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therefore likely to be more risk averse when their economic interests are heavily 
vested in firms compared with managers in Western companies. As a result, Chinese 
managers are likely to purchase property insurance to reduce potential asset losses and 
decrease the risk of financial distress (thereby enhancing their future job security).
The negative and statistically significant (p<0.10, one-tailed) interaction term 
between MAN and LEV indicates that the relation between MAN and the volume of 
property insurance purchased appears to decrease os LEV increases. This finding 
suggests that even if a company manager has decided to purchase property insurance 
(e.g., because he/she is risk averse), the decision regarding the amount of property 
insurance purchased can be affected by other factors (e.g., the severe cash flow 
constraints facing by highly levered companies) (Haushalter, 2000). As a result, it is 
plausible for managers in highly levered companies (despite any possible insider 
shareholdings) to curtail operating expenses (including insurance) in order to meet 
their obligations under debt contracts. As such, the negative coefficient for interaction 
between MAN and LEV does not necessarily run contrary to the managerial risk- 
aversion hypothesis. Consistent with Hoyt and Khang (2000), S1ZEMAN is found to 
be negative and statistically significant (p<0.05, one-tailed). This implies that the 
relation between managerial ownership and the volume of property insurance 
purchased appears to decline as companies grow in size. This observation provides 
some support for the notion that managers in small companies are likely to face 
greater business risks because it is more difficult for them to diversify their human 
capital compared with their counterparts in large companies. This result is thus 
interpreted to be consistent with the managerial risk-aversion hypothesis.
Contrary to hypothesis H3b, the coefficient for LEV is not statistically 
significant in the volume decision model. This implies that though major creditors 
(e.g., commercial banks) may require collaterized assets to be insured, the level of 
property insurance coverage does not appear to give them adequate ex-ante protection 
against ex-post asset losses. Therefore, it is plausible that in China neither creditors 
nor company managers are able to use property insurance to mitigate effectively 
agency problems (e.g., underinvestment and asset substitution problems) between 
debtholders and shareholders/managers. This could reflect that company managers
120
and/or those banks providing commercial loans may be under-estimating the 
probability/magnitude of potential asset losses (e.g., because of a lack of information 
and/or inadequate expertise in risk assessment). Indeed, Leung and Young (2002) 
report that Chinese banks are only recently starting to introduce sound risk 
assessment/management procedures on credit exposures. Additionally, the observed 
insignificance of LEV could be due to the possibility that managers in companies with 
high default risk may seek to reduce expenditure on insurance in order to generate 
sufficient cash flow to pay debt obligations (Whited, 1992; Haushalter, 2000). 
Browne and Hoyt (2000) further report that the “charity hazard” phenomenon could 
explain why insureds do not fully insure against fortuitous losses given that financial 
support can be obtained from other sources (e.g., the government). Indeed, given the 
substantial presence of State ownership in the current sample of Chinese firms and the 
key economic role played by publicly listed companies in national/local economy, 
“charity hazard” effects are possible. The negative relations between STATE, 
SUBSIDY and the likelihood of purchasing property insurance seem to be consistent 
with this explanation (e.g., see Table 6.5). However, I did not find statistically 
significant evidence on this substitutive effect.
Consistent with hypothesis (H4b), GROW is found to be positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.01, one-tailed). This result suggests that companies with 
high growth opportunities appear to use more property insurance in order to mitigate 
severe agency problems arising from high growth opportunities between debtholders, 
shareholder and managers.
It is interesting to note that SIZE, which appears to have a positive influence 
on the insurance participation decision, is now negative and statistically significant as 
expected (p<0.01, one-tailed). This finding is consistent with the findings o f prior 
studies (e.g., Hoyt and Khang, 2000), thus suggesting that small Chinese companies 
appear to purchase relatively greater amounts of property insurance coverage than 
their large counterparts given their potentially greater susceptibility to business risks. 
In contrast, large Chinese companies could be realizing economies by selectively 
retaining some (e.g., high frequency/low magnitude) risks and insuring other (e.g., 
low frequency/high magnitude) risks via the commercial insurance market.
Of the control variables used in this study, SYS is now positive and significant 
(p<0.05, one-tailed). This indicates that Chinese companies facing greater systematic 
risk -  for example, from flood, earthquake and other environmental catastrophe risks 
-  appear to buy more property insurance than companies with low systematic risk. 
Therefore, Chinese managers could perceive that increasing property insurance 
coverage is a cost-effective solution to potentially severe market risk exposure (such 
as a severe flood in the environmentally high-risk Yangtze River basin). Also 
consistent with what was expected, FOWN is positive and statistically significant 
(p<0.05, one-tailed). This implies that companies with a (relatively) greater degree of 
foreign ownership tend to purchase more property insurance than domestically owned 
companies. This could reflect differences in the risk/return preferences of foreign 
shareholders and domestic investors. However, UNSYS is unexpectedly negative and 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed). This implies that managers in 
many Chinese companies might be under-insuring unsystematic (asset-loss) risks (e.g., 
fire damage) through risk retention strategies rather than using (potentially costly) 
commercial property insurance solutions. Indeed, Browne and Hoyt (2000) recognize 
that managerial perceptions of risk and insurance (and even the severity of past loss) 
could have an important impact on the demand for flood insurance in the US. 
Similarly, in emerging economies such as China, problems associated with company 
managers’ (accurately) assessing risk exposure and recognizing the post-loss 
financing capabilities of property insurance could be exacerbated by generally low 
entrepreneurial ability/and risk management expertise.
Different from what was hypothesized (H2b), State ownership was not found 
to have statistically significant influences on the volume decision of property 
insurance usage. Therefore, I find no support for the possible substitutive linkage 
between the level of State ownership and the use of property insurance. The taxation 
variables and hedging substitutes were also found not to be significant determinants of 
the amount of property insurance purchased by Chinese publicly listed companies. 
Finally, the negative and statistically significant YEAR97 (p<0.05, two-tailed) could 
refbct economic difficulties experienced by Chinese companies at the time of the
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Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the resultant decline in the amount of property 
insurance purchased.
6.5 SENSITIVITY TESTS AND FURTHER DIAGNOSTICS
This section of the thesis examines the efficiency of the property insurance 
participation and volume decision models to various sensitivity tests and a battery of 
diagnostics checks.
6.5.1 Sensitivity Tests
First, I examine the sensitivity of SIZE by replacing the book value o f total 
assets with annual sales income; the results are similar and so they are reported 
separately.
Next I test for the possibility that the extent of property insurance usage in the 
current sample of Chinese companies could be affected by their cash flow situation. I 
partition the sample of insuring companies into two groups -  those with and without 
cash flow constraints. A company is defined as having constrained cash flow if it is 
above the 75 percentile of the sample leverage (i.e., 1.40) and concomitantly below 
the 25 percentile of internal cash balance (i.e., 0.16). A company’s internal cash 
balance is measured by the amount of year-end cash and cash equivalents (e.g., short­
term bank deposits) scaled by total assets. I then conduct both a Student’s t-test and a 
Mann-Whitney U-test to compare the level of INS between the above two groups. In 
both tests, the computed t- and z- statistics are negatively significant at the 0.01 level 
(one-tailed), thus implying that Chinese companies with cash flow constraints tend to 
purchase property insurance to a lesser extent than companies without cash flow 
constraints. This finding thus lends some support for the notion that while feeing 
severe cash-flow constraints, managers might cut back business expenditure 
(including insurance premiums) in order to meet obligations under debt contracts 
(Haushalter, 2000). It could also help to explain the observed non-proportionate 
relation between leverage and the amount of property insurance usage in the Chinese 
corporate sector.
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6.5.2 Diagnostics
In addition to the diagnostics reported in Tables 6.5 and 6.6, some other 
diagnostic checks are also performed.
The use of property insurance as a risk management mechanism may change 
simultaneously a company’s risk-profile -  that is, there might be a two-way causal 
linkage between INS and SYS, UNSYS and LEV. If this is the case, then the derived 
regression estimates reported in section 6.4 could be biased and inconsistent. 
Therefore, as suggested in Maddala (1992, p.395), I perform an omitted-variable 
version of the Hausman specification test to investigate the endogeneity of the three 
corporate risk measures (i.e., SYS, UNSYS and LEV) used in the analysis. First, I 
introduce three instrument variables - MARSD (the annual standard deviation of 
market return), PHY (the proportion of physical assets in total assets) and INTCOV 
(interest cover - the ratio of annual interest expenses incurred to earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT)) - as correlated variables for the systematic, unsystematic and 
insolvency risks (i.e., measured by LEV), respectively. However, these instrument 
variables are not directly influenced by property insurance usage . Second, I replace 
these three risk measures with their instruments in the probit model to re-generate the 
inverse Mill’s ratio for the use in the volume decision model. Third, I regress the three 
risk measures on all the exogenous variables (i.e., MARSD, PHY, INTCOV, the 
inverse Mill’s ratio, fixed-effects and all other variables previously included in the 
model) to derive fitted values as their refined instruments. Fourth, the volume 
decision model is re-estimated by regressing INS on the three corporate risks 
measures, their refined instrument variables and all other variables. A F-test, with the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients of three instrument variables are jointly zero, is 
then conducted. The computed F-statistic (¥3,359 = 1.427) is insignificant at the 0.10 
level (one-tailed). Therefore, no evidence is found to reject the null hypothesis that
68 MARSTD is the benchmark for computing company betas; PHY could proxy for a firm’s 
unsystematic risk related to potential physical asset losses; INTCOV could proxy for a firm’s 
insolvency risk. Both MARSTD and PHY are exogenous relative to corporate property insurance usage. 
While property insurance may (potentially) increase debt and thereby increasing interest expenses, the 
presence o f insurance may also lead creditors to lower the rate o f  interest charged. Additionally, 
INTCOV is also affected by EBIT. Therefore, the relation between INTCOV and insurance usage is 
unwarranted and so I feel that it is reasonable to assume that INTCOV is contemporaneously 
uncorrelated with the error term.
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SYS, UNSYS and LEV are contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term. In 
other words, simultaneous-equation (endogeneity) bias is unlikely to be a serious 
problem in this study.
Second, the normality of residuals for the volume decision model is tested 
using-the Jarque-Bera (J-B) statistic and the null hypothesis of normally distributed 
errors is rejected (x2 = 51.0, p<0.01, d.f.=2) (see Table 6.6). Visual inspection of the 
distribution of residuals suggests that the main problem is kurtosis (peakedness) rather 
than skewness. Non-normality (kurtosis) thus remains as unavoidable limitation with 
the research design employed.
As recommended by Kennedy (1998, p.98), I further perform a Ramsey’s 
regression specification error test (RESET) to examine whether the multivariate 
modeling procedure suffers from functional misspecification error and/or omitted 
variable bias. I regress the residuals from the volume decision model on the 
independent variables and the square/cubic of the fitted dependent variable. The null 
hypothesis of no omitted variables cannot be rejected at the 0.10 level or less (F2,36o = 
1.04, one-tailed). Kennedy (1998) further reports that the RESET test is useful for 
detecting non-linearity in the data. The lack of significance of the RESET statistic, 
however, suggests that the linear specification adopted in this study is appropriate.
6.6 LINKAGE BETWEEN THE VOLUME DECISION AND NON­
METRIC CONTROL VARIABLES
I also perform a series of two-sample parametric/non-parametric tests to 
determine the empirical linkage between the extent to which companies use property 
insurance and the time-invariant control variables (GEOG and IN DU) that are not 
included in the fixed-effects volume decision model.
First, a Student’s t-test (one-tailed) is performed to compare the means of INS 
among companies grouped by GEOG (see Table 6.7). Consistent with the results 
shown in Table 6.3, it is found that managers of companies located in China’s Eastern 
coastal regions appear to purchase less amount of property insurance than their
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counterparts of companies incorporated in inland regions (p<0.05, one-tailed). 
However, to avoid the undue influence of possible extreme values on test results, a 
non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test is also conducted to compare the medians of the 
volume of property insurance spending (INS) across sub-groups that are classified by 
GEOG. The results are consistent with the t-test results (p<0.01, one-tailed) (see Table 
6.7). Again, this suggests that managers in economically less developed inland-based 
Chinese companies may be less aware of risk management alternatives to insurance 
(e.g., financial derivatives) than their counterparts in more developed coastal locations 
such as Beijing and Shanghai.
Table 6.7
Inter-Group Comparison of Volume of Property Insurance Use (INS) 
(pooled data -  593 company/year observations)
This table gives the results of inter-group comparison of the volume of property 
insurance use for non-metric GEOG and INDU.
Panel A: Volume of Property Insurance Use (INS) Across Subgroups
VARIABLES Cases Mean % Std. Dev. I
GEOG 0 227 0.342 0.004
1 366 0.262 0.005
INDU 1 97 0.207 0.003
2 26 0.067 0.001
3 33 0.436 0.007
4 60 0.178 0.004
5 3 77 0.326 0.005
Panel B: Independent Sample t-tests of Mean Difference and Mann-Whitney U- 
tests of Median Difference Between Subgroups_____________________________
VARIABLE
PAIRS
t-test Mann-WhitneyUTest
Mean
Difference%
Std. Dev. 
Difference t-ratio p-value z-statistic
GEOG 0-1 0.079 0.0004 2.069 0.020** 5.155***
INDU 1-2 0.139 0.0003 4.313 0.000*** 4.417***
1-3 -0.229 0.0012 -1.924 0.031** -1.848**
1-4 0.029 0.0005 0.580 0.281 1.933
1-6 -0.119 0.0004 -3.162 0.001*** -2.342***
2-3 -0.369 0.0012 -3.166 0.001*** -4.260***
2-4 -0.111 0.0005 -2.220 0.015** -2.727***
2-5 -0.258 0.0003 -9.204 0.000*** -5.156***
3-4 0.258 0.0010 2.580 0.006*** 2.658***
3-5 0.110 0.0010 0.935 0.178 0.701
4-5 -0.148 0.0005 -2.960 0.002*** -3.535***
Source: Research Data
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Notes:
1. GEOG = geographical location -  dummy variable taking 1 for coastal zones and 0 for inland zones; 
INDU  = industry category variable, service = 1; real estate = 2; utilities = 3, conglomerate = 4; 
manufacturing = 5.
2. *** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed)
** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed)
Additionally, a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance is conducted to 
compare the difference between the median of INS across different industries. The test 
is significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed with four d.f.), suggesting that the level of 
property insurance spending varies across industrial sectors. Student’s t-tests are then 
carried out to compare the mean of amount of insurance purchases between paired 
industry groupings. Additionally, non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-tests between 
each paired industries are performed as a robust check. As Table 6.7 shows clearly, 
the results from the t-tests and Mann-Whitney U-tests are generally consistent except 
for the retail-conglomerate pair. Specifically, it is found that as expected, Chinese 
manufacturing and utilities companies are likely to insure their assets to a greater 
extent than other companies. The finding concerning regulated utilities is consistent 
with that reported in Yamori (1999), but inconsistent with Hoyt and Khang (2000). In 
contrast, real estate companies appear to purchase less property insurance than other 
companies probably because their major assets in China are (statutorily) non-insurable 
land. Also, conglomerate companies are more likely to diversify their business risks 
through multi-line strategy and hence, they appear to purchase less property insurance 
than manufacturing, regulated utilities and retail firms. However, no statistically 
significant differences in property insurance purchases among manufacturing and 
utilities companies are detected from the data.
6.7 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
This chapter tests the five major hypotheses and several control variables that 
are formulated in Chapter 4 using a panel dataset from 235 publicly listed Chinese 
companies for the period 1997-99. The empirical results obtained from the statistical 
procedures as described in Chapter 6 are reported and discussed in this chapter.
Consistent with what was hypothesized, I find that managerial propensity to 
purchase property insurance by Chinese publicly listed companies is positively related
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I to leverage and company size. Additionally, managerial ownership and leverage are
|
found to interact each other to influence the likelihood of purchasing property 
insurance by publicly listed Chinese companies. Specifically, given a certain level of 
managerial ownership, managerial propensity to purchase property appears to increase 
with the level of leverage. As discussed previously in section 4.2, managerial 
ownership and leverage could influence corporate decisions to purchase property 
insurance because they are related to owner-manager and shareholder-debtholder 
incentive conflicts. Therefore, the above findings provide some support for agency 
theory based motivations for the corporate purchase of insurance. However, mixed 
evidence is found regarding the effect of (convex) taxation schedule on the corporate 
purchase of property insurance. For example, the presence of tax credits (manifest in 
low effective taxation rates) appears to motivate Chinese managers to purchase 
property insurance in order to decrease the volatility of future annual earnings and 
thereby reduce the expected present value of taxation. However, another type of 
convexity in corporate taxation arising from the existence of operating loss carry-
i
forwards is not found to have positive influence on managerial propensity to use
I property insurance. It is plausible that such tax convexity is not recognized as being 
financially important by Chinese managers. Rather, the existence of operating loss 
carry-forwards could be interpreted as a binding financial condition, thereby forcing 
Chinese managers to curtail business expenses (including property insurance 
spending). It is also found that the decision of Chinese managers to insure appears to 
vary from industry to industry and geographical location. Real estate and 
conglomerate firms are found to be less likely to purchase property insurance than 
other entities. Companies incorporated in economically less developed inland regions 
appear to have greater propensity to purchase property insurance than their 
counterparts in more prosperous Eastern coastal regions. However, contrary to what 
was expected, growth options, risk profiles, the presence of State and foreign 
ownership and hedging substitutes do not appear to be important determinants of the 
property insurance participation decision in the Chinese corporate sector.
From the volume decision model, it is found that consistent with what was 
hypothesized, the volume of property insurance purchased is positively related to the 
level of managerial ownership, growth opportunities, systematic risk and the level of 
foreign ownership, but inversely linked to company size and unsystematic risk.
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Additionally, as expected, given certain level of managerial ownership, the volume of 
property insurance purchased appears to decline as a company grows in size and 
increases in leverage. These findings again provide support for the hypotheses that 
agency theory-based factors (e.g., growth options and managerial ownership) are 
important determinants of the volume decision of property insurance in the Chinese 
corporate sector. However, the inverse and/or insignificant relations found between 
unsystematic risk, leverage and the volume of property insurance use suggest that 
many Chinese managers might be under-insuring their asset-loss risks. One reason for 
this observation might be the existence of severe cash flow constraints in many 
Chinese companies. It is also plausible that managers and/or other contracting parties 
(notably commercial banks) are underestimating the probability/magnitude of 
potential asset losses. This may be due to a lack of expertise and/or unsophisticated 
underwriting procedures in Chinese banks. Otherwise, State ownership and taxation 
do not appear to be important determinants of the amount of property insurance 
purchased. The main conclusions, implications of this study and prospects for future 
research are evaluated in the next and final chapter of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1 INTROUDUCTION
This final chapter summarizes the research project and presents the main 
conclusions arising from the study. Additionally, the contribution to knowledge made 
by this project is assessed and its limitations are highlighted. Prospective areas for 
further research are also considered.
7.2 OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT
Prior studies (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1982; Main, 1983) identify differences 
in the motivations between the individual and corporate purchase of insurance. Such 
studies concluded that risk aversion by owners cannot by itself satisfactorily explain 
the insurance purchases by large and widely-held companies. The reasoning is that in 
frictionless (efficient) capital markets, it is more cost-effective for shareholders to 
diversify (firm-specific) unsystematic risks by holding a balanced portfolio of 
investment rather than for the company in which they invest to purchase insurance. 
Therefore, the purchase of commercial insurance by large and widely-held companies 
does not seem, at first sight, to be warranted. To resolve this apparent puzzle, 
researchers have used financial economics-based theories (e.g., agency theory) to 
identify other factors that might help to explain managerial insurance decisions in 
large and widely-held companies. However, empirical evidence supporting these 
theoretical predictions is hitherto limited, particularly in emerging economies. 
Motivated by the dearth of empirical evidence on the corporate purchase of property 
insurance in China - a major emerging economy - this research project thus attempts 
to isolate those determinants that could both influence: (a) managerial decisions to 
purchase property insurance and (b) the extent to which property insurance is used by 
Chinese publicly listed companies (see Chapter 1, section 1.2).
In the newly partially privatized Chinese corporate sector, share ownership is 
reported to be heavily concentrated in the State and a few institutional investors 
compared with the ownership structure of companies in many Western countries such
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as the US and UK (e.g., see Xu and Wang, 1999). Additionally, shares held by the 
State and Chinese institutional investors are currently not publicly tradable. As a 
consequence, in China investors’ portfolios are likely to possess a high degree of 
systematic and unsystematic risks. The generally less developed financial markets in 
China (e.g., with regard to the absence of sophisticated derivatives markets) also leave 
indigenous managers with fewer risk management options compared with those 
available to their counterparts in developed countries (e.g., the US). Therefore, 
ostensibly, insurance could be relatively more important to the risk management of 
Chinese corporations than to companies operating from more developed countries. 
Indeed, this view is supported by the high proportion (about 85 percent) of companies 
purchasing property insurance in the data set used in this study. The Chinese 
corporate insurance market is also tightly regulated by the CIRC. Among other things, 
the CIRC imposes a set of nationally universal benchmark premium rates and risk- 
rating rules. This implies that variations in the annual premiums incurred by PRC- 
based publicly listed companies are more likely to reflect the degree of managerial 
discretion over insurance purchases rather than sharp movements in external market 
prices and insurers’ underwriting practices. This institutional feature also means that 
the insurance decisions of Chinese managers are likely to be mainly influenced by 
firm-specific structures and economic incentives rather than by external factors such 
as regulation. It is considered that this is an important institutional advantage for this 
project as it enables more robust tests of the agency theory-based hypotheses to be 
performed (see Chapter 2, section 2.5).
Chapter 3 of this thesis reviews critically the positive-descriptive-type theories 
and hypotheses in the financial economics literature that could be utilized to address 
the stated aim of the study. From the literature review, agency theory is identified as 
the most appropriate and viable framework to direct the empirical part of this project 
(see Chapter 3, section 3.3). Drawing a framework from agency theory, this study 
therefore puts forward five key hypotheses in Chapter 4 (section 4.2) regarding the 
determinants of propensity and the financial extent of property insurance use by 
Chinese publicly listed companies. These hypotheses include managerial share 
ownership, State shareholdings, leverage, investment opportunity set and company 
size. Also, several other factors (e.g., three interaction effect terms and corporate risk- 
profile) that have potential influence on the corporate use of property insurance are
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also controlled for in this study. The motivation for these control variables is also 
outlined in Chapter 4 (sections 4.3-4.4).
In view of the data access constraints that preclude the application and use of 
supplementary field-based techniques (e.g., mail survey questionnaires or personal 
interviews) in China, statistical analysis is employed to test empirically the five main- 
hypotheses derived from agency theory. Statistical tests are considered to have the 
advantages of being scientifically rigorous and generalizable. The research design is 
covered in Chapter 5 (sections 5.3-5.5) of this thesis. The results subsequently derived 
from the statistical testing of data obtained from the 1997-99 panel data o f 235 
Chinese publicly listed companies are presented in Chapter 6 (sections 6.2-6.6). 
Overall, the analysis of the empirical evidence reported in this thesis suggests that 
agency theory is an intuitively useful framework for explaining the corporate 
purchase of property insurance in the Chinese corporate sector.
7.3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Three main conclusions arise from the analysis of the empirical results 
obtained in this study. These conclusions and their implications are as follows.
First, agency theory-based incentives appear to be important determinants of 
the corporate purchase of property insurance in China. Specifically, this study finds 
that, consistent with what was hypothesized, the likelihood of Chinese publicly listed 
companies using property insurance is positively related to leverage. This could 
reflect creditors’ “me-first” rules that require collateralized assets to be insured in 
order to give lenders ex-ante protection against potential losses ex-post. Additionally, 
this study finds that, as expected, the extent of property insurance usage is positively 
related to the level of managerial share ownership and a firm’s investment opportunity 
set. These findings suggest that in addition to debtholders’ “me-first” rules, managers’ 
risk aversion (e.g., arising from their concerns over job security and ill-diversified 
personal wealth) appears to be another important factor that determines the amount of 
property insurance taken out by Chinese companies. The observed positive linkage 
between a firm’s growth options and the level of property insurance usage could also
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reflect the intention of debtholders, managers and/or shareholders to use hedging 
mechanisms (e.g., the purchase of property insurance) in order to mitigate acute 
information asymmetries and associated agency problems in companies with high 
growth options. Again, this possibility is consistent with the agency theory framework.
Moreover, this study finds that some of the agency theory-based determinants 
could interact with each other to exert a joint influence on the corporate purchase of 
property insurance. For example, the (positive) impact of managerial ownership on 
the likelihood of purchasing property insurance is found to increase with the level of 
leverage. This suggests that managers owning a certain level of equity could have 
greater incentives to use property insurance in order to reduce the risk of financial 
distress associated with the increasing use of risky debt. I also find that after 
controlling for levels of managerial ownership, small companies appear to use a 
proportionately greater amount of property insurance than their large counterparts. 
One plausible reason for this is that managers of small firms often find it more 
difficult to diversify their personal risk (e.g., job security) than their counterparts in 
large firms. All these findings are considered to be consistent with agency theory. 
Overall, therefore, I conclude that agency theory has intuitive appeal as a framework 
for this study.
Second, I find that other firm-specific characteristics could also influence the 
property insurance decisions of managers of Chinese publicly listed companies. For 
example, the likelihood and extent of property insurance usage appears to vary from 
industry to industry and geographical location. Specifically, real estate and 
conglomerate firms are less likely to use property insurance to manage their asset loss 
risk than firms in other industries. Moreover, if real estate and conglomerate firms do 
participate into property insurance usage, they tend to use less amounts of property 
insurance than other firms. In contrast, regulated utilities and manufacturing firms are 
likely to purchase more property insurance than other firms (relative to the size of 
their asset-base). Disparity in the level of economic development among different 
geographical regions also appears to have an impact on corporate insurance decisions. 
In particular, I find that companies incorporated in economically less developed 
inland regions appear to have greater propensity to purchase more property insurance 
than their counterparts in more prosperous Eastern coastal regions. Other non-agency-
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theory based factors - for example, corporate taxation rate -  could also influence
i
| managerial hedging decisions in the Chinese corporate sector. In this study, a low 
taxation rate normally denotes the existence of tax credits. Therefore, the observed 
statistically significant and negative linkage between managerial propensity to use 
property insurance and taxation rate indicates that property insurance could be used to 
maximize the present value of tax shields, thereby increasing firm value.
The third main conclusion is that evidence regarding some of the explanatory 
variables derived from the insurance participation and volume decision models are, 
however, inconsistent. For instance, leverage plays a positive role in the insurance 
participation decision, but it is found not to have a statistically significant influence on 
the amount of property insurance purchased. Additionally, given a certain level of 
insider shareholding, the managerial propensity to purchase property insurance is 
likely to increase with the level of leverage; however, the amount of property 
insurance usage is found to decrease with leverage. I also find an inverse relation 
between the level of unsystematic risk and the volume of property insurance usage, 
which is contrary to what was predicted. I consider that low free cash flows and 
financial constraints (which are reported to be particularly pronounced in highly 
levered companies in emerging economies), could (at least partially) help to explain 
the above inconsistencies (see Chapter 6, section 6.5). In other words, the property 
insurance volume decision in many (highly levered) Chinese companies could be 
constrained by internal cash flows and bounded by covenants contained in debt 
contracts. Not surprisingly, therefore, many Chinese managers could be under- 
insuring their asset-based risks. Another plausible reason is that company managers 
and/or those banks providing commercial loans may be under-estimating the 
possibility/magnitude of potential assets losses (e.g., because of a lack of information 
and/or inadequate expertise in risk assessment).
7.4 CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT
This research project has provided insights into the determinants of 
discretionary purchase of property insurance by publicly listed companies in the PRC. 
In the light of the hypotheses development, methodology employed and the empirical
134
evidence obtained, seven major contributions of this research project classified under 
two broad headings - regulatory/policy-making and empirical/methodological -  are 
considered to arise from this project. These are outlined as follows.
7.4.1 Regulatory/Policy-making
I consider that the findings of this study have four major implications for 
various groups that have an interest in regulation/policymaking in the Chinese 
corporate sector (and emerging insurance markets generally).
First, combining the findings regarding leverage from the participation and 
volume decision models, it appears that in China, lenders of fixed claims debt are 
requiring company managers to procure property insurance as coverage for 
collateralized assets as a condition for issuing loans. However, the result of this study 
suggests that the level of such creditor-induced ex-ante insurance coverage may not 
be sufficient to fully compensate creditors for fortuitous losses ex-post. Therefore, 
creditors (like banks) may have to monitor more closely the risks and risk 
management practices of Chinese companies. This is also likely to be an issue of 
relevance for industry regulators.
Second, it is reported in the literature that the primary intention of introducing 
insider share ownership in the Chinese corporate sector is to motivate company 
managers to act in the interests of shareholders (Xu and Wang, 1999). However, the 
results of this study suggest that corporate risk hedging in China could reflect 
managers’ risk aversion (e.g., with regard to their concern over economic interest and 
job security) rather than the maximization of shareholders’ wealth. Indeed, this is 
particularly germane given that recent empirical evidence from the US suggests that 
corporate risk management initiatives often fail to deliver the expected welfare gains 
for shareholders, but rather provide economic advantages for managers (May, 1995). 
Therefore, shareholders and/or policymakers may need to evaluate existing 
managerial incentive schemes in Chinese publicly listed companies to ensure that the 
economic interests of managers and shareholders are more closely aligned.
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! Third, the findings of this study could also have important commercial
j
| implications for Chinese managers. For example, my results suggest that Chinese 
company managers may not appreciate fully the (direct and indirect) costs of financial 
distress arising from increased leverage and the role that insurance can play in 
alleviating such costs. Also, it is plausible that many Chinese managers may fail to 
realize that in addition to tax credits, the presence of substantial amount of tax-loss 
carry-forwards is an important tax shield whose present value can be maximized by 
hedging (e.g., through property insurance). Therefore, this observation underpins the 
need for further financial (risk) management education and training in the Chinese 
corporate sector.
Fourth, the empirical relation that appears to exist - for example, between 
company size, industry sectors, geographical location, foreign ownership and the 
| corporate purchase of property insurance in China - could help insurance suppliers 
(including foreign insurers operating in the PRC) to better target potential insurance 
customers. For instance, insurers may wish to more closely reflect on the risk 
management needs of inland-based companies and small enterprises in their product 
innovation and marketing strategies. Additionally, foreign-invested enterprises may 
prospectively become important in stimulating demand for property insurance in the 
Chinese insurance market. This is particularly the case given that China’s entry into 
the WTO is likely to stimulate further growth in foreign direct investment in China 
(and hence increase the demand for corporate insurance) (Shen, 2000).
7.4.2 Empirical/Methodological
Additionally, I contend that this research project contributes three major 
empirical/methodological advances to the academic literature as follows.
First, this study is believed to be the first to use firm-level panel data to 
investigate empirically the linkage between the corporate purchase of property 
insurance and firm-specific characteristics motivated by agency theory. One salient 
advantage of using a panel data design is its ability to control for unobserved firm- 
specific effects (e.g., inter-company differences in risk management expertise) that
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cannot be controlled for in a single-period cross-sectional study. This enables more 
robust results to be derived.
| A second empirical/methodological advancement on previous (developed
| economy-based) studies (e.g., Yamori, 1999; Hoyt and Khang, 2000) is that I employ
a two-stage analytical approach and demonstrate that determinants of insurance 
participation and volume decisions can be different. For instance, the insurance 
volume decisions of managers can be affected by other factors (e.g., firms’ cash flow 
constraints), which have not been identified or stressed in previous studies. This 
approach helps to generate more informative insights into the corporate insurance 
decisions of managers. Moreover, compared with previous studies (e.g., Hoyt and 
Khang, 2000), this research project directly controls for the influence of firms’
I systematic and unsystematic risk-profiles and industry factors on managerial 
insurance decisions.
I
Third, it is believed that this is the first empirical study of its kind conducted 
| in a major emerging economy - China. Therefore, insights into the linkages between
discretionary corporate purchase of property insurance and managerial ownership, 
leverage, growth options, size, risk-profile and so on, which have been gained from 
this study, could be usefully generalized to future studies conducted elsewhere. For 
example, the methodological approach and results of this study could also help to 
stimulate further academic research into the demand for insurance in other emerging 
economies (e.g., India and Vietnam).
7.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Like many other empirical studies, conclusions drawn from this study should, 
however, be tempered by the recognition of some limitations with the research design. 
Apart from the general constraints inherent in all research projects (e.g., with regard 
to data quality), the following three limitations specific to this research project 
deserve attention. First, given the nascent and volatile stock markets in China, market- 
based proxies used for many variables (e.g., corporate growth options) could be mis- 
measured (“noisy”), particularly given the short time series data used (1997-99) in
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this study. Second, though I take rank transformations of (metric) variables, the 
residuals from the volume decision model still suffer from the non-normality problem 
(due to kurtosis). Therefore, for this reason, some caution in interpreting the results is 
advised. Third, as Brown and Hoyt (2000) note, some behavior-related factors -  e.g., 
managers’ past experience of risk and their changing perceptions of potential losses -  
could also have impact on corporate insurance decisions69. However, these factors are 
difficult to model directly in the current analysis due to the absence of relevant data.
7.6 AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several prospective areas for fiiture research highlighted by the 
results of this study. First, further tests using longer time-series of panel data are 
needed, particularly on the role of the State ownership in corporate insurance 
decisions. Though I observed a negative influence of State ownership on the 
managerial propensity to participate into property insurance and similarly, an inverse 
linkage between the level of government subsidies and the propensity/volume of 
property insurance usage, this substitutive relation is statistically insignificant. As a 
result, it is not conclusive as to whether there is a State-induced “charity hazard” in 
the Chinese corporate sector. However, this issue is important because the existence 
of State-induced “charity hazard” effects could substitute for the use of commercial 
insurance and decrease the managerial need to hedge business risks (also see Chapter 
4, section 4.2.2). Second, future research should attempt to incorporate other 
potentially relevant variables into the analysis of corporate hedging decisions when 
appropriate data become available. Potentially interesting factors may include 
managers’ past risk experiences (or firms’ historical loss experiences), more accurate 
industry classification (e.g., a more refined breakdown of manufacturing firms), 
firms’ production diversification strategy as hedging substitutes (which requires 
segmental reporting data) and the risk management role of independent directors on 
the board. Research in such areas could yield interesting insights and contribute to 
improving our understanding of risk management practices in China and other
69 If these behavioural effects are time-invariant and permanent, they can be controlled for by 
incorporating firm-specific effect dummies in model. However, a fixed-effects model is not able to 
control for changing managerial perceptions o f potential losses based on past experiences o f risk.
potentially important emerging Asian markets such as India and/or former Soviet 
countries such as those in Eastern Europe.
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APPENDIX
Annual Premiums Paid by Chinese Publicly Listed Companies 1997-99 
Telephone-based Survey Instrument
Case N o:_____
A. Basic Details
Company:.................................................................................................................
Location: ............................  Phone: ................................ Email:........................
Name and Position of interviewee:..........................................................................
Date Contacted:...........................
B. Premium Data
1. Has your company ever purchased non-compulsory property insurance with a 
commercial insurer during the accounting periods 1997-99? (If your company has 
consolidated subsidiaries, their insurance purchases should be counted)
Year Yes No Refused Notes
1999
1998
1997
2. (a) What was the total amount of non-compulsory property insurance premiums 
accrued as expenses in the accounting year 1999? (If your company prepares 
consolidated financial statements, please give the consolidated figure)
(b) What was the equivalent figure in the 1998 and 1997 accounting years (If 
absolute premium figures are not easily accessible for 1998 and 1997, please give 
the approximate year-on-year percentage change)?
1999
(RMB)
1998 
(RMB or ±%)
1997 
(RMB or±%) Refused
Total property
Insurance
premium
Date carried out: July-September 2000 
Zou, Hong, University of Wales, Swansea, UK.
